

MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

EDITED BY

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Correction.—Dr. Wm. James, the writer of the first article in the present Number, wishes to withdraw the footnote standing first on p. 17.

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I.—LAURA BRIDGMAN.

IN 1837 a delicate light-haired girl, nearly eight years old, who at the age of 26 months had lost sight, hearing, and to a great extent the senses of smell and taste, from an attack of scarlet fever, was brought from her rural home in New Hampshire to the Perkins Institution for the Blind in Boston. During her long illness all recollection of her babyhood had been completely effaced. Her parents had communicated with her by the simplest signs addressed to her only sense of touch. A pat on the head expressed approval, on the back disapproval. She had been taught to sew, knit, braid, and assist in trifling ways about the work of a farmhouse. Dr. Howe began her instruction by pasting on common objects—chair, spoon, stove, &c.,—their names printed in raised letters. After she had associated the name and the object the labels were taken off, and she was taught to select the object for a corresponding name and *vice versa*. After a few days, when she had thus learned a small number of names and objects, Dr. Howe gave her a pin and a pen and made her feel his hands as he spelled from *disconnected* letters the two corresponding words. After repeating this process scores of times she suddenly seemed to understand that the signs were complex and must be observed separately, and at last she was able to select from a pile of letters those which spell 'pin' or 'pen' according as one or the other object was given her

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of daily life, and the other for serious discussion and hard reasoning, the former inaccurate but convenient, the latter inconvenient but as strictly correct as possible.

If for instance we were to use, for ordinary purposes, the terms 'voluntary,' 'experience,' 'disinterested,' &c., in the ordinary acceptation, but at the same time form a habit of remembering that in strictness 'disinterested' acts are 'unconsciously interested,' that the events which happen to an individual after birth constitute only his 'later experience,' that 'voluntary' acts are only 'practically free'; on the one hand, believers in determination of the will, necessary egoism, or the explanation of all knowledge by experience, would be themselves guarded from the errors—which ill-considered opposition often helps to drive them into—of fatalism, belief in universal conscious selfishness, or disbelief in *à priori* knowledge; and on the other hand their opponents would see, more clearly than at present, that these three latter theories are all that anyone is really concerned to deny.

ALFRED SIDGWICK.

VI.—THE PERSONAL ASPECT OF RESPONSIBILITY.

FEW things are more universally taken for granted than the high moral value of a belief in personal responsibility, and any one venturing to call in question not merely the scientific validity but the ethical excellence of any of the several assumptions grouped in such a belief, is likely to be vituperated without a hearing. Nor without reason; for when the moral title of a principle hitherto deemed fundamental is suddenly questioned, men's consciences experience a painful and possibly an injurious shock; and the indignation with which such questioning is met, or the reluctance with which it is tolerated, is due to a useful and perfectly justifiable instinct of moral self-preservation. People are wholesomely afraid of the consequences of being forced into impromptu defence of principles long regarded as so vital or so self-evident as to be independent of logical support; and nothing is more reprehensible than a wanton spirit of criticism which chooses to air its plausibility in the depreciation of beliefs closely concerning the higher emotions of those who hold them. The reformation of

moral principle is not effected suddenly or by force of argument, but is brought about slowly and silently, as it is needed, by the gradual working out of that social development which it appears to be its function to subserve. Any, therefore, holding an opinion distinctly opposed to a belief that passes muster with the public as necessary to the maintenance of practical rectitude, may well refrain from its premature expression as needlessly heretical: likely, in fact, to prove prejudicial to the popular acceptance of some greater truth on the admission of which it logically follows.

Nevertheless, occasions sometimes arise when the explicit repudiation, not of principles, but of current shibboleths which are mistaken for them, is clearly needed, in order to vindicate from inconsistency, or to rescue from misuse, some such greater truth which *is already* before the public, and which, when so vindicated, may itself operate powerfully as a reforming influence on a community recognising its bearings.

That such an occasion exists at present is indicated by the somewhat querulous discussions with which the air is rife, touching "mechanical" morality, and that discouragement of individual virtue which is supposed to follow on a belief in the modern theory of the natural evolution of society. It is certain that if ever the evolutionist's creed is to precipitate its principles in the practical form of a code, it can only be after a fair facing and resolution of the grave ethical difficulty which stands at its very threshold.

This is, of course, nothing less than the old difficulty about free-will and responsibility. To believe in a perfectly regular, not-to-be-suspended and not-to-be-hastened order in the phenomena of human development is to believe in the "necessary" character of every one of those benevolent impulses and beneficent actions which arise in the process of that development, and to which men have been accustomed to attach something of value over and above their mere social utility. When to the theory of social evolution we add the modern scientific views respecting the physical relations of consciousness, the logical resources of the belief in responsibility are further weakened, since such views undoubtedly tend to sweep aside as chimerical all ethical standards based on freedom of the will, reducing the loftiest and most far-reaching moral efforts to the irresistible reaction of a complex automatism or stimulus of which it had no share in the institution. In the temporary oscillation of the moral compass which ensues on the full perception of this aspect of scientific conclusions, it requires the strongest philosophic faith in the utility of truth to remain sure that whichever way the battle goes with reference to the

precious doctrine, the popular conscience will emerge from the conflict unscathed. Science must develop, and society must develop; and, at first sight, it appears that the only road along which they may peaceably progress together lies directly through the scientific justification of a belief in personal responsibility. Science, however, having already virtually discredited such a belief in her deliverances touching the genesis of morals, we find even philosophers, here and there, standing somewhat aghast in the presence of the considerations they have brought to light.

Does the salvation of conscience, then, depend at all on the precarious possibility of unravelling this gordian knot? Must an argument which should make short work of it by cutting it cut humanity at the same time adrift from its social and moral moorings, and expose it to wreck and ruin? I believe not. Nay, if truth demand the cutting of it, I am *sure* not; for truth ever remains the ultimate level upon which conscience and intelligence meet, and on reaching which each recognises in the other an invaluable ally. If the discovery of truth be intellectually excellent, none the less are its recognition and application morally so. Moreover, the welfare of society depends on no shifting sands of theory, but has its unseen anchorage in the profound depths of that irresistible impulse common to all organised existence, society included, to make for its own maintenance and further development. If the functional basis of morals be the perpetuation of this development through the development of social tendencies and sympathies in individuals, the security of morality may be at once inferred, even in the event of our having to give up the precious belief in our own *personal* deservings.

For such and little else is the belief in responsibility, if we strip it of all implications other than those which are threatened by science. Science has no word to say against the practical part of the doctrine. It is pure nonsense to assert that a man can only justly approve or disapprove his own or his neighbour's conduct, or must only allow such approval or disapproval to influence his further dealings, so long as he believes his own and his neighbour's conduct to be supported, each on a lever without a fulcrum—on a self-originating volition which might as well have been one thing as another. What possible connexion is there between the two propositions? Why should the appropriateness of moral approval, or of the practical linking of this approval with retributive dealing, be represented as dependent on whether or no the antecedent conditions of conduct had a beginning in consciousness? It is to me surprising that out of a doctrine which makes a point of extending the sure

foot-way of continuous causation into the field of mental phenomena, and which throws some explanatory light on the meaning of virtue and the conditions of progress, men should have extorted the strange corollaries that it is useless to try and be good, and unreasonable to dislike or resist what is bad. Is a watch that won't go the less a *bad* watch because it neither made itself nor wound itself up; or because its bad going is the *mere* result of bad spring and wheels? Shall we, on this account, disapprove it the less as a bad goer, and hesitate to take it to a watchmaker, to be put right if possible, and to be dishonoured and discarded as rubbish if incorrigible? Is a bad man the less a bad man—the less an unfit social influence—because he only follows his bad will, and did not originate it? Are we for such theoretical reasons passively to endure the results of his ill conduct, or to deem ourselves unjust for reprobating it and dealing with *him* in any way we believe fittest for reforming his will, or at least rendering it socially inoperative? Happily for society, men's morality does not depend on their lucidity of intelligence, and the occult process of reasoning which issues in such inconsequent conclusions, even if it could be demonstrated, could never be acted on.

The real moral lessons conveyed by a belief in determinism—in the connexion of every volition with certain antecedents uncontrolled by any previous volition of the agent, appear to be mainly these:—(1) In awarding our moral approval or disapproval we ought never to consider any one "by name," so to speak; but in every case our judgment (of ourselves as of others, of others as of ourselves) should be strictly proportioned to the social value of the principle evidenced in conduct, no admixture whatever of any personal favour or dislike being allowed to emphasise either our judgment or its expression. (2) Our rewards for virtue must be *real* encouragements, and our punishments of vice *real* deterrents, following the laws (so far as we know them) of volitional conditions, and not merely arbitrary symbols of our approval or disapproval, however just these latter may be. We are not to hate the man whose dominating tendency induced him to¹ "fix his attention" (*i.e.* to *will*) wrongly, but we may *disapprove* him, inasmuch as we are a part of the society he hurts. Further, seeing that certain conditions, hitherto absent, may induce a future beneficial modification of his will, we may, so far as we disbelieve in the power of that will to resist such conditions when really presented, rationally set about instituting them, in the shape of new fears,

¹ *Vide* a published lecture entitled "Is Man an Automaton," by Dr. W. B. Carpenter.

new deprivations, or new hopes and inducements. The morality and philosophy of the matter fit like hand and glove.

Nevertheless it is commonly assumed that the mere recognition that we are virtuous of necessity, when we are virtuous at all, is sufficient to remove that necessity and to render us vicious. It is only when we discover that the surplus value which rectitude is held to possess (beyond its social fitness) is the value it possesses for its follower *as differenced from the community* to which he and his conduct belong, that the reason of this apprehension dawns upon us. Nine times out of ten when a man speaks with unction of his responsibility, he is influenced, consciously or not, by a consideration less of his conduct than of his credit: less of the actual human worth of the deed or of the existing need for its performance than of its adventitious reflection on the baptismal name of the doer. This is no sneer. I think the phraseology of the subject bears me out. We hear of "shrinking from responsibility"—"disclaiming responsibility," and so forth, but not from great helpers, great saviours, or great reformers of their generation. These fix their gaze intently on the unrecognised truth which needs a preacher, no matter whom, or the stern duty which needs a performer, no matter whom, and fling themselves into the saying or doing of it with no thought of their *personal* responsibility.

It is scarcely sufficiently recognised in ethical discussion that the moral abstraction hidden away in the term Responsibility is in reality a compound of truth and fiction, and that (owing possibly to the long connexion of morals with theological beliefs) the fictitious element alone has been taken into account in the naming. Discriminating between the several and widely dissimilar ideas commonly present when personal responsibility is predicated of conduct, we find that the valuable element receives at the hands of the evolutionist not merely corroboration, but lucid interpretation. This valuable element is the recognition of the vast and permanent importance of all acts and forbearances: the dependence of weighty social consequences on the force and direction of human effort, and the appropriateness of a moral valuation of each man by himself, as by his fellows, strictly following the social quality of his deeds and tendencies. On the other hand, the distinctive part of the doctrine—all, that is, that distinguishes it from the moral lessons deducible from the doctrine of invariable physical causation—takes note only of the individual aspects of conduct; and so, is not, strictly speaking, *moral* at all. The tendency of the current commonplaces about personal responsibility is to insist, less on the virtue and healthfulness of truth, self-restraint, benevolence or industry, than on the merit of the person exhibiting such virtues: less on the

evil to society of dishonesty, cruelty, sensuality or idleness, than on the "answerableness" (whatever that may mean) of the sinner. The point about which so much metaphysical dust has been raised proves in the last resort to be one of those purely personal considerations of which moral advance consists in the gradual supersedure. Analysis discloses the heart of the dispute (concerning free-will, and the rest) to be less a question of morals than of merit.

It is at this point that we come in sight of what seems to me the moral insufficiency of the only part of the popular belief threatened by modern science.

A few brief remarks on the general character and meaning of moral progress may fitly preface what is to be said on this point; that so, having inferred the chief desideratum in any theory or principle claiming to exercise moral influence over its followers, we may observe how far the belief in question tallies with the required standard.

Broadly stated, the functional basis of morals appears to be the perpetuation of human development. This development presents itself under two aspects: (1) The evolution of society as a whole; (2) The evolution of the social or *super-personal* impulses, emotions, and tendencies in individuals. Virtue, functionally considered, amounts to the maintenance of humanity's fitness for survival so far as this maintenance may be secured by the civilisation of individuals through the medium of their own actions. That character is moral which (whatever the formulated principle recognised by its owner) issues in conduct conducive to the well-being, not necessarily of the personal agent, but of his kind: which keeps man at the head of things, and elevates his headship. That motive is moral which implies a desire to exhibit such conduct so far as the agent knows how. Just in proportion as the desires and purposes of the individual lead him to conform to social requirements, and to merge self, *the person*, in self, *the social unit*, can he obtain a virtual mastery over his conditions. Happiness consists in such mastery; rectitude, in the conformity which leads to it. The rectitude and the happiness, however, do *not* necessarily meet in the same personality; and in the artificial correction of this special instance of a naturally incomplete adaptation of our circumstances to our requirements lies the essence of all good and wise law-making, as also of the purification of public opinion, that most powerful of all social engines.

If the function of morals be to subserve the interests of the community, those motives and principles must be most moral which concern themselves most closely with the welfare of the community, and which have least regard to considerations

indifferent to that welfare. The most moral belief, again, must be that which tends to the institution of such social motives and principles; and which, in its indirect effect on the emotions of its follower, brings his will increasingly under their power. Quite in harmony with this conclusion is the fact that the central principles of that large body of rules and regulations for individual consciences which the felt consequences of conduct have caused to be empirically established as right—which have been permanent and which come into increasing prominence and play wherever a community advances in coherence and organisation—have always taken form as in some sort a merging of personality. A high degree of enlightenment and prosperity, or swift progress towards it, commonly accompanies the high estimation of such principles as self-government, sympathy, and equity. The latter especially is the crowning virtue of civilisation. From first to last moral advance appears to have consisted under varying disguises in the slow surmounting, not of individual distinctions, but of *personal* considerations: in the gradual lessening of the weight of special interests, whether egoistic or altruistic, in the balance of morally permitted motives, and in increasing the preponderance of what are virtually race-instincts as a compelling agency in the conscious lives of individuals. In states pre-eminently civilised we find teachers, governments and even public opinion busy, more or less consciously and more or less successfully, with the inculcation of ends, and the institution of restrictions bearing directly on the products of individual character and conduct, as affecting the vital resources, not of the agent *per se*, but of the community; the interests of the agent being included only in proportion to his capability of development in social conditions. Society is no impersonal structure; neither as regards the requirements of its development is it a merely magnified person; but it is a great super-personal organism into which the self-hood of every one of its units enters not merely as a modifying influence or a supplementary end, but as an essential ingredient. The requirements of society include, while transcending, the requirements of the individual; and, when supplied, yield what is *felt* as an improved quality of happiness (though seldom as an increased quantity) to each individual who lives in practical recognition of his share in a larger life than his own. The most virtuous man is he who is able habitually to regard, and to deal with himself, his friend, his enemy, and a stranger from the same standpoint; that is, from a point where these distinctions of self, friend, enemy, and stranger disappear, along with the special emotions belonging to them, in the distinction each assumes as a better or worse social member to be judged and treated by a human test alone, as if

nothing more circumscribed than the whole future of the whole race were concerned in the matter. The most moral valuation of personal morality must be that which regards conduct exclusively in its super-personal or social aspect, and which disregards its emanation from or reaction upon a given agent otherwise than as he too is a part of that whole his conduct must affect.

Provided with this test, if we return to the belief in personal responsibility, we find that, so far as it means a belief in the proper merits or the proper rights of persons, it falls *morally* short. For instead of placing the impulse to self-service or to self-sacrifice, as such, under orders to the dictates of the impulses conducive to race-preservation, it tends directly to reverse the process; and so far as it confines attention to the real or supposed reaction of conduct on the *personality*, as distinguished from the *humanity* of the agent, it does so at the expense of that purely social valuation of individual conduct, on the unbiassed integrity of which a true morality ever insists. Humanity suffers or may suffer in the person of self if the interests of less fit social members be taken into consideration *merely* because they are *not* self; and conversely, humanity may suffer in the person of others or of an other if conduct be modified by a consideration of one's merely personal relationship towards that other. The insistence on personal responsibility frequently means nothing more than an insistence on this personal relationship as giving a special moral colouring to conduct. I, at least, run more risk of self-deception as to what is my duty towards my neighbour in a particular conjunction of events if, instead of looking the position simply in the face with a single eye to doing the fittest thing, so far as I know it, I mentally attitudinise before my own relationship to my own conduct, reflecting on my own responsibility as if the eventual deed either gained or lost in intrinsic importance from the circumstance of *my* happening to be the doer. True virtue requires that we regard neither first nor second persons when a question of duty arises. Our moral judgment of third persons is more likely to be reliable and equitable, and the moral man must endeavour to appear as a third person in his own eyes.

In order to strain the principle advocated to its furthest capability, and to give dissentient readers the utmost room for correcting it, I take an instance in which, if ever, personal considerations may be held to intensify moral obligation. A father is said to be specially responsible for the moral training of his child, by which it is meant that he is liable to be specially disgraced in the eyes of others if he neglect such training. It is implied in this that the man is to the same extent

irresponsible for the moral influence he exerts over other people's children: that the personal relationship or its absence is alone sufficient to modify moral obligation; that, other things equal, his child's training *ought* to be a matter of greater concern to him than that of other children. Other things are *not* generally equal, or the moral fallacy involved would at once disclose itself. For the doctrine implies that the father deserves to be more disgraced for failing in what is a matter of general social duty towards one human being than towards another, the distinction all the while being one that concerns no one except himself. So far as the judgment concerning parental responsibility hints at the importance of senior guidance for the young, it is moral and true: so far as it specifies one child as of more importance than another coming under similar influence, and colours duty with a personal consideration of no value to the community, it is at least non-social, and, through its tendency to withhold a parent's attention from the human (which he may of course regard as the religious, or otherwise transcendental) meaning of his conduct, may become eminently immoral. Just so far as the father is practically influenced in his dealings with his child by a consideration of his own personal relationship, and the extra importance that relationship may give to his conduct in the estimation of those he knows, just so far is the good of the child subordinated in his mind to his own credit, and the tendency must be to lessen such considerations as, while concerning the child's good, are yet in no way related to that credit. Just in proportion to the access of value an action receives from the personal aspect of responsibility will be the loss of regard in which a precisely similar case is held when such responsibility is supposed or known to be absent. The question is to me unavoidable—Would not this loss operate harmfully on any one coming under the influence of the conduct based upon it?

Of course no question is here raised as to the appropriateness of the parent's greater love for his own child. Domestic welfare lies so firmly and deeply at the roots of social welfare that any principle threatening the former might well be mistrusted as unlikely to prove a true friend to the latter. What is here maintained is not that a father should not feel a stronger *affection* for his own child than for another, but that, when both are equally under his influence and control, his sense of "responsibility" concerning each child respectively should be precisely equal. He ought to treat both children with equal moral solicitude, and from the same motive. I profess to derive this "ought" from the highest sanctions of civilised morality. I submit that in recognising (as all must) the rectitude of such equitable dealing and equitable

feeling on the part of the supposed parent, the title of super-personal conduct to our moral approval is granted; and that, by implication, the special *responsibility* of the parent—that is, his title to special reprehension in the case of his neglecting his own child rather than the other, or the other rather than his own—is disproved. If this be true, a doctrine presenting the reverse principle of an insistence on personal distinctions, whatever else it may have to recommend it, cannot be moral.

A formidable objection is often made to a doctrine which, while upholding the ancient principle of the excellence of virtue, yet denies the free-will and consequently the personal merit of the virtuous agent. It is said that such teaching, to be logical, must make no account of conscience or of conscientious motive as such, since either is liable to be misguided. I, however, entirely disclaim any imputation of undervaluing the great utility of conscientiousness as such. There may be no *merit* in being conscientious, but, according to the social standard of excellence, there is great *good* in it. A person's susceptibility of feelings of pleasure or pain in proportion to the conformity or non-conformity of his own conduct with any standard having a basis wider than his own interests is what, I suppose, we mean by his "conscience". It may not inaptly be compared with a social nerve which, in measure of its development and activity, gives its possessor a place in the sensorium of the community. However misguided it may here or there be—however vague or even inaccurate in its response to the demands made upon it—it is yet the finest product of past millenniums of human socialisation. I even incline to agree so far with the orthodox moralist as to affirm that a *right* (that is a conscientious) motive prompting a *wrong* or erroneous act is a better thing than a useful (extrinsically-moral) action which has been prompted by a selfish motive. Why? Because the tenour of a life signifies more to the community than its single acts, and the degree in which a man habitually acts upon the suggestions of his conscience is pretty certain to correspond with the degree in which he is amenable to considerations wide of his own concerns, as such. In other words, conscientiousness is potentially, even where it is not actually, moral.

I, however, dispute the moral legitimacy of using this "social sentence" in cool blood as a means of personal gratification: of looking forward to its favourable verdict—which, as is admitted, is *not* always a faithful verdict—as an end to be kept in view when aiming at rectitude. Whatever his "merit," a moral man looks out from self at facts, and aims straight at their fit adaptation to what he deems right, with no side glance at his own reflection in to-morrow's eyes to see what figure he cuts while taking his aim.

Finally, it may be objected that it is both foolish and wrong to cry down men's ready belief in their own merits, since such a belief has constantly proved a valuable stimulus to well-doing. Doubtless it has. But a useful stimulus is one thing: a permanent and necessary vital condition is another. Alcohol is often useful to keep flagging physical power up to working-point: taken medicinally it may even save life: but the healthier the life the less the need of its services. Similarly, I am not here concerned to show that the idea of personal merit has never done good, or that where a belief in it can be honestly held it may not in the future do good again: but I desire to show that it is not necessary to normal moral vitality, while it has very often done harm and indirectly produced misery by leading men to claim personal recompense as their natural due for conduct which in the nature of things produces only a social result: causing them to feel ill-used of gods and men when such recompense has been withheld. Until we have learnt to rectify sub-human nature's oversights, and to apportion our rewards on a principle more complex than hers, such expectations are doomed to disappointment; it being about as reasonable to expect in the natural course of things a *personal* reward for a *social* effort as to expect a physical reward for an intellectual effort: the removal of a disease, for example, by the solution of a mathematical problem. Since those among us who accept unreservedly the conclusions of modern philosophy must learn to do without any belief in our own merits, it is just as well to recognise the consoling fact that men may yet care to do right after they become convinced that they are not fine fellows for doing it, and that the rectitude which persists in action independently of personal bolstering is the highest and most invincible rectitude of all.

It cannot be denied that a sense of merit masquerading as "honour" has often done good service in prompting men to deeds or strengthening them for forbearances which they were not sufficiently socialised to desire for their own sake. But though in nine cases such a sense might lead a man right, in the tenth it might lead him wrong, thus disclosing itself, not as an essential principle of morality, but as the falsely-assumed rule which is disproved by an exception.

However generally useful we may allow the sense of honour to have been, it is none the less true that a wide-spread feeling exists testifying implicitly to its moral second-rateness, and recognising the love of virtue as morally superior to the love of glory, the dread of vice to the fear of disgrace. And the existence of such a feeling, however small the operative power it as yet possesses, indicates a dim recognition of the higher social value of such a standard whenever it is seen in operation.

The desire of public approval is not necessarily identical with the desire of public good. It is at least equally allied with the paltry desire of public notice which may be and sometimes is clearly exhibited immorally by felons in the commission of crime, and non-morally by speculative or artistic egotists in the production of work differing from that of their compeers only in the matter of eccentricity. Men are slow to learn that even their own glory must play second fiddle to the wants of a solidifying community, although it is a happy thing for themselves and for the community when at last they do learn it. Life is at once simplified and beautified, and many faults of character with their attendant miseries vanish spontaneously when the individual learns to content himself with what Emerson calls "his social and delegated quality,"—when he sees that whatever "respects the individual is temporary and prospective like the individual himself who is ascending out of his limits into a catholic existence".

When at last the merely rational theory we have been slow to learn as such flashes into light as a substantive truth which it is beyond our power ever again to ignore in our computation of things and their values, and when we become intimately conscious that our goodness is not in any sense of our own providing—when we have reached this belief as a realised practical conviction, I say, we never want our personal merit back again. In reaching the point where such a conviction becomes possible we have left behind us all other points at which the belief in personal responsibility, having been honestly tenable, has been in any degree useful. We have also unconsciously outlived that in us which received gratification from the contemplation of merit; the love of goodness which needed a love of self proper to eke out its small propelling power being transformed into a larger faculty which needs it not.

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MODERN ATHEISM AND MR. MALLOCK.¹

WHEN we have to do with any excellent conjuror, and are bent upon discovering the secret of his trick, one of our first chances of success lies in learning to listen between his sentences. We must not miss a word of what he says, yet we must attend to it less for its own sake, or in hope of getting any direct light from it, than to observe what he does *not* say: what indeed he draws our attention away from in his actual utterances. Whatever he emphasises as certain, or airily dismisses as a matter of course, we must think over, chary of giving too unguarded an assent, unless we would allow him to delude us from first to last. We must suspect him of making new and unfamiliar use of old and familiar truisms, on the ground that the conclusions he makes them point to are clearly at variance among themselves.

During the past two years many of us have been reading the essays of Mr. Mallock. This clever but thoroughly unscientific young writer has apparently set himself by force of words to put what he calls the 'positivist' world out of conceit with its own inducements to live righteously, if not, indeed, to live at all: out of conceit, besides, with its own reasons for, or habit of, believing that there exist any real moral distinctions apart from a belief in God and heaven. Truth and purity are the two special forms of virtue which

¹ Mr. Mallock's Essay on *Modern Atheism in relation to Morality*, which appeared in January 1877, and to the examination of which I confine myself in the present article, contains in brief nearly all the arguments its writer has since elaborated.

appear to vex Mr. Mallock most by their supposed inconsistency with the positivist's diminished body of beliefs.

It is not my intention to attempt any denial of what Mr. Mallock affirms as to the greatness of the loss we experience in the obliteration of a belief in a God who will certainly arrange the universe to meet our deserts after we are dead. The greater part of what he says on this head appears to me as true as it is depressing. But because his conclusions that life is not worth living, morally at least, without supernatural religion, and that morality itself is a system of chains any man is a fool to hug unless he believes in heaven and hell—because these conclusions do not square with the tenacity with which sane persons who fully understand him continue to cling both to life and morals, it may be well to ascertain what it is that he suppresses or overlooks; what it really is which makes for moral living within the positivist breast, and prevents the positivist from feeling himself a fool for it either. And to secure an arrival at conclusions in agreement with these facts of life rather than with those of *hocus-pocus*, I find the best way is to treat Mr. Mallock's arguments as those of a conjuror bent upon deceiving me for his own advantage, and for my amusement. And just as I grant the conjuror all he says that harmonises with my common sense, so will I grant Mr. Mallock nearly the whole of his written propositions, and for the same purpose, viz., to get my attention free to pry into what he never mentions, but which I yet know is there, and somehow at the bottom of the whole trick. Meanwhile I will not be imposed upon by epigram, which is ever apt to degenerate into clap-trap, serviceable to the speaker, but confusing to the listener.

It is not a pleasant task to go over Mr. Mallock's ground with him. Having looked at that to which he draws our attention, and reasoned out or felt out one by one the points on which he challenges dispute, one finds oneself in sad honesty bound to agree with him in a number of thoroughly dismal and sickening propositions to which, while hoping that as much virtuous happiness as there is in the world may be presently found to give them the lie, we yet assent for the nonce as seeming to hang together with a grim and nasty consistency. Then comes the question, 'What may there be which our conjuror haply suppresses or overlooks?'

In the present paper I propose to confine myself to the discussion, from a point of view other than his own, of the interesting problem which Mr. Mallock chose as title and subject of an early essay, appearing in the *Contemporary Review* for January 1877, namely, *Modern Atheism* in its relation to morality. It seems to me that Mr. Mallock's whole argument, as unfolded in his subsequent writings, stands or falls with the pretensions of premisses he, with much show of assurance, lays down in this his opening essay.

With small preamble he opens fire thus:—

There is a certain foregone conclusion which to the world at large is held by each to justify and recommend his premisses, and which each is anxious to show as the logical result of them. This is the sacred and supreme importance of a high morality, the essential superiority of virtue over vice, the absolute antagonism of right and wrong. . . . No appeal to the sacredness of truth would give credit to a system that avowedly placed vice on a par with virtue, and left it merely a matter of individual taste whether lust and gluttony were preferable to what have hitherto been considered as the highest affections.

Every word of this utterance is emphatically true: true, perhaps, in these modern days of 'Atheism' and public-spirited good-will as it has never been before. Even more is true in the same direction. Ethical controversy is animated throughout by a remarkable tacit assumption that it would be a terrible thing to be equally happy and equally prosperous, supposing such a case were possible, without a *belief in right and wrong as such*. Whether or no it be true that the only conceivable human end and aim of life, life itself being once secured, is the happiness of the living agent, it seems evident enough that *a belief in right and wrong forms a very considerable element in the tacit popular conception of what 'happiness' necessarily includes*. It is this assumption that gives its ring of bitter melancholy even to the lurid glee of the Lesbian singers in their ever conscious defiance of what the world calls virtue. Religious orthodoxy makes its strongest defence when it entrenches itself behind this unquestioned and almost universal feeling. Scientific scepticism comes nearer to making illogical concessions at this point than at any other. So far there is nothing to dispute with Mr. Mallock.

In the essay under consideration, however, this fact, pregnant though it be with suggestions undermining our writer's whole argument, is only brought forward to introduce the proposition that men's liking for their own consciences and their belief in the value of what these consciences endorse must stand or fall with their belief, in the existence of a personal God and in the personal immortality of men. These are his words (the italics being my own). His aim is to show—not whether the beliefs [in God and immortality] be false or true, nor whether the change involved in their loss be for the better or worse, but simply that the change would be real—that, whether for good or evil, the belief in God and immortality has a practical effect upon practical life—upon what men do, and what they forbear to do, *what they love and what they hate*, what they think of themselves and of one another: that, whether we realise it or not, these two beliefs are implied in all the special praise men give to self-sacrifice, to heroism, to purity of heart, and in the special value they attach to the chastity of their wives and daughters. Without these two beliefs (he continues), I propose to show that vice under sanitary conditions ceases to be vice; *that without them there can be no standard by which the quality of pleasures can be tested*; that truth as truth, and virtue as virtue, cease to be in any way admirable; that, in short, the whole complexion of life will change, all our notions of life be turned upside down; and that those who deny this fact or try to conceal it from us are guilty either of unconscious inconsistency or unconscious fraud.

Mr. Mallock thus makes us a sinister promise, but he fails to keep

it. He 'shows' us nothing of this sort. The essay, within the limits wherein it aims at confining its reader's mind to work, is clever and complete; grant Mr. Mallock his airily assumed premisses, and his conclusion follows drearily enough—but the premisses, and they are stated and defended at length, amount only to this. All the morality there is in the world which does not happen to be based on immediate personal expediency, making it unworthy the name of morality, is the direct and exclusive outcome of religion as embodied in the two beliefs threatened by 'Modern Atheism'—1st, that God is, and 2nd, that He will deal with men in a future world according to their more or less adherence to a supernatural and super-*expedient* code of conduct in this world. Grant Mr. Mallock this much—grant that virtue is either valueless in the light of this life, or that, being valuable and shown to be so, its intrinsic excellence and beauty vanish—and we may go further, and grant that life will be changed in such a way as to lose its moral meaning and worth in proportion as its God dies and its heaven disappears. But these are just the two propositions to which careful consideration forbids our assent. Happily for the man whose happiness in any degree depends on the pleasures of conscience, Mr. Mallock is a juggler and a special pleader, and no discoverer or teacher of new truth.

Let us examine the above-quoted utterance phrase by phrase. I have italicised the only clauses which appear to me entirely inaccurate, and postpone their discussion for a few pages for the sake of observing how very much truth there is in the rest of the quotation, and how completely that truth is made to subserve what I conceive to be a radical misconception.

The first proposition above quoted as to the reality of the change that will come over our notions of morality when, if ever, the two primary doctrines of religion cease from among us, is true enough: the change *will* be real, *is* real enough in many a 'positivist' mind already. Our sanctions and prohibitions of one another's conduct, our approval and disapproval of one another's motives, will be awarded on different grounds,—are already in many directions coming to be awarded on different grounds;—and we may or may not retain the name of virtue for the conduct and motives we approve, and the name of vice for the conduct and motives we disapprove. All that I care to deny is that the change is of a kind subversive of moral distinctions; all that I here insist upon is, that, however implicit in our moral beliefs our religious beliefs may have been, the fact (never once glanced at by Mr. Mallock) remains that the *reasons we give ourselves* for a feeling or a judgment, and the *causes to which we really owe* that feeling or judgment, and which underlie it and give it practical validity, need not be, and by no means generally are, one and the same thing. We may, for instance, tell ourselves that we prefer sight to blindness because of what we can see with our eyes; really we prefer it because we inherit a liking for what has indirectly helped us into

the making of 'right'? How far has the fear of Mrs. Grundy modified or superseded the fear of God, her threatenings proved coercive where God's have had no weight, or her extenuations silenced reproof based upon the express utterances of a God-Christ? How far has a worldly morality (based upon the love of man, upon man's high valuation of his neighbour's trust and good-will, or even upon a more or less instructed regard for health and happiness) influenced and modified religious doctrine, and with its own progress and correction advanced and corrected religion, making it revise its sanctions, and reducing it at bottom to a mere echo of human wisdom? Do not annals of religious reformations show man again and again able, consciously or not, to teach his gods how to rule him? Once more: has religion done more to make men 'good' in the sense of raising their wills and their powers above *self*-limited considerations than the love for parent, child, or friend has done, or than, more indirectly, the dread of disgrace or desire of human approbation has done? Has the fear of God's wrath operated as largely in determining men's moral decisions as the fear of starvation? Which, I wonder, is nearer the truth?—that morals have been merely sustained by force of their supposed supernatural authority, and will flag, and eventually cease to be, in the absence or supersession of that authority—or, that certain forms of dogmatic theology have survived longer than they otherwise would have done, on account of and for the sake of the moral utterances they enclose and authorise? Every one of these questions Mr. Mallock should show himself prepared to answer before he assigns to religious belief an almost exclusive share in the institution of moral ideas and feelings.

Without the belief in God, Mr. Mallock next undertakes to show us that 'vice under sanitary conditions will cease to be vice,' and that 'virtue as *virtue* will cease to be admirable.'

As to the former of these assertions let us, upon full consideration, boldly admit that as soon as, under any conditions whatever, anything hitherto deemed evil loses all human harmfulness, adds on one side to the general amount and general chances of human well-being without taking away on another side, increases in short the sum total of *unreactionary and wholly happy happiness* in the world, it will rightly cease to be 'vice.' If by 'sanitary conditions' be understood the exclusion of all hindrance to the normal and healthy development and preservation of the body, intelligence, and 'conscience' of the agent, and those of all other persons his conduct, directly or indirectly, affects, then assuredly we may, without fear and without reproach, consign to the limitation of sanitary conditions our catalogue of sins. Prove that any given conduct or habit takes absolutely nothing from the resources of any one's temporal happiness, and the conscience of the strictest religionist would find it hard to demur to its innocence. Prove that any conduct hitherto deemed wrong produces an increase of temporal human good without increasing temporal human woe, and more or

less readily will the most religious conscience tend to its toleration, eventually, perhaps, accepting it as virtue, and trying to convince you that this bible or that church has recommended its practice all along.

On the other hand, so long as any action, habit, or line of conduct continues, directly or indirectly, immediately or ultimately, to thwart men's more permanent and hereditary worldly interests,—to do what, on any account, human beings agree in considering *more* harm than good, and to bring, in the long run, more misery than joy into the world,—so long will the sure instincts of a governing community, ever in empirical harmony with the tendencies that preserve and perpetuate, treat such conduct as a thing hateful, call it 'vice' or something synonymous, visit disapprobation upon it, and keep alive the conscience of the offender regarding it. We have not the least fear that the vices Mr. Mallock seems chiefly to have in view will be able to stand the above test, or that the sum total of the forces left untouched at the decay of theological belief will favour their preservation to the slow annihilation of the society that has still more slowly learnt to discredit them. A change is coming, but we firmly believe that, after some possible tacking, moral opinion will eventually set sail in a direction so nearly parallel with Christianity that the divergence towards a yet more social standard will, for generations to come, be scarcely perceptible.

Then as to virtue. 'Virtue' in the loss of religious belief will—so Mr. Mallock tells us—cease '*as virtue*' 'to be admirable.' I assert, on the contrary, that so long as man is man, 'virtue, *as virtue*,' will never 'cease to be admirable;' and for this reason. Man will always accord a very special kind of admiration to such conduct in another as forwards his own interest at that other's cost. He will, of course, appreciate directly the value of the conduct, and, from his own experience of the practice of similar conduct, will indirectly recognise its difficulty; and to appreciate that good which is achieved with difficulty is likely always to remain a deeply-rooted impulse in a being who owes his complex existence to a multitudinous series of difficult survivals, and is the outcome of such numerous and varied successful struggles as civilised man. When he moreover receives the benefit of such struggle without himself encountering its difficulty—in other words, receives his own good fortune as the result of his neighbour's struggle—not the death, burial, and oblivion of a thousand creeds will avail to hinder the *instinctively special* force of his admiration. To ask why he should admire in another, and so come to aim at for himself, this kind of conduct, is about as much or as little relevant as to ask why he should prefer straight limbs, intelligence, or fine weather, to deformity, idiocy, or bad seasons. In one case as in the other, man cannot but approve that of which he and his ancestors have consciously or unconsciously reaped the benefits, though the basis of his appreciation be in one case physical, in another æsthetic, in another

intellectual, and in a fourth moral or social. All those acts and forbearances which remain at once useful and difficult will continue to be prized as virtuous—prized, that is, in a way special to the meeting of these two characteristics. As society evolves, and men's needs and powers slowly change, the precise set of acts and forbearances which will be at once difficult and useful will vary, as they have varied with former changes of men's needs and opportunities, and with them will also vary the precise code of conduct; for note that no conduct has been permanently or universally prized as virtuous which is on the one hand useful but natural, or on the other difficult but obviously useless. That the gradual obliteration of religious belief must reduce many pseudo-virtuous acts and forbearances to this latter category, it would be idle to deny. All I deny is the statement that virtue, as virtue, will cease to be a lovely thing in our eyes, or that we shall cease to accord the name of virtue to conduct which, while difficult in practice, has a genuine over-balance of human utility to recommend it. As to motives, they take the moral colouring of the ends to which they have reference, and with which they more or less accurately correspond as the agent is more or less instructed as to the true means for reaching his moral end. Mr. Mallock opines that, in the possibly approaching dissolution of religious beliefs, 'our notions of life will be turned *upside down*.' Not so; but they will be turned *inside out*, that we may 'know that which we have believed.' Judging from the few facts we as yet have to go upon, I surmise that the ensuing change in the world's moralities may be of a less revolutionary though possibly of a more evolutionary kind than Mr. Mallock, in his enthusiasm for orthodox sanctions, prognosticates. There will be less change on the surface of our code; more at its root.

To refer now briefly to those two sentences in the paragraph from *Modern Atheism* which I have italicised as appearing to me wholly inaccurate. The first is the assertion that the 'belief in God and immortality has a practical effect . . . Upon what men love and what they hate.' I am unable to call to mind a single fact of life as I see it, or of history as I read it, which justifies or exemplifies this remark. On the contrary I find everywhere proofs that the converse is the case, that what men love and what they hate has a strong effect upon their beliefs in God and immortality. They like fair play, therefore they believe God to be just, and the rewarder of the just. They like being loved, therefore they believe God to be loving. Or they admire and feel the value of strength and power, therefore they believe God to be almighty.

So with immortality and heaven. Life is dear; so men believe they will live for ever. If human nature took a sudden and real aversion to conscious existence, convincing proofs would appear to rise up on every side that the tomb ends all, and the belief in immortality would be obsolete in a week. Here, if anywhere, 'the

wish' has been 'father to the thought.' It has notoriously troubled theologians in all times and places to reconcile the theory of a future life with the phenomena of physical death. As to the heavens that have been believed in, they have been very many, and significantly various. There have been heavens of feasting and hours; heavens of golden streets, thrones, crowns, great lights, and much singing; heavens of purity and peace; heavens of endless worship; heavens of unbroken human ties; heavens of endless ministry; heavens of self-oblivious absorption into infinite being. And each of these heavens has corresponded exactly with what the men believing in it have been constitutionally disposed to deem desirable, and would have secured to themselves on earth if they could, and which they postpone to the day after death only because they know it to be unattainable now, and know too little about death to be sure it will be unattainable then. Always, too, the rewards of any specified heaven have been the *complementary aspect of the drawbacks to the conduct required of the individual* by the social pressure of his earthly surroundings. In every case, moreover, the strength, and so the *moral force*, of the belief in the reality of heavenly life has rested upon an unquestioned and often unconscious inference, that what seems so good cannot but be true. 'I want it so much, therefore I shall get it;' or more insidiously, 'It helps me to do my duty so easily, therefore it must be good to believe; and no lie is good.' Or, 'I want it—this heaven—therefore I'll deny myself many things' now in order to increase my chance of getting it.' Mr. Mallock possibly, however, may only have had conduct and character in view in speaking of 'what men love and what they hate.' But even so, the case remains the same. That conduct has been ever loved which is supposed to pave the road to the chosen immortality, not to any other; hence the frequency with which religious teachers have found all the inducements their religion offered fall flat on the carnal hearts of the 'unregenerate,' whose tastes remain 'of the earth, earthy' after all done and said, and whose torpid moral energies can only be stung into life, if at all, by threats of hell-fire. The preacher has not offered his sinner a heaven the sinner would care to go to. At the bottom of his heart the latter would far rather eat, drink, be merry and die. 'Modern Atheism' has not *created* this morally obtuse worshipper of 'the world, the flesh, and the devil,' and such a worshipper is not likely to have a better time of it under its sway than he has had through the difficult, dead centuries of superstition. The world will never want for such unsocialised beings, at any rate for millenniums to come; but for the rest of human kind it has yet to be shown that all inducement to live righteously vanishes in the absence of a belief in God and immortality. A man who is capable of making a difficult exertion, restraining a furious passion, or patiently enduring a painful experience, for the sake of a loved and

ideal God or a vague and distant heavenly reward, is equally capable of doing so for the sake of a fellow-creature, or for the reward he receives through the exercise of his sympathetic affections. In one case as in the other the real satisfaction derived from the difficult duty is felt in the suitable exercise of his 'conscience.' Of which more anon.

The second italicised sentence above quoted from Mr. Mallock's essay is of much greater importance. He tells us that without the old grounds of moral judgment there will remain 'no standard by which the quality of pleasures can be tested,' and consequently, I suppose, no clear idea of the best way in which to bring up our children for their own good, or of the best way to behave ourselves if we would benefit those we love, or be approved of those we respect. I am aware that I have just mentioned a group of motives, incentives, and influences which, for all that appears in his writings, seem to have no place in Mr. Mallock's view of human life and human nature. But I prefer, in treating a subject, at least to name all its bearings, whether or no I have space or power to discuss them all; and perhaps the mere allusion to the natural affection and sympathy of man for his child or friend may suggest directions in which Mr. Mallock's forcible commentary on life and manners is incomplete and assailable.

But about this testing of pleasures. Mr. Mallock has cleverly implied that a belief in immortality supplies us with an infallible test of the respective values of different joys—implied it in the assertion that we *lose* such a test in losing the belief. Before proceeding to inquire what test, under the auspices of 'Modern Atheism,' we have, or have not, let us just examine the soundness and the universality of the test we are insidiously told we are losing. Mr. Mallock's test of the value of any given pleasure we will suppose to be this: 'How far does it coincide with God's will? and how far does it increase or lessen our fitness to reach and to enjoy heaven?' Obviously a definite and indisputable answer to these questions in reference to any moral point would imply a definite and undisputed notion of what is included in the term 'God's will' or 'fitness for heaven.' No such undisputed notion exists or ever has existed; and the questions therefore admit of answers as various and as conflicting as the notions of God's will and of heavenly life, of which each age, each race, almost each sect has had its own special idea, offering denial, more or less pronounced, of what every other age, race, or sect has affirmed concerning the duty of man. Even although the civilised religions of the world have been roughly agreed in the approval of, say, justice and purity, and in the condemnation of their opposites in *the abstract*, yet the interpretations of these virtues in detail, the modes of conduct in which they are held to be exemplified, and the means by which their practice is to be attained and enforced, have varied with the secular requirements of widely different communities. Such coincidences between the moral codes appended to different

religious creeds as have been wide-spread or long-enduring have had a correspondently coincidental secular justification; and herein the real secret of their generality has lain.

This assertion I think Mr. Mallock will find it very hard to disprove. No pleasure that at once procures any one's present happiness, while it lessens for all concerned the probability of future misery in this life, has ever been considered wrong; no pleasure that, procuring present gratification, is known to draw from the store of general happiness, or even to lessen the agent's own resources for procuring his own future happiness in this life, has ever been more than tolerated by religion; and in most instances any such pleasure has been explicitly condemned. It is an easy 'saw,' seldom challenging examination, that 'heaven' is a definite object to aim at; and it is easy, having accepted it, to carp at 'Modern Atheism' for offering only abstractions to take its place. The indefiniteness of the idea of heaven is cloaked under the universality of its interpretation as complete happiness, perfect holiness, endless life, and so on. But surely, if such terms as 'beautiful order,' 'sweet purity,' and 'kind smiles,' are, as Mr. Mallock elsewhere complains, terms too abstract to serve as beacons by which the moralist may guide his course, is 'heaven' less so? 'Heaven' I take to be a conveniently abstract name used to cover as many abstract ideals as there are tongues to use the word, and minds to fit a meaning to it. A long time in which to do as one now wishes to do, to possess what one now wishes to possess, to be what one now wishes to be—this is heaven; and it means one thing to you and another to me. It means for all of us life indefinitely prolonged and freed from all its drawbacks. The heaven of one man would be the hell of another, and to say that the idea of the heaven of high morality, which is, we presume, the only heaven in question, has ever had much attraction for the successfully dishonest 'man of the world,' the drunkard, the libertine, or the ambitious tyrant, or has ever of itself done anything to reform the will or ways of such persons, is to credit it with a usefulness it has not possessed, and the loss of which we are not, at its dismissal, obliged either to infer or to deplore. What has influenced man when he has been influenced at all in his valuation of the pleasures he feels is a *bringing home* to him the superior power this pleasure has over that of issuing naturally and of itself in further pleasure. He will appreciate these fruitful and generally moderate pleasures in proportion as he is already capable of feeling them, but his capacity for feeling them will not depend upon his belief in God or heaven, but upon the constitution he inherits, the habits he has formed, and the degree in which his imagination renders vivid and real to him the remoter issues of his conduct.

Of course, for the evolutionist, there is just as much reason, and just the same kind of reason, for calling social pleasures higher than anti-social or even non-social ones, as there is for calling a man

higher than a sponge. Man is the *highest* link in the chain of zoological development, in the sense of having taken the most 'evolving' to bring him about. Moral feelings, again, are the *inner aspect* of that latest link in the chain of man's own special development, his *social condition*; they have taken more evolving to bring about than his other emotions; that is, they have survived more difficulties, are the outcome of a longer array of experiences, are of a more complex character, and so depend upon a larger and more variable set of conditions. They are thus shown to be by so much the richer in chances of survival, the proof of fitness. Nature *in toto* has been more uniformly on their side, or rather less against them than against their opposites or their negations. They are therefore called 'highest' by a custom of language as little arbitrary as any naming can be. If Mr. Mallock disputes the appropriateness of this scientific valuation, we may with equal right dispute the appropriateness of his religious valuation, and ask him to give us reasons for considering the love of God, despite God's indemonstrability, 'higher' than the love of man, or the desire of heaven 'higher' than the desire of earth. He must, if he would prove anything to us, use our very own instruments in his demonstration, and show us that his highest happiness and highest duty have firmer natural ground, and a more select ancestry than ours have, which is the very point we dispute with him.

So far I am aware I have scarcely met Mr. Mallock in direct argument at all, having been busy with my own reasons for denying beforehand any one's ability to perform such a promise as that with which his essay opens—namely, to show up morality as a shivering, shadowy figment when removed from the glories and the glares of theological heavens and hells. In thus weighing well beforehand the very terms in which our writer states his object and makes his promise, nothing has, I think, been said to bias the judgment of a candid inquirer, whilst such a method of procedure may have been serviceable supposing Mr. Mallock's argument to be, as it seems to me, that of a special pleader who uses weighted words even in preparing to open his discussion.

It is possible, however, that I do Mr. Mallock injustice in thus dealing with him as with a conjuror to be 'found out.' It may be that, in the evident absence of a scientific 'turn' of mind, even so clever a writer is unable to see the strong case of *Society versus Self* in any workaday light. Such is the impression suggested by some of the following utterances, which I at length quote as containing the gist and marrow of the argument in the essay on *Modern Atheism*, and which I will examine singly but briefly.

First, as to the basis and end of morals, he says:—

Let us remember that when we praise morality as utility we do not praise it as morality. It is (then) not an end in itself, it is not a good in itself. It is simply the perfect adjustment of all the wheels of the great human mill. No mill, however,

is perfectly adjusted only for the sake of going, or goes only for the sake of being perfectly adjusted; but it goes and is adjusted for the sake of some definite work in reference to which alone we praise or blame it. In the case of the human mill this work is to produce happiness.

Here let me remark that before any one can be happy he must live. The scientific import of happiness in relation to morals lies in its implications. Happiness necessarily connotes the presence of a life to feel the happiness, and it is to the fundamental stirrings of the impulse to save life itself rather than to any later consideration that we must trace the still small beginnings of ancestral morality. The morality that has been handed down to us retains the same character, consisting in the last resort of that mass of conduct-conditions upon which for the time being as many of us as live can, with a minimum of friction and a maximum of comfort to every one concerned, continue to live and to leave a survivable posterity. Not only is this supposition in harmony with all the light thrown by the evolution theory upon the facts of development, but it is in harmony with men's universally intuitive tendency to regard as virtue's natural reward some promise of 'life to come,' whether in the form of personal survival, or of a permanent influence on other human lives that shall be.² Long before men emerge far enough out of the state of savagery to dream of an immortality, or to love and fear a God, the rude beginnings of a *subordinated will*—a morality—appear; showing themselves in the voluntary yielding of any one man to any other, even though for no loftier (or less urgent) motive than the desire of escaping death, destitution, or torture. The idea of denying self for the sake of happiness seems of far later growth, and by finding the primary sources of conscience among the very earliest and deepest of living instincts we at once recognise its relationship to religion as other than that of offspring to parent. Figuratively speaking, one may say that the desire to live has been the parent of rectitude; necessity, its task-master; religion, its sick-nurse; experience its tutor; happiness, its helpmate; and reward and progress, its child.

To return to Mr. Mallock. Having informed us that morality is the 'perfect adjustment of the human mill,' and the object of the 'mill' to produce happiness, he continues thus:—

Now happiness is of different kinds, and it is the wisdom of the human race to choose the greatest and to adjust itself with a view of producing this, and this greatest happiness, the unbelieving moralist tells us, is virtue or morality.

Does he? I certainly have very frequently heard it proclaimed alike by 'unbelieving moralists' and by believing religionists that the

² The utilitarian formula, giving, as it does the air of a scientific conclusion to what is at best a very inadequate and indefinite idea of the basis of morals, has had much to answer for in confusing men's views with regard to some of the most conspicuous ethical facts. Even if all the moral phenomena to be accounted for could be brought within its terms, which, it seems to me, they can not be, it is yet as a formula

man who is virtuous and moral stands a better chance of being happy than the man who is vicious and immoral, because his virtue disposes him to derive happiness from sources otherwise barren, besides protecting him from various sorrows and inconveniences which lie in the path of vice; but this is quite a different thing from *identifying* happiness with virtue. Does the unbelieving moralist attempt to deny what every one else affirms and knows—that virtuous conduct, *per se*, is constantly a painful and laborious thing, only to be achieved at all for the sake of what lies beyond it, either within or without the immediate consciousness of the agent? I think not. In fighting such a position, Mr. Mallock is fighting the air. His chief difference with the 'unbelieving moralist' lies in his selection of the 'sake' for which the pains of virtue are to be deemed worth encountering. The unbelieving moralist finds his 'sake,' for example, in smoothing the paths of earthly life for himself *along with* his neighbour, and his posterity; the believing moralist thinks such a 'sake' insufficient, and must have a God and a future self in heaven to work and suffer for, or at least, with Mr. Mallock for his spokesman, he *believes* he must. All I maintain is, that the power and persistence of morality among men are not at all at the mercy of any individual's choice of the 'sake' for which he will spend his lifetime: in other words, it is not at the mercy of the religious or any other convictions of this, that, or the other person or group of persons. Without being an institution of the arbitrary will of a being who insists upon it as man's only chance of a comfortable immortality, it may yet have all the coercive strength while escaping the rigidity of such an institution, for it may depend upon what are, if less arbitrary, at least as exacting, as the will of any conceivable God—the conduct-conditions of man's life. To ascertain categorically what these (ever slightly fluctuating) conditions are, would of course be a superhuman task, since their complexity must equal that of the compounded and averaged requirements of all and every member of a many-millioned humanity. No religion has yet settled them for us definitely and finally. So much of them as we have felt out, forms, nevertheless, the basis of our rectitude, whether we give ourselves a religious explanation of our code or not.

Mr. Mallock's next utterance is as follows:—

Of sources [of gladness] there is a great variety. It is quite conceivable that great masses of men might harmoniously agree to differ, each seeking its own happiness and bidding the rest a hearty welcome to theirs. Now among all these possible consummations morality steps in and authoritatively orders us to aim only

objectionable, being vitiated by a triple ambiguity. There are three equally plausible but mutually incompatible ways of interpreting the phrase 'greatest happiness of the greatest number.' 1. Some happiness for all; 2. more happiness for some; 3. complete happiness for a few. 'Great,' moreover, as applied to happiness, may be applied quantitatively or qualitatively, and may imply a valuation in terms either of durability or intensity.

at one. One of these it implies is essentially better than the others, and we must go on believing this even though we fail to see it. . . . It is indeed better for humanity to go on aiming at a high state, even though it could never be realised, than at a low state that certainly could be. This is what morality implies.

Why is this taught and believed? he asks. Because virtuous happiness is greater than any other happiness. Thus, says Mr. Mallock, the unbelieving moralist answers, and there, he tells us, the unbelieving moralist ends. He can give no further account of his greatest happiness, nor convince any one that the greatest happiness does lie in the line of virtue who may happen to think otherwise.

Mr. Mallock makes a great point of this being able to convince a person out of his opinions, and upon this point I have, in passing, a remark to offer. By daringly advancing such an objection to the position of the unbelieving moralist, and by simultaneously suppressing the fact that precisely the same deficiency appears in the believer's persuasive powers, he once more misleads the unwary reader. Whether 'believing' or 'unbelieving,' the moralist can only appeal to that in a man which is there to be appealed to, and it is ten to one whether any viciously disposed person could be made really virtuous in heart and life by another man's account of God (even a human Christ-God) and of heaven, who would remain insensible to an appeal made to whatever social, domestic, and human affections lay slumbering beneath his vicious tendencies. Such affections precede and underlie the religious sensibilities, and hence the superior persuasive power and the superior working power of Christianity over other religions. There is more of social and domestic common sense in Christian morality than in any other the world has yet seen; hence the superior fitness of the Christian religions to spread and to penetrate to the core of daily life. Any appeal made to affections in ever-present relation to what is before a man's eyes and on his right hand and his left, whether the appeal be of a virtuous or a vicious character, is largely independent of supernatural threats and promises. Christian and post-Christian morality makes the most of such appeals in the cause of virtue. A man, for example, who could be persuaded to give up drinking, or thieving, or profligacy for the love of Christ and the hope of being with him for ever in a heaven where such courses are to be utterly shut out, is a man in whom exist other affections than those of mere self-interest; and these affections will be quite as readily drawn out by a clearly and earnestly drawn picture of the piteous effect of his selfishness on any fellow-creature the sinner loves (or even towards whom he bears no ill-will), as by the picture of God's grief or anger. Let the moralist, believing or unbelieving, go forth among his fellow-creatures and try.

It is noteworthy that Mr. Mallock makes his whole argument throughout this essay hinge upon a tacit but definite appeal to human

selfishness. He never once appeals to his reader as to a being whose happiness in the smallest degree depends upon the exercise of his personally unremunerative sympathies. He addresses a creature righteous only by compulsion—a creature against whom all the social forces of nature war—a creature, moreover, hardly likely to be won to virtue through desire of a heaven of Christian holiness. Is there anywhere a man sensitive to what God thinks of him who is yet utterly disregarding of the opinions of earthly beings? Is there any one alive who will pluck out his right eye for the chance of getting it back again to look at God with after he is dead, yet who would not be capable of doing so to make a parent, a sister, a friend, or a little child suffer less or enjoy more in this present life? Thanks to the myriad generations that have evolved us by and from out of our circumstances, and, by the help of religion and many other things, fostered our budding sympathies for our own perpetuation and well-being, we cannot, for the life of us, escape the destiny which we inherit along with the instincts which command it; we cannot escape the fact, for all our arguments, that every natural force which has direct relation to man at his present standpoint is on the side of his continuance and prosperity exactly in proportion to the delicacy, the accuracy, and the sensitiveness of his 'conscience.'

Finally Mr. Mallock points out three most indisputable facts, and draws his own conclusions from them:—

1st, that the essence of virtue is inward in the heart of man; 2nd, that its importance is incalculable, and its attainment the great end of life; 3rd, that its standard is something absolute, and not in the competence of any man or of all men to alter or abolish. . . . Deny any one of these three propositions (he says)—say that the essence of morality is in the outer act, not in the inward state; that its importance is small and second to many other things; that its standard is not absolute, but varies according to individual taste—and morality becomes at once impossible and not worth preaching. For all these characteristics of morality, its inwardness, its importance, and its absolute character, the believer can give account.

So, emphatically, can the evolutionist, be he a 'believer' or not.

He maintains with Mr. Mallock:—

1. 'That the essence of virtue is inward'—inheres in a special set of socially produced sensibilities in the individual, and not at all in any special set of outward acts, just as the 'essence' of sight is in the special susceptibility to light, not in looking at this or that object. And this moral susceptibility—this 'inward state'—the evolutionist declares to be the product of countless generations of fruitful experience.

2. 'That its importance is incalculable, and its attainment the great end of life.' The unbelieving moralist, as far as he is also an evolutionist, finds just so much justification for this supreme valuation of morality as he finds of its hitherto importance to the continuance of man's being and development on the earth; and this importance is truly, as Mr. Mallock says, 'incalculable.'

3. 'That its standard is something absolute, and not in the competence of any man or of all men to alter or abolish,' is what my object has been throughout this paper to exhibit. From the 'unbelieving moralist's' point of view morality appears far too deeply rooted in the necessities of man's being to be at the mercy of any individual's reason or religious belief, far less of his 'individual taste.' The only hint to the contrary that has been given occurs in an above quotation from Mr. Mallock's own essay!—namely, that 'it is conceivable that great masses of men might *harmoniously* agree to differ, each seeking its own happiness' in its own way. Such an arbitrary agreement is just what the evolutionist declines to admit to be scientifically 'conceivable' *at all* without conceiving at the same time the speedy and utter annihilation of human society; while he denies that it is *possible* at all, so long as human nature and its requirements remain constituted as at present.

For these three characteristics of morality, its inwardness, its importance, and its absolute character, the believer, says Mr. Mallock, can give account. He ascribes morality entirely to 'God's will,' which of course 'passes understanding.' 'Nothing, however,' he continues, 'is gained by postulating a mystery. Man must know its connection with himself; and this connection he finds in his belief in personal immortality. The first of his distinctive beliefs, God, *gives* him the connection; the second, his own personal immortality, *perpetuates* it.' So it does, very conveniently and very comfortingly, so long as one can honestly believe it. Not for one moment do I deny that in losing an easily syllabled *rationale* of morality, however vague its mental representation, we lose what has been a very useful and in some of its aspects a very beautiful thing. We *do* like to believe in an end that we may make our special, personal *own* in all nature's large impersonal workings. But the 'unbelieving moralist' must resign the luxury of such a belief; and all I insist upon is that his resignation leaves the springs of his virtue (so far as it *is* virtue, and not a disguised personal expediency) untouched. Those who have been or who have become just, pure, and true *in heart* under theological beliefs, have been or become so on grounds deeper than those beliefs—grounds which 'Modern Atheism' leaves untouched, and which philosophical investigation fortifies with new reasons from day to day.

The opinion which forebodes the collapse of morality—that is, of the observance and honouring of such habits of mind and life by individuals as are not felt by the agent to be consonant with the direct production of his own individual bliss—implies in him who holds it two important oversights. He overlooks, first, the existence of sympathy as one of the strongest and most deeply rooted motive powers of socialised man, rendering him back the result of his every act and forbearance as reflected from the love or hate of his fellow-men; and,

secondly, he overlooks the fact that this motive power not only exists, but that there is an utter absence, even at the present crisis, of anything in society tending to make us less dependent upon one another (and hence to lessen the natural inducements and provocations to sympathy), or to give any lasting advantage to a man accidentally or exceptionally destitute of this social sensibility. If the loss of the beliefs in God and in personal immortality will injuriously affect public opinion as to what is permissible in daily life—if it will deaden the affections or relax that iron rule of things which, in the development of man's destiny, has ever given an award of *survival* (against which all individual appeal is vain) to social sensibilities—if these effects will indeed be wrought by the honest hand of 'Modern Atheism,' then we may fear the worst; and, to put it in another and surely suggestive way, we may hope not long to feel it is the worst.

But if conscience, virtue, self-restraint, and self-bestowal be, in any true sense or on any grand scale, verily good for man through men, it will infallibly persist through all disturbance of opinion and whirlwind of destructive theory; and it will bear the blaze of all new lights science may turn upon it. If this thing we love so well—this chain of virtue, which we hug as our best treasure—be the good thing we believe it, it shall endure; if not—may we not dare to say?—we shall be the better losing it.

Meanwhile the mass of us are so helplessly social, that this way or that our liberty of act and of conscience is fettered—bound to the cause of the general good, or at least the general *code*, even in defiance of a personal recklessness as to 'right' and a will at variance with its own restrictions. No argument, no force in heaven or earth, is working now so strongly against morality as the very conditions of our existence, in present actual or possible surroundings, work for its preservation. Possibly, here and there, a man or a woman, in flinging aside the thralldom of an outworn creed, will fling away with it the principles he or she has mistakenly held to be one with it, and doomed to die with its death. Then comes a non-moral episode in any such life, when conscience falls numb and apparently lifeless, and with the force of a reaction the passions assert themselves violently. Happiness is wildly sought, pleasure greedily seized, under a perfectly genuine temporary conviction that good and evil are fictions so far as they profess to mean more than personal joy, of the means of obtaining which last each person may best judge for himself. A character, however, which thus becomes reckless, or even vicious, so to speak *upon conviction*, and which showed no rebellious symptoms so long as a religious, philosophical, or any received standard of conduct remained unimpaired, is in no danger whatever of becoming permanently selfish. Its conscientiousness will not allow it to do so. An infinity of suffering and effort may be required of it in its slow return through the devastation its outbreak has made, to

walk once more even though blindly in the old paths, or so far in them as they tally with the ineradicable sympathetic tendencies of such a character. But more or less tardily such a return is assured. Such a temporary lapse, however, occurring in perhaps thousands of isolated lives, in just the very section of society upon whose word, whose influence, and whose example, the rest depend for their rule of life, may—*must* produce a more or less wide-spread disturbance of moral opinion, looking for the time like an anarchy of principle. But though such may come, it will not stay: it shall work its own cure, and issue finally in a reformed moral order—an order, I confidently believe, in which equity shall be counted supreme among the virtues, and in which personal sincerity and self-restraint, covering as these do the whole area of men's conduct, shall be recognised as equity's twin manifestations.

'Conscience' has taken millenniums to develop, and it has developed in obedience to a *need*, not a creed—sprung out of the fundamental demands of progressive existence rather than from the comparatively recent demands of theological aspiration. The hope of heaven may be doomed to extinction, but not the will to live upon earth, and until the mass of mankind is in the mood for suicide, there will continue to be a right and a wrong road for men to walk in.

Although no considerations such as I have endeavoured to set forth can be expected to weigh with persons either deficiently endowed as to moral sensibility, or under the present influence of reactionary convictions, I would implore all calmly honest inquirers into the moral meaning of the great modern revolution to be of good courage. That human virtue is on the eve of reaching a difficult and stormy crisis in its development, I do not seek to deny; but that our power to weather that crisis, and to emerge beyond it with unscathed social sensibility, depends in any important degree on the failing vitality of religious creeds, I *do* deny, emphatically and utterly. Let us brace our wills beforehand to meet the inevitable crisis, and to see in that crisis a trial society must pass through in order to rid her, not of her code, but of its imperfections—not of her 'conscience,' but of its sickness.

In this paper I have made no attempt to argue Mr. Mallock out of his opinion. Indeed I do not address him at all, but only those among his readers who are likely to be distressed or misled by his glib and sinister insinuations; my object having been to recommend to such readers another view than that which he suggests as to the relationship subsisting between 'Modern Atheism' and modern morality.

Whether or no life without religious beliefs be 'worth living' is the next question that arises, and to its discussion I propose to devote a future paper.

L. S. BEVINGTON.

Nor, in our own country, must we fail to take notice of the establishment of School Boards. A generation hence we shall have a reading public almost as numerous as in America: even the very lowest classes will have acquired a certain culture which will beget demands both for journalists and 'literary persons.' The harvest will be plenteous indeed, but unless my advice be followed in some shape or another, the labourers will be comparatively few and superlatively inadequate.

I am well aware how mischievous, as well as troublesome, would be the encouragement of mediocrity; and in stating these promising facts I have no such purpose in my mind. On the contrary, there is an immense amount of mediocrity already in literature, which I think my proposition of training up 'clever Jack' to that calling would discourage. I have no expectation of establishing a manufacture for genius—and indeed, for reasons it is not necessary to specify, I would not do it if I could. But whereas all kinds of 'culture,' have been recommended to the youth of Great Britain (and certainly with no limit as to the expense of acquisition), the cultivation of such natural faculties as imagination and humour (for example) has never been suggested. The possibility of such a thing will doubtless be denied. I am quite certain, however, that they are capable of great development, and that they may be brought to attain, if not perfection, at all events a high degree of excellence. The proof, to those who choose to look for it, is plain enough even as matters stand. Use and opportunity are already producing scores of examples of it; if supplemented by early education they might surely produce still more.

There is so great and general a prejudice against special studies, that I must humbly conclude there is something in it. On the other hand, I know a large number of highly—that is broadly—educated persons, who are desperately dull. 'But would they have been less dull,' it may be asked, 'if they were also ignorant?' Yes, I believe they would. They have swallowed too much for digestions naturally weak; they have become inert, conceited, oppressive to themselves and others—Prigs. And I think that even clever young people suffer in a less degree from the same cause. Some one has written, 'Information is always useful.' This reminds me of the married lady, fond of bargains, who once bought a door-plate at a sale with 'Mr. Wilkins' on it. Her own name was Jones, but the door-plate was very cheap; and her husband, she argued, *might* die, and then she might marry a 'man of the name of Wilkins. 'Depend upon it, everything comes in useful,' she said, 'if you only keep it long enough.'

This is what I venture to doubt. I have myself purchased several door-plates (quite as burthensome, but not so cheap as that good lady's), which have been of no sort of use to me, and are still on hand.

JAMES PAYN.

MODERN ATHEISM AND MR. MALLOCK.

CONCLUSION.

HISTORY repeats itself; but never quite in the same key. The grand scientific hypothesis of this century is upon its trial, as were the theories of Galileo and of Newton before it. A useful minority of steady-headed thinkers are busily testing its scientific merits, and its ability to bear the strain alike of logic and of experiment: a larger section concern themselves with its theological bearings, gauging its title to credence mainly by the degree of its correspondence with pre-supposed canons of religious truth, and its tendency, if not to echo, at least to harmonise with the dicta of written and unwritten creeds.

But this is not all. The modern hypothesis differs in one important particular from the other great guesses by which men have directed themselves in research, or re-focussed their vision to take in an ever-widening range of experiences. The bearings of evolution, when fully comprehended, touch not merely matters of fact, but matters of principle; not only questions of dogma either, but questions of duty. The speculations to which it gives rise do not begin and end as matters of simple opinion; they cannot but have a practical moral outcome in proportion to the clearness with which their drift is perceived; and the thoughtful listener detects, beneath the somewhat noisy religious and metaphysical discussion going on around him, those deeper and more serious undertones of inquiry, which, interrogating as they do the very principles of right and wrong that control the daily life and action of men and women, will not wait for solution at the tardy hands of any theoriser upon the genesis of the universe. Already for some years past, the great question of human freedom and human responsibility has ceased to be merely the bugbear of solitary analysts of their own consciousness; and has been forced upon the bewildered attention of all sorts of people who would never have thought on such a matter at all, had it not turned out to be part and parcel of the theory which no one can escape hearing discussed, and upon which every educated man is supposed to have an opinion. 'What is the moral aspect of the new philosophy?' 'Is it competent to solve questions of right and wrong, and to regulate

views of duty and of purpose?' 'Is the code imposed by the new creed moral or immoral; or does it imply a collapse of all moral distinctions?' 'Have we wills? have we duties? have we hopes which may reconcile our wills to our duties?' Such are some of the questions raised in the wake of the new doctrine, and where is the human life they do not touch?

In a former paper I did my best to help pierce this cloud of controversial dust by which the ideas of right and wrong are obscured, by submitting the old claims of human virtue to human credence and respect to the test of purely secular theory. I tried to show the lifewardness of right doing; and how in the evolutional view of man's social condition we seem to have a firm basis for a clear theory of morals, quite independent of the comings and goings of religious creeds. I suggested that the general value of rectitude corresponds with the requirements of a race of mutually independent individuals, all alike bent upon as prolonged and as comfortable a survival as possible. In short, I gave, as I best might, the evolutionist's reasons for maintaining that *in the abstract* 'duty' is worth doing.

But I am aware that this theoretical position, however firmly established, goes very little way towards satisfying the doubts of many. Some minds are full of, and riveted upon, the fact that ever so consistent a theory of morals may fail to do the work of a sermon. Duty seems a dangerous matter to theorise about in cold blood; and although moral pleading, of course, presupposes moral theory of some kind, yet the theory, as merely such, cannot always be made to plead for itself. It makes its strongest appeals to the reflective few who are in little need of its lessons, and remains of small account in the eyes of the active many who must be about their business, and who, having much strain put upon their moral fibre by the temptations and rubs of life, need showing not merely that duty, in the abstract, is worth doing, but that it is, besides, worth their special *whit* to do it. It is not enough to show these latter that they owe their existence, and a great deal else, to the morality of former generations and of their neighbours; one must enforce the further conviction that they in their turn owe it to their neighbours and their children to be moral also. In short, the very nature of morality is such, that a perfect theory of it must include among its postulates man's sympathy with his fellows, and his appreciation of his own conscious existence. For it is not only needful that a code of progressive human conduct may be *logically* based upon it: it is null and void even as a theory, unless it can be married to certain existing human emotions, and can so sway the motives which underlie conduct.

The object of the present paper is to show, not indeed that the evolutionist's code of morals can be made forcible, and can justify its own demands in the case of every self-seeking sinner, but that while it fails in this direction neither more nor less than purely religious moral

pleas, it can be forcibly urged, and can justify its demands in cases where the loftier religious moralities have held their own: that it can still help the moral helpers of men, without adding to the weakness of the morally helpless. So far as human life is worth living, so far is it worth protecting. So far as it is not worth living, so far is it needful to ameliorate it. Duty, on secular principles, consists in the summarised conduct conducive to the *permanent protection* and *progressive amelioration* of human lot.

A sickly question is indeed asked in our day, whether this very life which duty is to subserve can be proved a thing worth subserving at all. There are always temperaments, and often moods, upon which pessimistic doubts intrude themselves, and such doubts take occasion to press to the front just now, with the assurance that the modern scientific renunciation of the belief in a personal life beyond death reinforces their pessimism, and shakes to its foundations the pretensions of secular morality. 'Is it not justifiable,' these doubters ask, 'to disregard, wherever convenient, the prospects of a race whose ills are so many as to leave room for question whether its best prospect is not to cease?'

Mr. Mallock has constituted himself the spokesman of this phase of feeling, and has expended a good deal of argument in its justification. He appears to have seized upon some of the sorriest mental and moral symptoms incidental to a searching phase of intellectual and social struggle, and to have magnified these symptoms into the importance of a normal and permanent variation. While, on one hand, one wonders in what cause, social, moral, or religious, it can be that any writer expends labour elaborately to explain his own aimlessness, to tell miserable men and women that they are miserable and to assure comfortable and passably moral men and women that they are only comfortable and moral because they are blind; one finds on the other hand a great deal in Mr. Mallock's position that supplies any writer who would sweep anew the circle of the modern ethical horizon with suggestions as to points at which definite scientific utterance is desirable.

The opinion I desire in the present article to oppose is, that what is called by Mr. Mallock 'positivism' controverts either the stability of moral obligations or the reality of life's value. It seems to me that Mr. Mallock bases his deplorable doubts upon a dual misconception of his data: upon the piecing together, that is, of two assumptions, each of which is fundamentally erroneous. These two assumptions are—first, that the felt value of life depends upon a belief that it will last for ever; second, that the coercive force of morality is entirely due to its ascription to an arbitrary and mysterious divine authority. Each of these positions I have occasion to deal with in the present paper. Lest, however, in speaking of life's value as itself the ground of duty's value, I seem to be dressing up the conclusion I

desire to arrive at in the disguise of a major premiss, I will first do something more than glance at the sensational query, 'Is life worth living?'

I. To demonstrate logically that life, moral or immoral, mortal or immortal, is worth living, is a task rendered impossible by the absurdity of its terms. General human life is not a measurable entity capable of any individual's positive valuation. There are no means whatever of affixing to it a fixed standard of worth; no means whatever of saying that, as a whole, it is either precious or worthless. The very constitution of living beings, the very being of life as at once the end and the starting-point of all physical, emotional, intellectual, and moral activity, gives us all we need for pronouncing it theoretically important, but this goes no way towards giving it a general practical value which it shall be beyond the power of the first hypochondriac to deny. 'Life' in the popular sense is a merely abstract name for a vast mass of concrete experiences and their appropriate emotions, each of which experiences is meanwhile of variable emotional value. There are numberless standards of such value, all equally human; many of them, perhaps, successively within the reach of a single individual. An end may be worth living for at twenty which will not be so at forty; or worth living for at forty which was not so at twenty.

Dressed in the pomp of high-flown abstractions this human life of ours, never for two hours or in two hearts of equal felt value, may be doubtless stripped of meaning—one valuation peeling off what another valuation leaves intact, until all *theoretical* reason for abstaining from suicide or from merciful wholesale murder seems explained away. But this is a false and factitious way of dealing with our data. As Emerson somewhere says: 'Nature trips us up when we strut;' and the facts presented to us on every hand by the busy eagerness of millions who never give themselves either a theological or a scientific reason for anything, but who are content to live by the reason of the hour, the home, and the heart, make the question look silly when it is crept about by perplexity-hunters, or is made the subject of elaborate treatises.

The only answer to the inquiry concerning life's worth which is deserving of consideration springs from the heart rather than the head of him who gives it; and is not of the nature of a demonstration, but of an assurance. Life is worth living wherever it is *felt to be so*; and it is felt to be so wherever there remains a hope of removing an actual misery or of acquiring an unpossessed joy. Nothing with the selfish but absolute despair of bettering or seeing bettered the condition of self—nothing with the sympathetic but the despair of bettering or seeing bettered the condition of some other person or persons—renders life undesirable and valueless, because felt to be so. There may be—probably are—seasons of nearly valueless living in the

lives of most persons of great sensibility; and here and there suicide testifies to the impatience of that actual despair which renders life not only painful, but unendurable. Still, the obviously interested way in which life is lived, not only by busy thinkers and leaders, but also by that vast majority of persons who give practical evidence of profound indifference alike to the group of assertions called religion, and the group of enigmas called philosophy, shews how amply sufficient are the aims and hopes, the successes and joys this world affords to make their share of conscious existence worth the having.

Feeling is the primary datum dictating all our valuations, emphasising variously reasons of equal logical validity, and differing in different minds and even different moods as to the force and direction of its stress. Thus to the question really at issue—‘*Is a life of eighty years worth living morally by a disbeliever in immortality?*’—the answer will vary with the person who gives it, and perhaps with the mood or circumstances he is in at the time he gives it. A socialised and sympathetic man, whose idea of happiness and whose power of feeling happy is inseparable from the feeling and opinions of others, will perhaps answer ‘Yes’; while the thoroughly selfish person, whose cruder stock of sensibilities leaves out all reference to others, will, likely enough, be as prompt as Mr. Mallock expects with his ‘No.’ Between these two extreme types there occur, of course, all shades and degrees of each character, and the more nearly the selfish and the sympathetic tendencies are balanced in a person’s character, the more difficult will it be for such a person to give himself a decided answer to the question of life’s worth under the social conditions which perpetually check his selfishness. Again, there is a similar variability as to the value different minds and different moods assign to the very ideas of a personal God and a personal immortality. No universally, or even generally true answer could be found to a question of value whose terms admit of all sorts of different adjustment according to the speaker’s personal experience.

It is in the highest degree serviceable to a true appreciation of the data at our disposal, that we should observe what are the phases and conditions of human life in which religious beliefs appear of greatest moral value. Much light is thrown on the nature of the relationship subsisting between religion and rectitude by the fact that it is in miserable, hopeless, and oppressed conditions that the deepest need is felt for, and the highest value placed upon religious consolations; and that it is in the case of the greatest criminality and least social sensitiveness that men chiefly require the menaces of supernatural creeds. The greater advance that is made in social well-being, and the keener the sympathy of the individual with the experiences of the fellow-beings his conduct affects, the less is the need of transcendental hopes and of transcendental fears. It is quite certain that an unsuccessful, unhealthy, or any way valueless and hopeless

earthly life is made more bearable by a belief in unfailing love which mysteriously permits the misery, and in unfailable power which will eventually remove it, and by the convinced hope of 'another chance' after death. No less certain is it that it must be some check upon a selfish libertine, a brutal tyrant, or a sneaking knave, to be possessed by a conviction that a strong Deity minutely sees, and is personally offended at, his evil life, and is able to make such worldly courses productive of hideous personal woe to the offender. It would be fanatical and false to deny that convinced religious belief is always and everywhere morally useless. And on both these accounts—because it makes earthly affliction more endurable, and because it in a measure protects society by here and there in a measure checking the wicked where human law cannot get at him, many persons commit the pathetic irrelevancy of saying it must be *true*. But at bottom we all know that truth does not thus wait upon utility. Else what should hinder the deliberate invention of a new dogma for 'authority' to preach upon the appearance of every new difficulty that arises in the government or education of life. As a matter of fact, indeed, this is just the course that in early days *was unconsciously* pursued in the finding of supernatural creeds; but hopeless as any of us may be of the secular resources for rendering attractive in our eyes the kind of life we dimly feel it to be for our good to lead, which of us dare thus open-eyed cheat ourselves or our fellows into virtue?*

If we analyse the comfort and the utility of religion as instanced above, we find it made up of material wholly belonging to this earthly life. Were there no sickness, and no earthly hopelessness and joylessness, there is nothing to show that there would be any need of or any demand for celestial comfort. Were there no cruelty, no imprudence, no crime of man against man, no conduct that induced human misery as its permanent result, there would be no need of supernal threats and promises. The miseries which it is the continual office of the moral impulses to remove are supposed in every supernatural longing. It is out of our own imperfections and inabilities

* Yet such a proceeding seems to be that recommended in the final chapter of Mr. Mallock's recent volume, 'Is Life worth Living?' Having virtually conceded (*vide* chap. ix.) that the 'positivist's' rejection of dogmatic religion is rationally founded, and consistent with the deliverances of the best-formed and best-informed intelligence, he supplements this concession with the assertion that positive morality is no less dogmatic and superstitious than is theology; and he concludes his volume with a suggestion that, in order to retain a belief in the meaning of morality, and hence (observe the admission) in the value of life, we should throw ourselves into factitious ecstasies—clinging by blind force of will to the creeds we know to be 'impossible,' and echoing the shibboleths of a mediæval church—as our one chance of escaping a deathly listlessness.

This seems to me very like a recommendation to deal *untruly* and *unheroically* with our convictions, in order that we may keep a belief in the value of truth and heroism; which is absurd.

that we have constructed our religious ideals. Largely as religious belief has contributed one way and another, here to make up for the breaches misdoing causes, there to hinder or discourage the misdoing itself, it appears to me obvious that it is upon men's sense of the value of their present work-a-day healthful liberties and lifeward enjoyments that religion indirectly depends for its high valuation. Rectitude of earthly living forwards earthly success and progress; rectitude has nevertheless its practical difficulties and impediments; therefore all hail to any external and unquestionable make-weight thrown into the scale of moral obligation. This is not commonly reasoned out; it is simply exhibited in religious conduct.

In estimating our moral and emotional prospects under altered speculative conditions, it is well to bear in mind that the 'virtuously disposed character is alone the type which really remains absolutely unopposed by the governing forces, social and other, of man's world. The forces called into play by an individual's own wants, taken, as in the crowd they must be taken, along with his neighbours' wants, go to make him happy and free just so far as his personal interests fit in with those of his community. This again is plainly the case in exact proportion to the extra-selfish tendencies and tastes—in other words the *sympathies*—which the man possesses. This, once more, is the measure of his moral stature.

And thus we come in sight of a good, sound, rational hope for the preservation, so long as we need them, of those dear fetters of righteousness, which, as Mr. Mallock admits, gives life much of its colour and zest, and which nearly all of us vaguely, but heartily, dread to lose.

The practical view of the matter is this. Were every one's progenitors temperate, chaste, and self-controlled; were every man's neighbours sincere, honest, and just; were every man's children filial, grateful, and kind; then every man would be rid of the external and circumstantial causes of the chief miseries of his life. The world would cease at any rate to be a 'vale of tears.' Positive woe would vanish, and every man for his fourscore years would be *negatively* happy. Further, were every man's own self, his disposition and tastes, such as to make him take spontaneous delight in the exercise of beneficence, temperance, purity, and sincerity, the *positive* element would be added to his happiness; life would be swept clean of its *negative* sorrows: the world would become a world of smiles and of songs, and nothing would remain but to exercise those pleasant liberties which the internal conformity of will with external requirements would secure, in the discovery and application of such outward means of checking disease and procuring enjoyment as were needed to rid life and death of what pains remained.

This is the *Utopia* of the secular moralist: a vision, of course; yet to those who see it it seems no contemptible vision, and the hope of its gradual realisation no insane or fanatical hope. It is a vision

seen through no coloured spy-glass of impatient wish, or excited fancy, but through the natural lens of what facts we know. It looms in its exceeding peacefulness and beauty through the fires of present passion and the reeking miasm of present lust; through the chill fogs of present discouragement, and the twilight of present ignorance. Every throb of generous emotion yielded to and acted upon, every paltry impulse to exalt the bliss of the moment above the strength of the morrow triumphed over by the *will* (I use the word advisedly), brings nearer the realisation of the vision: a realisation opposed by nothing that nature is not, *through man's own nature and needs*, herself opposing; slowly, indeed, but unvaryingly and effectually.

Fulfilled, even in prospect, it presents to the imagination of the moralist a picture of a happy community, in whose midst men and women would forget their whole life long (as happy individuals do in their happy hours forget) to crave for a future world: being fully occupied in the busy employment of powers and enjoyment of liberties between the unconscious cradle of healthy infancy and the unconscious death-bed of satisfied old age.

It is at this point, however, that Mr. Mallock, and those who agree with him, meet us with a threefold objection.

1. It is urged that no object is, humanly speaking, worth a life-long struggle for, that is only to be attained by another person than the struggler; and that so, this distant *Utopia* of the secular moralist will avail nothing to make the present sinner good, nor to make the present sufferer happy.

One answer to this is, that sinners and sufferers are the two classes of persons in whose behalf the vision enables those who see it to labour. Indirectly, therefore, it is not inoperative even in the case of the wicked and the wretched.

As to its not being worth a life-long struggle on the part of those who see it, that is their concern. And to go no further, certain present social movements, instituted largely by disbelievers in personal immortality and with no hope of large result in their own generation, indicate that, as a simple matter of fact, such prospective altruistic hope is profoundly inspiring to an increasing minority. This is an indisputable and stubborn fact. Moreover, persons capable of being thus inspired to energy and virtue are precisely those whose desires are in the long run forwarded by the march of superhuman forces, being in harmony with the demands of a dominating race. There is scientific ground for expecting this type of person to be the surviving type: the incorporateness of its aims and tastes with the interest of the community will ensure to it that aid of the community denied to more self-bounded aims and tastes; and it bids fair to be multiplied and perpetuated to the slow extinction of less social types. The man who is morally disposed escapes much of social friction; his word is trusted, the mighty voice of public opinion endorses the

spontaneous stirrings of his will ; his life will thus be longer, his children healthier, his possessions more secure than those of others. These are truths : nay, more, they are truisms ; but their mention is necessary in course of criticising any argument which attempts their suppression.

2. It will be urged by some, as it is urged by Mr. Mallock, that even were it conceivably worth while to strive painfully for the good others shall enjoy, *supposing these others might enjoy it for ever*, yet, that the value of this good itself vanishes with its eternity, and it is worth no one's pains to secure a boon for his progeny or his neighbour, which neither could enjoy for more than some fourscore years.

To this the reply is that duration is but one of many measurements, and that as regards happiness it is in practice ignored even by many a professed believer in the theory or creed which makes it an exclusive test of value. So long as there remains any hope of increased welfare in this life, whether to be enjoyed by self or by those rendered dear by affection, every one's practice testifies to his sense of its value, and to its sufficiency as a motive for action. The self-denying, self-bestowing, self-consuming efforts of parents on behalf of the avowedly worldly and temporal advantage of those who shall live after their own death, the secular education of their children, the making of their wills, and their frequent ambition to 'found a family' or 'make a name,' are some of the most common and obvious illustrations of men's ordinary belief in the solid value of even imperfect earthly well-being *taken by itself, and in spite of its short duration*. Such considerations of the posthumous earthly consequences of present action are indeed, with the most sordid and unimaginative of human beings, frequently far more coercive to orderly, veracious, and 'respectable' conduct than are any of the inducements religion holds out through the consequences the agent shall bring upon *himself* in a future life.

Again, in all the most powerful inducements to action, whether religious or worldly, whether good or bad, temporal or eternal, it seems at bottom to be the thoroughness of the good to be possessed rather than its duration which is pictured by the seeker after it, and which actually dominates his purpose. The intensity of the satisfaction hoped for is first, and the certainty of the hope is second among the motive forces at work upon human will. Duration comes in as a later consideration, and generally as an apology or compensation for deficiency in either of the other inducements. At no moment can we experience more than that moment's satisfaction, and at no moment can the future be more than imaginatively represented. This being the case, the future experience of others is neither more nor less real to us than the future experience of self, and just in proportion to the degree in which present dependence on, and sympathy

with others influences our conduct hour by hour, will the future of others influence our desires as to the future consequences of that conduct.

At this point, therefore, I would again ask Mr. Mallock what advantage the 'believer's' power of rendering ideally luminous and attractive his own peace has over the similar power of the non-religious moralist? In arguing with the sinner, whose valuation of good is simply founded on its nearness to his hand, either is similarly helpless. The religious believer sees in God's will, and feels in God's approbation, the way of peace; the evolutionist feels the same glow of calm blessedness in contemplating a mass of human beings whom his own smallest act of generosity, his own smallest achievement in self-education and self-elevation, cannot but affect beneficially. There is no small and great for him, since all is effectual. The least thing done for the sake of Christ is held valuable by the Christian theist. The secular moralist feels the same intensity of purpose, the same eagerness for result in the least thing done, as it were, *with* Christ, in behalf of Lazarus or Magdalen, and tries to feel the same for the perhaps less moving personalities of his conventional neighbours. In neither case is the duration of the end sought the only or the most direct measure of its worth. The thing itself is wanted and striven for; when achieved further measures will of course be needed to retain it, and further hopes will loom beyond it, but this is an after consideration. The thing is valuable for itself, not for the number of hours or years it is present. The quality of happiness is not at the mercy of its quantity any more than is the light of the sun less truly light because it is not the light of Sirius, or because on some astronomical morrow it may be utterly extinguished. But the quality of happiness is dependent upon its freedom from alloy or painful reaction. It is an insult to righteous happiness to give in without demur (as so many do) to the ignorant and vulgar assumption of its intrinsic unreality, or the unreality of its superiority, apart from a theory of its permanence. It is constantly assumed, and seldom boldly denied, that only by making it out eternal can we establish the right of conscientious pleasure to equal weight and value with the careless bliss of a licentious hour. In point of fact, however, by those who are fortunately able to experience it at all, it is *felt* as joy in its present experience, and has the durability and fertility of its good effects to recommend it *over and above* its present excellence.

Why then, it may be asked, does the current notion persist as to the superior *present* value of selfish over virtuous happiness? I reply, it is rooted, partly in want of imagination, and partly in a mean and cowardly despair. Beneficent joy, sweet as its presence is felt to be, does profess to have a value that outlasts that present sweetness. Vicious or careless pleasure professes nothing of the sort,

and through the very paucity of its ideal suggests greater apparent completeness, and attains a greater apparent success than the rival pleasures of conscience. It is at once recognised as being all it professes to be. But once render *certain* in men's eyes such consequences as are admittedly only possible through rectitude, and much will be accomplished to rid vice of its plausibility. It is because we have not yet done all we can, and are almost hopeless of doing all we have it at heart to do, with this life's resources, that we are so prone, either viciously to despond to the point of a greedy seizure upon handy pleasure, or, if virtuously disposed, to sigh at life, and picture the fruition of our hopes in some unearthly future not dependent upon our patience for its production. The sanguine 'positivist,' however, forced to concentrate his hopes on this world, sees with fresh vividness that all has *not* been done that may be done; that only by self-consecration to virtuous effort can more be accomplished than we have yet seen of human welfare; and that 'every little helps.' He values the present none the less because he can mentally present to himself the end of the planet. Life is not less precious to him, either individually or socially viewed, because, for all he can see, it is of definite duration. Rather the more. Because he must die, and others must die, he does not therefore conclude that life may as well be one thing as another. If one year may as well be wretched and productive of further wretchedness, as happy and good, why not a million million years? If it be a good thing to be healthy, happy, and free at all (and hence to be instrumental in diffusing health, happiness, and freedom, at all), why not next year as well as at the end of threescore and ten next years? The course of conduct which inevitably results in unalloyed and unreactionary welfare *somewhere*, is in every case similar, and in every case right. He is happiest who has within himself the means of obtaining such welfare for others while in the exercise of his own favourite pursuits and his own readiest impulses. He is also the most moral.

Once more, as to the reality of a purpose and reasonableness of an effort which regards only the good of others or the posthumous recognition of a man's own services. The desire of posthumous reputation *is* all-powerful when present, but it is, and can be, the desire of a few only. Still, for those few it is decidedly of quite equal force as a moral influence with the desire of heaven; and (for the nonce taking Mr. Mallock's criterion and calling that hope most reasonable which is a hope for *self*) it is quite equally reasonable. In one case, as in the other, the present emotion is determined by a thought of what *shall be*, not by any immediate pressure. The future that shall begin at one's death is, in either case alike, removed from the life whose worth and duty we are discussing; and the only question is, which—through the vividness of its mental representation, the sureness with which it can be counted on, and the clearness

of the present means for forwarding it—has superior force as an inspiring idea? The idea of being spoken of approvingly—loved, remembered, memorialised in men's lives and works—is as clearly apprehensible *now* as is the idea of any heaven; the feeling that it shall so be is a present delight, and it is the *present* delight in a *future* good which alone can affect present motive. We are pushed by our hope into action, not drawn by the, as yet non-existent, something hoped for. Facts, if we can take them as they are, and can exclude habitual doctrinal bias, tell in favour of the greater attractiveness for the mass of mankind possessed by the idea of a posthumous earthly consequence over that of a personal heaven. The impulse that impels Hodge to give up his drinking, and to save for the sake of his children, is more, and not less, deeply rooted than is the impulse to do so for the sake of getting safe to heaven, or for the sake of pleasing an invisible divinity. It is more natural for the man of recognised public fame to abstain from this or that personal satisfaction because indulgence might darken his fame, or lessen his son's advantage from it, than to abstain for the sake of religious consequences. More natural, I say, and not weakened by the loss of supernatural beliefs; and on both these accounts, a safer and surer motive for the moralist to appeal to.

As to heaven, the idea constantly exhibits itself as a *pis aller* rather than a natural craving. All, save the few who seek suicide—which, by the way, in the eyes of those who commit it, never means a jump to heaven, but always a cessation of consciousness—regard death, when feeling and speaking naturally, as a regrettable event. This is because death is nearly always at our present stage of civilisation, premature and painful. When death is truly welcomed, either for self or for a loved one, it is welcomed not as a positive good, but as a relief; a cessation of something *not* good—painful; and so long as such a thing as human health of mind or body exists and can be enjoyed, death will be regarded as an evil, however firm the theoretical belief in heavenly bliss. Moreover, beliefs which associate the chief meaning and value of right conduct with a supposed good inseparably connected with dying, themselves oppose the lifeward impetus of the mind, tend to render the connotations of virtue depressing, and will continue in a measure to fail of brisk moral attractiveness for the average healthy character. It is to be wished, for virtue's own sake, that we could rid her finally of the smell of grave-clothes, infusing into our hymns in her honour some ring of innocent earthly laughter, some warmth of the blood of this life. Much, we believe, would be gained on the spot, could we show rectitude clearly to the eyes of all in its daylight colours; not as the mysteriously-compiled and painfully-retained passport to the favour of a God, but as the natural expression and result of all the generous affections of this dear daily life.

3. A further complaint sometimes advanced against the moral theory connected with evolutional belief is that it is *over the heads* of selfish, narrow, and worldly natures. As much may be said of the morality of pure Christianity. I venture to suggest that such an indictment, even though true, is less serious than would be its converse. A morality, of which this is the worst that can be said, is surely safer from overthrow than would be a morality that appeared *under the feet* of the 'salt of the earth,' as the morality does in fact appear whose strongest motives are the hope of personal heaven, or even personal gratitude to a divine benefactor. A moral ideal seen clearly, and aspired after strongly by the gifted minority, is more likely of its own force (thus mysteriously displayed over the heads of the majority) eventually to raise the moral tone of that public opinion which, more than any gospel, sways the majority, than would be a theory whose inducements were easily apprehensible from the level of uncivilised natures. Better even, socially speaking, that a doctrine should, for a time, fail to raise the low, than that it should in any instance succeed in raising them at the price of lowering the noble. For as in science the truest theory, and as in politics the shrewdest economy, ever prevails over what comes short in these respective essentials of science or of policy, so in moral matters the highest—that is, the least *personally-bounded* morality—is destined, as all history goes to show, to prevail over forms of morality in which the sanctions are of a more limited and personal character.

But let us see what Mr. Mallock says in support of a contrary opinion. Having previously satirised George Eliot's aspirations after 'beauteous order,' 'kind smiles,' and 'sweet purity,' as '*a lot of fine phrases*,' he remarks, concerning J. S. Mill's description of what is to make life perennially desirable and moral, 'that it is as vague as George Eliot's,' and that to the question as to what is to be the test of conduct 'his answer is just as worthless' as is hers.

Are states of feeling, or thought coloured by feeling under the excitement of beauty, an end so definite that any man can work for it? Or could they form a test even were they so, by which we could condemn any gratification, however base or abnormal, which we might passionately and persistently long for? Or, granting even that such longings did stand condemned as distracting us on our course, should not we in this case best conquer temptation by yielding to it?†

Such is the form of Mr. Mallock's inquiry. Could such a happiness as appeared attractive to Mill 'form a test of value by which we could condemn any base or abnormal gratification,' or could it show the unwisdom of 'conquering temptation' by 'yielding to it'? Truly, no. Such a happiness enters not into the heart of 'abnormally base' human nature to conceive; nor does it gravely concern the evolutional moralist that it should. What is 'abnormal' is, as such, foredoomed, and a moral rule of life is no more vitiated by non-

† *Nineteenth Century*, September 1877, p. 270.

applicability to abnormal cases of conduct or character than is a rule of reason, intended for the guidance of rational minds, rendered null and void by failing to cover and accommodate itself to the vagaries of the lunatic mind. It is as little necessary for moral certitude that rules and motives for right living should appear attractive to the abnormally depraved, as it is that the right mode of using the limbs for use, pleasure, and healthy exercise should be practicable by the deformed wretch who has lost or who was born without arms or legs. Nature is, so to speak, able to punish her monstrous and diseased cases, physical, mental, or moral, without our help; and Mr. Mallock does but expose the weak points in his argument when ~~he~~ such cases in by the heels to give point to it. We are not concerned to show that the ideal bliss of a Mill or a George Eliot will be powerfully attractive to the imagination of the abnormally base, any more than the attractions of religion can be so; but only that what attractiveness they do possess is unaffected by the loss of religion, and that whether attractive or not as matter for preaching, virtue, as matter of practice, yields a larger *total* of satisfaction, or, to put it another way, secures its followers from more misery than vice does.

Mr. Mallock continually asks the secular moralist to declare what is the *something* of which vice robs us, and which virtue alone can procure for us. Now, to me it seems clear that the 'something' procurable by rectitude is simply the slow and certain amelioration of man's condition upon earth; the improvement, positive and negative, of his position and resources through the conforming of his very will with the conditions of his own life. This is the abstract, external account of the 'something.' Its relation to personal happiness consists in altering the character and balance of desires, so that they shall be more simply, more surely, and more permanently gratified, rather than in bringing certain fulfilment to haphazard personal wishes; in *improving the quality* of happiness, by ridding it of all dull, peaceless, or painful reaction, rather than in directly *increasing its quantity*.

In my last paper I took some pains to affirm that this 'something' is not, previously to experience, seen by all alike to be desirable. Fortunately its reality does not depend either upon its desirability or upon its instant obviousness. I further pointed out, however, that the partial invisibility of virtuous content is not new or peculiar to modern secular ends of virtue, but that it has in all ages stood in the way of religious inducements to morality. The 'unregenerate' hardness of heart has baffled and distressed thousands of moral teachers from Christ downwards, who have found it no easier to send the obdurate sinner to taste of hell on the spot, and so be convinced of the error of his ways, than the modern moralist finds it on the spot to visit upon him the secular pains, penalties, and

deprivations that follow in the track of vice. The difficulty merely remains to distress, but is not newly discovered by, the nineteenth-century lover of his kind.

Here let me suggest that nothing in ethical discussion is more mischievous or more misleading than the assumption, so often made and so seldom contradicted, that the several means of happiness entirely elude comparative valuation. As a matter of fact, happiness can be tested like any other thing, either directly, or economically. Tested through its effects. Only, being a matter of individual consciousness, such comparison, to be valid, must be made by a valuer who is himself capable of experiencing the several forms of happiness. We should not commit a task dependent on nicety of vision to the colour-blind, but to the person of delicate sensibility to minute distinctions of shade. A man who can only see blue and yellow is no fit judge of red and green. To lay down the chromatic law we must refer to one who knows all about both. And his decision once given, we, the colour-blind, should submit our judgment to his under pain of inconvenience. All that signifies is that, in thus yielding to authority, we should not suppress or violate any of our other knowledge, and that we should demand on the part of our teacher entire consistency with his own account of things.

Now, we have as much practical proof as common sense and reflection can help us to, that the persons who, sharing the commoner sensibilities to selfish pleasure, are *besides* susceptible to moral pleasures, are in this very fact richer, better off, more 'highly endowed,' and more safely placed than those who can appreciate the former only. We have the same proof of this as we have that the seeing man is better off than the blind man. And this, *despite the blind man's abnormally-intensified sense of hearing or of touch*. Mr. Mallock, however, repeatedly alludes to the philosophical temper with regard to happiness as if it, *per se*, incapacitated its possessor for a just appreciation of the commoner and coarser incentives which move the mass of mankind. He speaks in one place of philosophic moralists being of 'too fine a nature to understand' that virtuous happiness cannot be for all, an end in itself; implying that the fine nature of such men debars them from appreciating the counter-attractions that move the masses. Again, he speaks of 'the shy, profound student incapable of understanding passion,' 'talking about moral matters as if scientific research were the great thing to live for;' and he contrasts such a person with 'the fashionable *femme incomprise* famishing for some mad distraction,'* as if these two respectively were the main types of a true and broad division of human character, instead of two extremes between which it is contained; between which for the most part life is lived, and must be legislated for, philosophised for, and cared for. Let us agree with Mr. Mallock that there may

* *Nineteenth Century*, September 1877, pp. 271-2.

be 'something grotesque' in the picture he draws 'of a *savant* emerging from the examination of a beetle's wing or a speculation upon parallel lines before men and women of the world, flushed or embittered with the joys, the passions, or the pains of life, led by the bright or dark allurements of ambition, or of vanity, or of love, to instruct them on the strongest motives to action, and the real secret of making the most of this life.'⁹ This picture may be grotesque, since it presents a contrast, strong to incongruity; but when the cynic laugh has subsided, the question arises whether the real secret of the solid happiness all alike are in search of, and, consequently, the real *secret of a correct judgment* as to the wisest course of human conduct, does not lie nearer to the man who is himself happy, and who causes others no misery, among his beetles and his parallel lines, than to the men and women who are sometimes 'flushed,' often 'embittered,' and always demoralised by the restless and selfish excitements of life. There are, indeed, moods in life when this rather flippant argument of Mr. Mallock's arises to taunt and depress the earnest thinker. But its force is greater than its depth, and in a sound mind it passes and re-passes along with other shallow arguments of its kind, but does not stay. The mistake is in investing a mere mood with the importance of a final conviction, as if it were gathered from a full and finished survey of *all* the facts, instead of from the excited bias of adventitious despondency. We think Mr. Mallock's arguments, taken as a whole, may be credited with this mistake, since the wave of popular feeling to which they give utterance seems an obviously superficial symptom of intellectual conflict rather than to have about it any characteristic features of a serious or general psychological revolution.

Of course there are persons among us of accidental emotional deficiency, to whom passion is but a word in the dictionary, who know it only from the outside, and who regard its control as part of an obvious and easy theory; persons who, being for ever necessarily ignorant of their own ignorance concerning it, are unfit to fill the office of teachers of the way of life, however keen their intellect may be. There are other equally one-sided characters who, on the contrary, note little else in life *than* passion and its excitements; who indeed identify 'life' with 'passion' in their very language. But, besides these two types of character named by Mr. Mallock, there exists a third class; persons whose humanity is of so wide a range that at various points in their experience they touch one extreme and the other; seeing life alternately from the intellectual and the impassioned point of view. And, lastly, there is that vast majority of men and women who are neither distinctively passionate nor distinctively passionless, but the rule of whose lives is for the most part

⁹ *Nineteenth Century*, September 1877, p. 271.

accepted at the hands of whomsoever may have been their educators, and whose conduct is pretty uniformly guided by so much of public opinion as touches them and their concerns; persons who feel, without resisting, the coercive force of convention, and owe their virtues and their vices alike to what the habit, wise or foolish, of their day, their class, or their country prescribes or proscribes. This morally inert majority it is, upon whose conduct, after all, the secure continuance and well-being of nature's favourite, the race, mainly depends, and for whom, therefore, it chiefly imports that a strong, sound, and healthy code of living should be formulated. But it is the third class of persons whom I have mentioned—the class of widely and keenly gifted men and women among whom the prophets and poets of the world are found, those whose words have been collected into bibles and called divine—these it is who must draw up the required code. Not either of the extreme and one-sided groups whom Mr. Mallock alone mentions; not those who see without feeling, nor those who feel without seeing, nor even those who do both without caring; but those who, feeling more strongly than others, can more rightly value what they see, and who, seeing more broadly than others, can more rightly interpret what they feel: these shall be, as they have ever been, our helmsmen through all tempests of moral and social revolution; and there are nowadays many of Mr. Mallock's 'unbelievers' as well as some 'believers' among them. Hence, possibly, the tolerance which surprises him of 'deans and cardinals' towards 'atheists and unbelievers.'¹⁰ It is a moral agreement which at our day, most concerns men; not a religious agreement; a truly significant fact, indicating that we have reached that stage in our advancing mental and experiential development when the reins of duty must be in an increasing number of cases definitely passed from the exclusive keeping of our creed and our conventions, to that of as much independent conscience as we have already acquired. Religion's foster-child, Society, must eventually learn to trust her own two feet of civil and moral law, and run alone.

The crisis is solemn. Even from the evolutionary standpoint its seriousness can hardly be over-stated. Mr. Mallock counts upon the universal belief in its seriousness for all his effects in writing down such belief on the part of the 'positivist' as folly. But does life, in face of such considerations as are in our day pressed upon us, lose either its meaning or its value? Mr. Mallock assures us that it does, and that the 'positivists' are only contented in so far as they overlook the fact.

But to tell truth, the key to the position is not thus missed by the positive thinkers. They see the same facts as Mr. Mallock sees, but they interpret them differently, because they see also certain other facts to which Mr. Mallock is apparently blind. They see what

¹⁰ *Nineteenth Century*, September 1877, p. 254.

religious belief has done in past times by way of aiding men in the uphill road from a lower to a higher state of civilisation. They see in addition how and why it has done so, and further it is obvious to them what religion has *not* done; the points at which it has overstept the borders of true rectitude, and the points at which it has provided moral cures more injurious than the diseases assailed, by directing into fictitious and unnatural channels the strong human forces it was necessary to educate. The 'positivist' observes again the points at which religious authority has unduly restrained the impulse to social amendment, only because no text for such amendment could be recognised in the canon laid down for the wants of an earlier and more barbarous epoch. In short, there are points at which religious belief has militated against man's developing conscience to the extent of warping and stunting it, and points at which it has stimulated such development in false directions, producing cumbersome and useless moral excrescences which it is part of the pain and grief of our day to lop off or eradicate. Our 'unbelievers' know what they lose in losing religion. They lose their moral sofas, their spiritual 'cakes and ale;' but the solid ground remains for spiritual exercise, and the bread and meat of success and survival will continue to reward that exercise wherever faithfully performed.

II. Throughout the historic past, notwithstanding minor changes in practical codes, the received theory of duty has been undeniably this:—that virtue consists in the conformity of voluntary human conduct to the will of a god or of gods. Yet to show how little definite and coercive has been the sense of moral obligation so based, we find that on this common ground of ethico-religious persuasion, nearly every possible human action and forbearance has been somewhere or somewhen both accused and excused. On religious grounds, *taking religion as a whole*, everything men and women can do, and every motive they can feel, may be at once disclosed as righteous and as wicked. Change of latitude and longitude, or of date, effects so much change in moral colouring that virtues get transformed into crimes, and crimes into virtues. Yet every reason that can be urged against taking this broad view of religion in dealing with the question, is either on the face of it dogmatic and sectarian, and begs the question we seek to answer; or else such objection must take a merely moral ground, and credit this religion with higher morality than that; which is to concede the point at issue, namely, that men's moral sense dominates their religious sense.

If there were no other standard than a religious one, by comparison with which religious *codes* might correct themselves and one another, moral theory would indeed be in a hopeless plight. In these days, when access is easy to the conflicting canons of various races, and of various phases of civilisation, and when the annals of man's conscience present their many-hued pages in impartial succession, the observer's

eye for moral colouring might well become so confused as to see all white, or else all black, together.

All moralities have been alike religious. Who, then, on religious grounds, can declare to us that this or that morality is perfect, complete, final or supreme? Truly, there were here room for endless wrangling and for endless sophistry, were it not for the speedy check put upon dispute by the answer given, in unison, by the civilised theologian and the civilised secularist; to wit:—Moralities may, indeed, all have been alike religious; *but all religions have not been alike moral.* The religionist adds of course, 'Wherefore, my religion, being of superior moral texture, is true,' wherewith the secularist shakes his head, and looks further for his conclusion.

It affects the problem no way, except as giving room for quibble, that the moral reformer of a religion constantly affirms that it is *true religion* itself he for the first time establishes, or that he claims deference to his improved moral ideal by an impassioned proclamation, either that it is supernaturally revealed, or that it is supernaturally handed down to him, as a *religion*. The one important fact remains in every such case, that it is upon the rock of moral faith the reformer stands to preach his new doctrine, and to decry old orthodoxies; and it is the moral response, or the want of it, in the consciences of his hearers, which, on this hand, permits them to accept him as a prophet, or, on the other, causes them to persecute him as a heretic or a blasphemer.

So much in love is the modern world with the idea of virtue, that the modern measure of divinity is, itself, virtue, and nothing else. While infant society owed whatever peace and comfort it possessed to the strength, individual or numerical, of its members, power was the crowning attribute of its god, and miracle the chief evidence of his existence. But to what proof does the civilised modern Christian fly when challenged to show his creed better than that of the lascivious Greek, the fatalistic and indolent Turk, or the murderous Thug? To what proof does the Protestant fly to prove his Christianity sounder than that of the cruel Inquisitor, or the lying Jesuit? Will not each quote the moral lessons included in the creed he professes as evidence of its truth? Will he not show the deity he worships, or the prophet whose deity he accepts, to be a more civilised being, a purer, a truer, a juster, a gentler, or a more sympathetic being, than other men's objects of worship?

I once heard a Christianised Persian gentleman give his reason for having, after much study, inquiry, and hesitation, resigned Mohammedanism in favour of Christianity. What conquered him was the single attribute of fatherly *love* attributed by Christians to their God. This, of course, shows that this Mohammedan was, *first*, a believer in the excellence of fatherly love; secondly, and on account of that belief, he became an adherent of a creed where such love was

a prominent attribute of deity; and this single case seems to me to contain 'in little' all the characteristic features of wholesale religious reformations. The progress of theology has not consisted in the intellectual discovery of *objective theological* truth; but, so to speak, in the emotional discovery of *subjective moral* truth; in the new awakening age by age of fresh individual response to the laws of social fellowship. The 'revelation' impressed from without has been then, for the first time, felt within; the man arises in the awful mystery of new moral certainty, and cries to his fellows that which they indeed need, but are only just ripe, to hear. So a new prophet is proclaimed amongst men, and a new bible or a new church, a new sect or a new reformation takes its place for evermore among the influences that go to form the generations.

It seems to me that the belief in immortality, and the belief in supernatural moral authority, are *secondary, incidental, and theoretical* beliefs, deriving their existence and their strength solely from the *primary, essential, and practical* certainties,—1stly, that life is the first concern of living beings; 2ndly, that life is capable of being continually made safer, easier, and happier; 3rdly, that the human will is an ulterior agency in improving human resources; and 4thly, that a more satisfactory total of result is obtainable by the agency of wills set upon virtue than upon wills set only upon immediate self-service. Everything in the history of religious codes goes to show them at the mercy of any and every advance in social feeling. Religious sanctions have ever bent to moralities rather than moralities to them. This is increasingly the case, as social justifications for virtue emerge into recognition. 'Better than his creed' is a common phrase among us, and it is one of the typical phrases of our time. A perfectly honest, sober, and generous atheist comes far nearer to the dominant modern idea of a 'good' man, than does the orthodox devotee ready to lie, extort, tyrannise, or upbraid in service of a religion he unfeignedly and wholly believes.

All things considered, the great modern disturbance about right and wrong as something dissociated from theology is itself a sign that morality is in a condition of high vitality, militant progress, and vigorous growth. It may be passing through a metamorphosis—probably is; and the items of the code that shall govern the consciences to come may in various ways differ from those comprised in earlier and more empirical codes; but at this hour of wide-spread free-thought and deeply deplored selfishness, conscience (in the very courage of free-thought and the very conviction of selfishness) shows itself alive, and bent on holding its own if it can.

What are its chances of success? Nature is unswervingly and at bottom on the side of its support. I utterly deny that 'the chances are,' as Mr. Mallock prognosticates, 'that all will ere long acknowledge life's vanity,' for no better reason than that the heaven, so seldom thought of when men are most actively in earnest, may in the course of

a few generations cease to be taught and to be thought of at all. The history of everyday experience, as well as the history of morality as a whole, sufficiently shows men's profound belief in the value and seriousness of success upon earth, whatever may or may not be coming after death. Nay, it is this very belief that is at bottom the provoking cause of a belief in the seriousness of life after death. It is life as life that is valued, and the future life is only fallen back upon to make good certain disappointments and despondencies about this life.

There is a significant passage in one of Mr. Mallock's essays in which he unconsciously makes a concession of some value to the evolutionist. He says:—

It is but a very small proportion of religion that exists pure. . . . To *de-religionise* life, then, it is not enough to condemn creeds and to abolish prayers. We must also sublimate the beliefs and feelings which prayers and creeds hold pure out of the lay life around us. . . . As it leaves [common things], their whole aspect will change. Much more shall we see it yielded up by heroism, by piety, and by love of truth.*

Does it not occur to Mr. Mallock here, that, since the loss of religion in its pure state is of such small account compared with the loss he anticipates from the sublimation of its secular combinations, it is for the sake of lay life it is valuable at all; that it is for the sake of its utility in this world that, unknown to ourselves, we have chiefly dreaded its obliteration? By way of set-off to the picture Mr. Mallock draws of the consequences of its loss in common life, let us place the grimmer picture of a loss of purely secular restraints and obligations. Let us suppose society left under the single restraint of its present religious faiths, while for one single year it should be deprived of the sense of secular legal obligation, and of the voice of public opinion. Were men and women left for so long at the mercy of their religion, and otherwise perfectly free to follow their own convictions and their own bent, one dares not say what of practical morality would for that dire year be left standing. What, in the absence of all fear of outward penalty, all hope of outward reward, and in the absence of all chance of public or private praise or blame, would religious morality amount to? It is seldom considered how far the *moral* weight of A's creed is dependent upon B's valuation of that creed, or how largely faith lives by sight.

To sum up. We are all ready to admit, as a matter of theory, that since life has to be lived, the art of making it more liveable is worth cultivation. Life has many evils. Granted. It has also for most of us some compensations. These compensations in the arithmetic of feeling ever rather more than balance the pains that must be taken and undergone to obtain them.

Morality is the art of making life and its liberties and gladnesses more complete. Here and there there exists a lot which is, and to

* *Nineteenth Century*, September 1877, p. 273.

its end must remain, without pleasure, comfort, or hope. Such terrible cases it is one end of virtue to cause to cease from among us. Let all that *perpetuates their supply* be called vice, or sin, and cease. We all are a little glad when we find human heroism, public spirit, or self-devotion really making ever so little way against some potent and obvious source of human misery. We all should care a little (could we obtain it without too impossible a cost) to be *ourselves* blessed, thanked, loved, honoured, memorialised by others, as having ourselves, in measure, lessened the weight of the world's woe.

There is surely still left this much of meaning in the struggle of virtue against vice, of conscience against mere sense, of sympathy against self-interest, of the *man* in us against the intellectual animal. Even 'men and women of the world' are not without generous affections. It is to such affections, in whatever measure, great or small, they exist, that the modern moralist makes his appeal. It is upon them that he bases his wistful hope. The evolutionist looks round upon the world, which he gravely recognises as his all, and upon the fellow-creatures whom he must consent or refuse to love and to live for. The world is comfortless, unhealthy, painful; full of early graves and dying moans. Need death be so often early, or dying so often painful? he asks. His fellow-creatures are, many of them, sordid, cruel, ungrateful, mean, loathsome. Must the world and these fellow-creatures remain as they are? Has everything been done that can be done, everything hoped that might be hoped, everything suffered that might be suffered, to better the one and the other? The just answer, surely, is No: and it remains for rectitude, truly so called, to do the rest.

It is, perhaps, in some moods, a tempting thing to escape whatever is hopeless in life, by denying its hopelessness, and by a feat of mental acrobaticism, to take one's stand, head downwards, upon obsolete dogmatisms, in order to proclaim that one has life's clouds under one's feet. And doubtless it is a smarter thing to decry in racy epigrams, moral obligations that all the world, theoretically and habitually, takes for granted, than laboriously to go over arid and unpopular ground only to re-establish old-fashioned truisms. Yet it is the former task rather than the latter which, in spite of the sensational enjoyment it may afford a reader, is likely to send him empty away.

The value of earthly life has been, and is, often obscured. A certain kind of human conduct in the long run tends to obscure it. This course of conduct has obtained, and for the evolutionist shall retain, the name of *unrighteousness*. The opposite course of conduct has obtained, and for the evolutionist shall retain, the name of *righteousness*, the meaning and value whereof is, that in measure of its practice, its broad and certain outcome is to make life ever better and better worth living.

MIND

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OF

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MIND

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PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.



I.—THE DEPENDENCE OF QUALITY ON SPECIFIC ENERGIES.

I.

THE history of Physiology can point to no more memorable event than the discovery of the independent irritability of muscular tissue. When, in the latter half of last century, it became an acknowledged truth that muscles are themselves possessed of the power of reacting against external stimulation, the intelligibility of life entered a new phase. Living motion, the most salient manifestation of vitality, was thus recognised to be the indwelling property of the very material which exhibits the movements. The bodily substance, the concrete material of the muscle, which—like any other matter—had hitherto been considered inert, was now seen to contract by dint of a principle of life residing within its own self; it was found to display its marvellous function of motility independent of outside animation, without the slightest intervention on the part of vital spirits descending to it through the nerves.

The discovery of this elemental fact in organic nature was by no means accidentally hit upon or intellectually anticipated. Only by most patient research and the justified sacrifice of many

II.—DETERMINISM AND DUTY.

ACCOMPANYING an intellectual acceptance of the Evolution-theory as affording the truest interpretation yet given of the facts of existence, there tends to arise in many minds a dread of certain practical moral consequences supposed to be incident to the spread of the doctrine. Misgivings are constantly expressed lest a conviction of the truth of the great modern hypothesis, in its sociological application especially, should be attended by the outgrowth of a fatalism so pronounced as to tend, more or less, to retard human progress, through the chilling of enthusiasm, the dwarfing of aspiration and the paralyzing of endeavour.

The admission that human society, as a whole, has been "evolved" in a definite and uniform manner, analogous to the manner of development of an individual organism, is seen to point *by implication* at necessary causes or conditions governing the origination and workings of volition, since volition is the spring of the conscious acts of individuals composing society. Hence what becomes of "free-will"?

Nor is the doctrine of social evolution the only means by which science throws discredit on the idea of spontaneous volition. Modern physiological research brings to light facts favouring a theory of "Animal Automatism"; and shows consciousness, according to one view, as the mere "symbol" and "concomitant," and, according to another view, as the subjective equivalent, of a cerebral state. This cerebral state depends obviously on further physical conditions, which conditions are often, themselves, demonstrably of other than voluntary production, and are at the mercy of general physiological "laws". Thus is corroborated from another standpoint an apparently fatalistic view of human affairs, even in the cases where individual or social action visibly emerges as the consequent of, and visibly depends for its direction upon, the character of individual human wills. So it happens that some persons, even while admitting that there is a grave appearance of truth in the conclusions of science, yet deprecate the necessarian doctrine which seems to be involved in them, as "paralyzing" and "discouraging"; and even find in its implications some undefined reason for doubting the efficacy of individual effort to promote social welfare. Such persons not unnaturally look forward with apprehension to the possible ultimate acceptance of evolutionary doctrine by masses of men; and even while holding it to be the truest they can formulate, they seem to lose faith in the tutorship of fact, and to suspect that they have at last

found a case in which ignorance may be, if not absolutely beneficial, at least safe and harmless.

These apprehensions, however, appear to me to be founded on a certain misconception of what really is and is not involved in the question of free-will. And this misconception in turn arises from an ill-considered use of terms, which, when applied as we are wont to apply them, react on the ideas they rather cloud than express, to the confusion of the whole argument.

The aim of the present paper is, in the first place, to point out where this misconception lies; secondly, to discuss how much the *reality* and the *value* of the belief in free-will really amounts to; and further, to give reasons for presuming that such "fatalism" as is warranted by science, so far from operating unfavourably on the motives or energies of its believer, tends, or may tend, to influence him beneficially, and to render him a *more* and not *less* efficient agent in the promotion of human welfare.

I. It is commonly assumed by those who enter into the discussion of free-will that there exists a mysterious contradiction between the scientific conception of undeviating natural processes, and certain immediate *dicta* of consciousness concerning volition. This assumption is, however, gratuitous, and arises, as I believe, from the use of the ill-fitted words which we import into the discussion. There is no contradiction, names apart, between the deductions of science and the immediate deliverance of consciousness on this head. What science asserts generally is the indissoluble nature of the relation between cause and effect. Applying this general thesis to the particular case of volition, we merely affirm that each volition is dependent for its origination and its impetus on given antecedents, which may be within or without the field of immediate consciousness. On the other hand, what consciousness asserts is the connexion of our act with our will; which connexion no affirmation of science—least of all that which hints at the identity of will with cerebral conditions—even tends to discredit. Consciousness asserts that we *do* as we *will*. Science asserts that we *will* as we *must*; and these two propositions, so far from being contradictory or even antithetical, are perfectly consistent with one another, and with the general doctrine of invariable causation.

Yet in argument we perpetually find the *freedom* of the will confounded with the *existence* of the will; and the voluntariness of action confounded with its dissociation from an endless and complex preceding chain of causes. Neither speaker nor listener, writer nor reader, perceives the error. Meanwhile the words used react on the ideas, and on their own further significance: and the argument flounders on its way into quicksands,

not of mystery, but of most illogical nonsense. If in every case we were to say "voluntary action" for "free-will," this would immediately appear; for it is our power of voluntary action—of doing as we intend to do—that men stickle for, I imagine, rather than the absolving of the will from all conditions of its impulses. It is the former and not the latter which at any rate gives their meaning to such words as "education," "government," "influence," "persuasion," and "responsibility."

If we analyse the utterances of those persons who repudiate scientific determinism on the ground of its supposed moral hurtfulness, we shall repeatedly find them accusing determinists of denying the reality of the human will. They speak alternately and indifferently of *will* and of *free-will* as if the terms were interchangeable, or the distinction between them unimportant to the argument. Having made this first step into confusion, a second commonly follows. Not only is the undisputed existence of what we know as "will" verbally confounded with its disputed spontaneity, but this disputed spontaneity of will is further confused with undisputed voluntariness of conduct. What wonder that the argument often concludes with a bewildered shake of the head, and an attempt to regard the matter as if there lurked about it the same "mysteriousness" as that which, from the very constitution of consciousness, shrouds all speculation concerning, say, the infinite divisibility of matter, or the boundlessness of space?

What I desire to point out is that, after all, the testimony in favour of determinism does not necessarily gainsay the belief that will (whatever be the conditions of its production), *as will*, contributes to action; and that so we act, or refrain, *as we choose*. All it does gainsay is, that the choice—the volition which prompted such act or forbearance—was, itself, its own originator, and independent for its existence, strength or direction of that undeviating process of things which we call law. After all, who contends for more than an admission that when we act consciously we act as we will? Who cares to deny that this or that circumstance or predisposition influences the desire that prompts to action? So stated, the reprehended fatalism reads very like a set of truisms, as universally believed as they are innocuous and pointless.

But, so far from conceding anything as to the real spontaneity of volition, I believe that these apparent truisms—that we act as we desire, and that we desire as circumstances and individual disposition combined lead and permit us to desire—are the forms in which we are all wont to express our real disbelief in free-will. Will is fixed midway between that which sets it up, and that which, when set up, it needs must accomplish, within

or without the willing organism. We do as we choose. We choose as—being ourselves, and circumstanced in a given way—we must. And in this light, which is the right light in which to view the bogey, it is well if it appear no bogey at all, but only a very familiar though unchristened acquaintance by whose rule we live day by day.

Yet, though we may live and prosper day by day on principles unconsciously held—woven by inherited and individual experience into our nature, and so instinctively followed in the main—the beneficent effects of any such principle are doubled in depth, in directness and in fruitfulness, when the principle dawns into consciousness and becomes a recognised and realised fulcrum to steady our motives on. Only when a thing is perceived—consciously differentiated from what it is *not*—can it become a power capable of stirring emotion; hence, of modifying volition; and hence, of directing consistent action. We must occasionally walk round and round our truisms and see what they amount to. It is not labour lost if a shred of mist get swept from the mind by the way; if a single life-principle thereby receive added vindication, or a single “law of nature” be once more proved consistent with itself. The full title to our unvarying and earnest deference of that old acquaintance, whose behest we obey as well as we can whenever we are reasonable, is only acknowledged after we have recognised that its real name is Necessity.

II. Preparatory to considering the bearing of fatalistic convictions on life, conduct, or progress, it may be well to examine what the so-called belief in *free-will* which is commonly opposed to such convictions really amounts to. That this belief is neither so definite, so confirmed, nor, consequently, so influential as its advocates allege, may be inferred from the shadowy character of the arguments by which it fortifies itself. Beliefs which are permanently needful, alike to the safe conduct and the progress of human life, are of two kinds. They are either the conscious affirmation of direct perceptions, as the belief in sunshine when one sees it, or they are realised intelligent convictions concerning some relation between things and result from a process of reasoning upon observed facts. Such is the belief that sunshine is an agency in ripening fruit. Of this kind also is the belief that acts performed by us, and corresponding with the volitions we are conscious of entertaining, are related to those volitions, and that the relationship is one of cause and effect. These beliefs are grounded upon invariable experience, and could we practically slight them life would, of course, quickly come to a standstill. If we have any evidence that the belief in *free-will* is of the same character, we are

justified in dreading—or, to speak more rationally, in denying—the possibility of its annihilation by scientific theories.

As to the first of these two types of belief, I think we have no reason for regarding the belief in free-will as an intuition. All that consciousness takes immediate note of is actual existence as represented in present feeling: abstract propositions, relating to the connexion or disconnexion of such feeling with antecedents, require several mental acts successively performed. What we immediately perceive in the case of volition is its *existence*, not its *origin*—the fact that we will this or that, not how we came to will it. At the moment of willing to move my pen across this page, I am wholly unconscious of the connexion or disconnexion of my will to do so with conditioning antecedents. To arrive at *any* conclusion on the matter I must *re-view* my mental experience; and the conclusion reached is thus shown to be a matter of reasoning.

Intuition apart, what is the *rationale* of the vague feeling of freedom which has given rise to the belief in free-will? May it not be an illusive result of our power of inferring the future from the past? We recognise in ourselves the capability of being, to some extent and in a certain sense, indirectly acted upon by the future—that is, by what *is not*—that is, by *nothing*. Our power, based on memory of past experience, of forecasting events permits us to have wishes concerning what has not yet happened: these wishes modify our present conduct, and we feel as if such actions were the result of a literally spontaneous volition with *nothing* behind it. While actions based on a purposive volition *seem* to the agent to be based on what at the time *is not*, namely, on his state, or the state of something else at a future moment, what they really *are* based on is a present inference that the future will be like the present, which is in turn based on the consciousness that the present *is* like the past.

Whether this be anything like a true account of the vague feeling above alluded to, or whether the latter be always—as it certainly is sometimes—nothing more than the inexact reference consciousness makes to that real liberty of *acting as we choose* so constantly experienced, the certainty remains that no real belief in *free-will* can be of the nature of immediate intuition. If a distinct belief that the origin of volition is spontaneous (in the sense of being uncaused, or self-caused) be reached at all, it must be as a realised intellectual conviction, the result of a more or less extended process of reasoning.

Here the advocates of the belief in question are met by the discouraging fact that every step hitherto made in the investigation of the laws of volition tends towards the discovery of its dependent character. Nay, the very admission that conscious-

ness (of which will is a form) is governed by laws at all, virtually contains a denial of the self-determining nature of volitional impulses.

Comte, apparently sharing the wide-spread repugnance to necessitarian belief, vindicates his philosophy from the charge of fatalism on the ground that "all phenomena . . . admit of being modified in their secondary relations, and this the more as they are the more complicated": and further, that social phenomena "admit of larger modification than any others, and that chiefly by our own intervention".¹ The last clause quoted, implying as it does the efficiency of human will in modifying social phenomena, leaves untouched the question as to what modifies will itself, and affords another instance of the strange oversight by which in nearly all discussions on this subject propositions are advanced wide of the mark that neither prove nor disprove anything. What Comte means to affirm in reference to social phenomena, and what many others mean who use this argument of modifiability in reference to the will, is, I suppose, this—that the condition regulating the phenomena under examination are exceedingly complex and exceedingly subtle, and that the number and variety of things and circumstances capable of effecting modification are inconceivable; and that so, the possibilities of modification being practically infinite, the society, or the will, is practically free.

This argument, however, goes no way towards negating a doctrine of necessity. For it must be borne in mind that even infinite modifiability is not freedom, is not even of the nature of freedom. To admit of modification is still to be at the disposal of modifying agencies. That *any* thing *may* modify volition is true enough in the abstract. It is true in reference to will in general, things in general, and time in general. What we have to remember here is that wills exist individually, that time is practically a single stream of successive moments, and that the sum of things constituting the conditions of a given volition at a given moment results in *one modification only*, which, in occurring, excludes all others; and that so, of all conceivable modifications, only that *one* occurs which the actual set of factors, antecedent and co-existent, renders at once possible and necessary. Infinite capability of modification does not, in short, imply any possibility of escape from one particular set of modifying agencies at any given moment of conscious existence, of which set of agencies the will has at that moment no share in the selection.

But those who maintain that the social changes constituting

¹ *General View of Positivism*, translated by J. H. Bridges, pp. 57, 58.

progress are of a character transcending natural law, and are un-necessitated in virtue of their being mainly brought about through voluntary human agency, are apt to overlook this. It is of the small, ever-recurring, and necessarily-modified volitions that the conscious life of every individual is made up; his conscious life including all his voluntary actions as well as the motives (distinctly or indistinctly recognised) by which his conduct, moral, social, and political, is regulated.

If we assert that each moment separately is the determined and natural outcome of the moments preceding it, we must assert the same of a lifetime made up of such moments. And what we say of the life of an individual, we must also say of that social whole made up of multitudes of such individuals. It is only a question of relative complexity. If the modifications from countless extraneous and organic causes to which any given will is subject be, as they truly are, inconceivable in number and complexity, no wonder that we sometimes lose all sense of the fact that each modification as it occurs does so of necessity; and in grouping larger numbers of such modifications into, say, a year's life, we find it even more difficult to realise that of all the various acts, words, and thoughts, not one was free to arise or to work, to be dispelled or to remain inactive, apart from its connexion with a determining and equally un-free antecedent. More complex again are the social phenomena made of the welded lives of millions.

Fortunately for us, the freedom of the will is no requisite of progress. Could we rightly see all that such freedom would imply, we should perceive that, in our present condition of ignorance at least, such freedom would be fatal to the continuance of society at all.

III. The question next arises, Does the abandonment of belief in *free-will* involve, either logically or practically, the abandonment of belief in human instrumentality as able to forward human wellbeing? To affirm that it does is surely to draw a most inexact inference. The power of men's voluntary efforts to achieve their ends does not depend on the dissociation of the volition prompting the effort from antecedents, but on the exactness with which such effort, when made, conforms to the laws regulating the things with which the volition concerns itself. Whenever a man's will is at one with the constitution of things he wills about, we may say that he *does* accelerate the arrival of the end he desires. His will is a new and powerful factor added to all the other factors already at work at the inevitable; and there is half a truth in the assertion that things run their appointed course the faster for its co-operation. But the degree in which his will so conforms is not a matter of his own deter-

mination. Its conformity depends on his knowledge of the conditions with which his forthcoming act will deal, and this knowledge is the outcome of the whole array of his past individual experiences. No less does the conformity depend on his power of applying, and his disposition to apply these lessons of experience; and this power and disposition have been settled for him by the incalculably longer array of ancestral experiences. To desire the conditions of social happiness, to know exactly what those conditions are, and to be able directly or indirectly to supply them is to possess mastery over those conditions: With these three forms of power, the moral, the intellectual, and the physical, the process of evolution has already to some small extent supplied us. But as yet we are not fully equal to the task of improving society by *direct* voluntary agency. The phenomena are too complex for our present powers. The *whole* of the natural force needed for the improvement of our race does *not yet* flow through the channel of human will. Meanwhile things do not stand still. While our imperfect adaptation to social requirements is shown in the frequent errors our volitions lead us to commit (even with the best intentions), the forces which have originated society are not idle at the work of its advancement. Though slowly and indirectly, they work through our very errors; since the gradual rectification of errors by their own natural reaction eventually brings about the inevitable improvement.

There is no escaping the conclusion that the future is as fixed and certain as if it were already past. The very belief in the fixity of law and the unbrokenness of causation, which is the ground of all our hopes, and which underlies and makes possible every volition, is also, when duly considered, tantamount to a belief in a future destination as certain, though not as certainly known, as the actual present. The subjunctive mood is the language of our ignorance. We need it to express our guesses, but it conforms not at all to the mode of actual being. However many ways we may beforehand imagine possibility may run, there *will* be only one way, and for that way things are already—nay, have ever been—in train.

We believe this practically every minute we live, concerning everything of which we have real knowledge. If I see a lighted match thrown among combustibles, I know that, other things equal, a conflagration must ensue. If I modify this statement with an "unless, or an "if," I don't imply any uncertainty in the actual issue, but merely *my own ignorance* as to whether the conditions necessary to check the conflagration are or are not forthcoming. The future as a whole, as well as in

detail, will be one thing and not another. Progress is single-streamed. Things only happen once. They *do* happen, and in happening exclude from the region of fact all "woulds" and "mights". On the aggregate *set* of human wills at the present moment depends the aggregate future effect of the special actions in which they are tending to issue. This is "fatalism?" But persons who shrink from its acceptance, or deprecate its promulgation as a truth, must surely be adding to the conception of "fate" something more than it necessarily contains. They must be assuming a conscious doggedness, or at least a callousness, somewhere hidden away among the impersonal forces at work around them, or they would not trust those forces so little. Past experience—and I use the word in its largest sense—should teach them better. This array of dogged and callous "laws" and forces is precisely that to which we owe our own distinctive powers. In their working they long ago "evolved" human consciousness, of which will is a form; and in the course of numberless generations they have at last brought within the range of that consciousness some of the conditions of its own amelioration. They will continue to work through consciousness increasingly henceforward; for it seems to be a rule that the highest faculty—that faculty which has taken most "evolving" to bring it into play—is ever that which is eventually employed as the chief instrument in the evolution of that which lies yet beyond it. This is exemplified in the fact that sight, when evolved out of mere tactual sensation, does the same work for the organism, and does it *better* than mere sensation: directing the creature in its escape from harmful influences, and in its search for things needful for its sustenance and general welfare. Intelligence is a vast improvement on instinct. That growing perception of the source and end of morals which answers to moral *sight* is a vast advance on the indefinite and blind moral *sense* which has for ages done duty for it, and when intelligence and intelligent morality have sufficiently long struggled with opposing circumstances to approach perfection, then and not sooner will that will, which, without too much straining of language, we may call their appropriate "organ," be competent to receive and transmit most of the forces needed for the next step forward. In other words, when the conditions of wellbeing are fully known and rightly balanced by the understanding, then and not sooner will voluntary exertion be the instrument exclusively employed in attaining social ends.

Thus we find it is one thing to deny the freedom of the will: quite another to deny its activity as a factor in human advancement. I think we are justified in accounting conscious effort to

be the appropriate effect of volition. For in so far as an act or a series of acts, accompanied by that form of consciousness we recognise as volition, while *inwardly* felt as effort of will, is invariably observed *outwardly* to differ in force, directness, and coherence from an act, or a series of acts, not so accompanied, so far are we by the laws of thought compelled to infer the necessity of that *accompaniment* as a specific factor, to effect that *difference* which is the specific product: to infer, in short, that will is, like everything else, needed for the achievement of its own result.

Will leading to action is one of the admitted means by which the progress of society has been secured. Things having been as they have been (the operation of human will on human action included), the affairs of mankind have shown a progressive tendency. The cessation of voluntary endeavour would be the cessation of what has, to say the least, constantly accompanied progress. Has any consistent believer in continuous causation, then, a right to assume that this constant accompaniment can be waived, and all go on as before? that what has happened will continue to happen under unlike conditions? Till it be proved that human endeavour has done more harm than good, till it be proved that this preponderance of harm is on the increase, and that the manifold experiences conscious effort has brought have made men less and not more consentaneous with Nature's method, we must assume the needfulness of such conscious effort as one of the many means by which the increase of social well-being is secured. The more clearly universal history shows us the coincidence of human improvement with human endeavour, the stronger must the tendency become to make the endeavour when we desire the improvement. The will is not free to remain unaffected by a dictum of history any more than by anything else recognised as true: and if the wish for anything be coupled with a just knowledge of how it has hitherto been attained, the consequence will be the putting forth anew of the energy which has before been proved successful. The fact that we consciously co-operate in the necessary working of the law we live by does not surely nullify either the consciousness or the law. When a man sees—what after all is there before he sees it—that whatever he does produces an effect of one necessary kind, a factor is added, calculated to render his acts effective and their effect such as he aims at. For such realisation itself modifies the man's will, disposing him to act in conformity with such knowledge as he possesses of the conditions regulating what he wills about, and so far as he judges truly of those conditions, he will act rightly.

This seems self-evident. But that it is not wholly unneces-

sary to insist, as a matter of theory, on the real influence of will on conduct is shown by the readiness with which the advocates of a belief in free-will assume that, along with the freedom of the will, its efficiency is denied by their opponents. The truth is that part of the non-freedom of the will consists in its being bound up with a consequent no less than with an antecedent; the existence of a volition involving no less the succeeding mode of existence or action of which it is itself a condition than it is itself involved in the sum of pre-existing and co-existent conditions which necessitate its own origination. It matters little, except as theory, whether we call the will a "symbol" always "accompanying" given molecular changes in the brain, or whether we reverse the terms, or whether we adopt the third and (it seems to me) most tenable hypothesis, which—repudiating the terms "symbol" and "accompaniment" as inadequate or misleading—regards the will, and that cerebral state always attending it, as an identical phenomenon under different aspects. The facts, however we theorise on their origination, remain for all present purposes the same. Given will, and a certain sequence follows, exactly corresponding as "effect" with will as "cause".

As to the arguments drawn from the phenomena of social development, I am not aware that any of them deny or render doubtful the necessity of those activities we recognise as voluntary in the achievement of social welfare. Neither is it evident that a belief in the necessary origin of the effort which achieves good lessens that *desire for good which prompts the effort*. While, on the one hand, the various arguments put forward to show that the amelioration of society has been, directly or indirectly, brought about by human endeavours consciously directed to secure that end, while these arguments do not negative the just application of the theory of evolution to social phenomena; yet, on the other hand, a doctrine setting forth the slow and inevitable evolution of that human will which has so largely contributed to the progress of mankind, in no way lessens the practical value of the voluntary moral and social efforts which are its natural outcome.

Those who fear that belief in the necessary character of volition, and in the parallel doctrine of the inevitable nature of progress, is likely to paralyse moral effort, may be asked the following questions:—

(1) Do not those conscious acts of ours which we recognise as efforts, often produce those results which we recognise as gains in welfare?

(2) Does a conviction that certain means have attained certain

ends lessen our faith in those means, or hinder our alacrity in employing them when we seek those ends ?

(3) What reason is there for assuming that a perception of the law by which human ends are gradually worked out, will lessen that desire for wellbeing, or that uneasiness in its absence which has been one of the chief instruments of increased welfare, in the stimulation of action through volition ?

The conviction that the all-powerful "laws of nature," are working through our own wills at the (now conscious) evolution of our ascending race, is surely more effort-inspiring and more encouraging than is the opposite belief that a multitude of purblind individuals are waging unequal war with universal law ; which law they only very partially understand, and which, without such sorry *opposition* as human ignorance can make, would infallibly drift mankind backward into barbarism and ruin.

Lastly, we must surely consider deeply before we decide that we are face to face with such an unprecedented anomaly as a pernicious truth, concerning which ignorance or denial is likely to be desirable. If a thing is true, a man or a community must surely be the better for knowing it, because the wiser. It must be easier to adjust conduct to the sum of surrounding conditions when a new fact or a new law—that is, a new condition—becomes manifest. If our volitions are necessitated—each as it arises—then by all means let us know it ; that we may see with added clearness how important is the discovery of all things which tend to direct it rightly ; and that, so seeing, our wish may be such as to result in the right (*i.e.*, nature-rewarded) measures whenever we aim at the attainment of any end that lies on the other side of a human will. Could all the dutiful persons in the world become consistently "fatalistic,"—could a conviction permeate the moral portion of society that, though right willing is a condition of right action, or even right disposition to action, it remains no less certain that given conditions are necessary to the origination of this right willing,—I believe the improvement of our condition would be then and there accelerated. For such a conviction could not but result in an earnest adherence to such of the physical and psychical laws governing the origination of impulse as are known, and an equally earnest search for such as are not yet discovered. So long as will tends to action or, which amounts to the same thing, so long as the will's inseparable condition of brain tends to action, and so long as such action differs in directness from purely unintentional action, the progress of life can hardly be retarded by a recognition of what the conditions of will or of that brain-state really are. Only when we have admitted and realised that volition does invariably conform to law can we

consistently set about operating on it, so as voluntarily to influence life and deed through its agency. Our belief in education, and in government by reward and penalty, indicates our *practical* belief in determinism; all that modern philosophy does is to prop practice by theory.

No dismay need attend the conception of inexorable conditions governing the will when we recollect how far those conditions have already brought us. Comparing the condition and life of a modern intellectual person, or the condition of the society in which such persons are numerous, with the semi-conscious existence of a struggling barbarian, we may gladly concede with Mr. Spencer that "freedom of the will, did it exist, would be at variance with the beneficent necessity displayed in the evolution of the correspondence between the organism and its environment": seeing that, since the means by which life becomes higher and happiness greater is the gradual moulding of inner relations by outer relations, "the harmony at any moment existing would be disturbed, and the advance to a higher harmony impeded," "were the inner relations partly determined by some other agency:" and that so there would result "a retardation of that grand progress which is bearing Humanity onwards to a higher intelligence and a nobler character."

He who would largely influence for good, *i.e.*, for liberty, his own destiny or that of posterity must first be the intelligent pupil of experience, and so the (consciously or unconsciously) acquiescent servant of the "inexorable". If a man is ever to be master of his fate he must first know, with a knowledge transcending all his present powers, what are the laws regulating the infinitely complex conditions of his own well-being; and then he must *obey* those laws with a docility and a consistency at present undreamt of even by philosophy.

Meanwhile the knowledge we have does not lead us to assert the vanity and uncertainty of all human effort, but only on one side the failure of human mistake, and on the other the certain success of human rectitude. Human mastery over human fate increases day by day. It is *part* of human fate that it should do so. We cannot *not* learn by experience: we cannot see given results, good or bad, follow given acts without having our will concerning future acts of the same character modified henceforward; though of course the action of observed facts on the will depends in each individual case for its degree of force, clearness, and permanence on the higher or lower stage of organisation reached. The learning by experience is most sure and most rapid in the highest intelligence; and here again is an instance of the beneficent way nature plays into her own hands. For the most competent persons—those persons, that is, who best

understand how to re-apply experience—are ever the most certain to do so: and their acts, good or bad, being more consistent and more frequently repeated, more organised and more law-rewarded, ever tend to deepen and widen that “line of least resistance” along which mankind is at once impelled and attracted to its own ennoblement. The higher the organisation the keener is the awareness and the greater the power of effecting what we may—for the nonce—call self-modification. To understand Nature’s economy is to fall in with it and see the vanity of attempting any other plans than those marked out for us in the chart of possibility. Thus to believe is perhaps to abandon impatient hopes of great achievement in one’s own lifetime, or through one’s own personal instrumentality; but it is to see also that nothing could in the nature of things have been gained by *not* abandoning them, since they were waste of steam. We learn to husband our resources and to spend them on the principles set us by necessity. Still, what was but a hope before becomes an increasingly confirmed security when once we are so awake to the unfailing and inexorable nature of causation as the necessary growth of one thing out of another, as to trace its impersonal working in the affairs of personal conduct. The promise of the inevitable reward which universal law will bestow on the smallest rightly-guided action (which reward shall be reaped in kind either by oneself or by others for whom one labours) raises the moral importance of the most inconspicuous deed or most passing word from the level of trifles to that of “efficient causes”. Moreover, the frame of mind which is indirectly induced in a morally disposed person by an acceptance and practice of the principle of Necessity is of that noblest of all conceivable types—the self-bestowing, the super-personal.

To sum up: (1) The bogey men made of their own ill-fitted words tends to vanish altogether when those words are replaced by the thoughts they represent. To deny the self-creative power of volitional impulses is seen not to imply a denial of the useful character of the acts and efforts based on those impulses. To affirm that volition depends for its existence on an uneasiness set up in the organism by some faulty adaptation of its present circumstances to its present functions is also seen to leave the cause of any such uneasiness what it was, and therefore to leave the conditions involving “aspiration” unaffected, at least so long as human life is felt by human beings to be short of perfection.

(2) Starting from the assumption that beliefs which are necessary to the conduct and progress of life are mostly either instant and intuitive perceptions (such as belief in sunshine

when one sees it, or belief in will when one feels it), or else are recognised and realised connexions of cause with effect (such as that belief which attributes the ripening of fruit *in part* to the agency of sunshine, and the attainment of a distant end *in part* to the action of our will on our intervening conduct), it appears that the belief in the spontaneous nature of volition, being neither of the former nor the latter type, may be beforehand supposed unnecessary to the proper conduct of human affairs. This conclusion is reinforced when we discover that the abstraction of the so-called belief leaves the real springs of effort untouched, and human capabilities of "mastering" circumstances precisely what they were.

(3) The spread of a scientifically-warranted fatalism need not be dreaded by any persons who believe in its truth. A true belief in a sane mind works infallibly, and works for good.

Much good is done by right naming, and many things in the conduct of thought and of life may be beneficially affected when the inseparable connexion subsisting between our conscious lives and the rest of nature is recognised. As Emerson says, "If Fate is ore and quarry; if evil is good in the making; if limitation is power that shall be; if calamities, oppositions, and weights are wings and means—we are reconciled. *Fate involves the melioration.* No statement of the universe can have any soundness which does not admit its ascending effort."

If we are "fatalists," and at the same time have faith in the tutorship of experience as the means by which the gradual change we feel as progress is secured, we shall see futility nowhere; but even in those cases where a fervent effort fails of its intended end we shall recognise, both in the effort and in its failure, the beneficent working of that universal law by which impersonal nature perpetually sifts out her own shortcomings, and increases her own truth of aim. I say *impersonal* nature, thus seeming to beg the theological question, because the abounding signs of this general impersonality in the economy of nature are reinforced by the fact that, taking *life* as the consummation of *existence*, only some millionth or less part of things so fortuitously comports itself as to issue progressively, beneficently, or even coherently. The discouragement this fact suggests may be, however, for us who *do* live, balanced by the further fact that (given the absence of any opposing, clumsy, shiftless, or maleficent personal power) the successful millionth of lifeward occurrence gathers, and *must* gather, as it goes; and, eventuating in conscious volition, must bring ever more and more of nature under its purposive control. The conditions under which this life-power may be continuously maintained and increasingly attained, we call the "laws" of life. Which

"laws" as they come to be better known, and can be better co-operated with, must, for all we can conceive to the contrary, tide man onwards ever nearer to that happy and powerful something he is tending to be.

Knowledge is the rectifier of will; and each increment of truth, however severe its immediate implications, betters our condition. So far as the growing belief in the dependence of will on fixed conditions is the natural and normal outcome of a widening knowledge of things and relations, we must take it as itself part of our advance and trust. Our "fate" has hitherto been that "will" should be "evolved" in us, and that, when evolved, it should plunge us with added impetus into that struggle for individual and social amelioration in which life consists. At last comes the determinist, and avers that nature claims all these (rightly called) *voluntary* efforts of ours as her very own, and adds the promise to our hope of success for ever and in exact proportion to the exactness of our voluntary conformity to the laws of our own being and wellbeing.

In the severely merciful code which is the product of such a creed as this, while vengeance and impunity are alike shut out by the larger law of equity, there *tends* to grow up between each man and his fellows that spirit of "sweet reasonableness" which, in proportion as it prevails, further tends to land us, individually and collectively, in a completer welfare than any that our present sluggish aspirations enable us to imagine.

L. S. BEVINGTON.

III.—SYMBOLICAL REASONING.

SYMBOLICAL reasoning may be said to have pretty much the same relation to ordinary reasoning that machine-labour has to manual labour. In the case of machine-labour we see some ingeniously contrived arrangement of wheels, levers, &c., producing with speed and facility results which the hands of man without such aid could only accomplish slowly and with difficulty, or which they would be utterly powerless to accomplish at all. In the case of symbolical reasoning we find in an analogous manner some regular system of rules and formulæ, easy to retain in the memory from their general symmetry and interdependence, economising or superseding the labour of the brain, and enabling any ordinary mind to obtain by simple mechanical processes results which would be beyond the reach of the strongest intellect if left entirely to its own resources.

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THE MORAL COLOUR OF RATIONALISM.

ONE continually meets with persons who, seeming to give intellectual assent to the leading scientific hypothesis of our time, yet deeply mistrust what they conceive to be its moral implications, and who, as a consequence, are reduced to a chaotic condition of opinion, precluding them from taking any cause frankly to heart, or from carrying any theory firmly in the head. It would save a good deal of fruitless discussion if thinkers who find themselves in this uncomfortable ethical predicament would refrain from eloquence until they have given the body of their convictions time to range themselves on one side or the other. But this is the last thing it occurs to them to do. With no apparent ideal to uphold, and with no distinct advice to offer, they yet have quite a noisy literature of their own, and many forcible exponents of their somewhat futile distresses. Such prophets prophesy unto us things the reverse of smooth. They generally begin by admitting, or implying, more or less dejectedly, that the voice of science has to be listened to, as on the whole the most credible voice within earshot of this century. Then, having made this admission, they commonly proceed to dilate on the prospective misery and degeneration such listening will bring upon our ill-fated race.

To one essayist whose writings at least tend in the direction I have indicated, it is my purpose in this paper definitely to reply. Mr. Goldwin Smith has within the past four or five years published several essays, the apparent object of which has been to exhibit the moral shortcomings of scientific philosophy. While nothing that he says leads one to suppose that he considers the objective grounds of the evolution doctrine invalid, his thesis is that the code of ethics he conceives to be suggested and supported by it is certain to prove generally detrimental; and that it in particular negatives the legitimacy of the belief in "human brotherhood," the spread of humane feeling, and the protection of the interests of weaker races against the selfishness of the stronger.

I propose to deal with Mr. Goldwin Smith's arguments in a two-fold manner. In the first place to point out how his thesis displays a misconception of the ethical tenets of the evolutionists, and by implication a misconception of the fundamental theory of development itself; in the second, to refute the specific charges advanced in his essays concerning certain recent political and colonial doings cited by him in illustration of that thesis. I believe it may be shown that rationalists in general and that evolutionists in particular are, in the

practical apportioning of their sympathies and their aid, as a body relatively more humane than the orthodox section of the community; that it follows from their theory they *should* be, and that in fact they are so displayed.

I have before me three of Mr. Goldwin Smith's essays. The first is entitled *The Ascent of Man*.¹ The second is written in depreciation of *The Proposed Substitutes for Religion*.² The third is on *The Prospect of a Moral Interregnum*.³ In each of these three papers, and also I am told in detached passages elsewhere in what he has written, the charge brought against scientific doctrine, and variously enforced by argument, is that it tends to give a charter to personal and political selfishness and tyranny. And in each article the author brings forward as among conspicuous examples of the kind of harm that evolutionary and positivist conviction has already begun to work, the state of public feeling in England as shown in the "Eyre Defence" agitation, at the time of the Jamaica insurrection.

I. The *Ascent of Man*⁴ opens with certain ethical admissions favourable rather than not to the evolution hypothesis. But in succeeding pages we find advanced the rather curious complaint—that evolutionists are unreasonably prone to overlook the facts of human development, and to disregard the probability that further development awaits our race in time to come. Here are the words:—

"There seems to be (among evolutionists) a tendency . . . to treat the origin of a being as finally decisive of its nature and destiny. . . . An eminent writer on the antiquities of jurisprudence intimates his belief that the idea of human brotherhood is not coeval with the race, and that primitive communities were governed by sentiments of a very different kind. His words are at once pounced upon as a warrant for dismissing the idea of human brotherhood from our minds, and substituting for it some other social principle the character of which. . . is beginning in some quarters pretty distinctly to appear."

(One would be glad at this point, for sake of clearness, to be told who is the writer on jurisprudence, and which are the evolutionists who "pounce upon" his words. Mr. Goldwin Smith leaves his reader in the dark as to these particulars; and continues—)

"But surely this is not reasonable. There can be no reason why the first estate of man, which all allow to have been his lowest estate, should claim the prerogative of furnishing his only real and indefeasible principles of action. Granting that the idea of human brotherhood was not aboriginal, granting that it came into the world at a comparatively late period, still it has come; and having come, it is as real, and seems as much entitled to consideration, as inter-tribal hostility and domestic despotism were in their own day."

Here our essayist beats the air. If there is a theory which more than any other holds of account not only every variation, but every

(1) *Macmillan's Magazine*, January, 1877.

(2) *Ibid.*, February, 1878.

(3) *Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1879.

(4) *Macmillan's Magazine*, January, 1877 (p. 194).

detail of every variation in the summing of its conclusions, it is the evolution theory. Not a change, however apparently trifling, not a condition, however apparently accidental, not a factor, however apparently insignificant, but is noted by that theory as soon as it appears, and never lost sight of again, as contributing in increasingly complex ways to the increasing complexity of the phenomena under observation. At no two moments, according to the evolution hypothesis, can the universe or any of its constituent parts and processes be said to be in direct causal line, either with original antecedents, or with ultimate consequents. As Emerson somewhere says, "everything in the universe goes by indirection;" and the office of the evolutionist is to discern the precise kind of indirection in which things move, and to note the relations which are common to them at every point, as rules or "laws," for the further conduct of our conceptions and expectations.

As to evolutionary teaching with regard to the special matter of moral development, we may here fitly quote the words of Mr. Herbert Spencer, as offering a curious contrast to the doctrine imputed by Mr. Goldwin Smith to evolutionists. In his *Appendix to the Data of Ethics*, Mr. Spencer remarks as follows:—

"So far is it from being true, as might be supposed from the general incredulity, that though there has arisen a considerable moralisation of the human being as a concomitant of civilisation, there will be no comparable increase of such moralisation in the future, it is true that *the moralisation will hereafter go on at a much greater rate*, because it will no longer be checked by influences hitherto and at present in operation. During all the past, and even still, the need for maintaining adaptation to the militant life, which implies readiness to sacrifice others, has perpetually held in check the progress of adaptation to the industrial life which, carried on by exchange of services, does not of necessity entail the sacrifice of others to self."

Again:—

"Not only must we infer that the future of man and of society will have modifications as great as the past has shown us, but that *it will have much greater*. That is to say, that the transformation of altruistic gratifications into egoistic ones will be carried very much further; and an average larger share in the happiness of each individual will depend on consciousness of the well-being of other individuals" (pp. 298—9).

In face, indeed, of the profound but orderly complexity of natural development, as perceived and taught by modern philosophy, the words of Mr. Goldwin Smith fall very wide of their mark—

"Supposing (he says,) the account of the origin of the moral sense and of moral life given in the *Descent of Man* to be true, it is an account of the origin only. . . . It is not more significant compared with the subsequent development than is the origin of physical life compared with the subsequent history of living beings. . . . Between the origin of moral life and its present manifestations has intervened something so considerable as to baffle any anticipation of the destiny of humanity which could have been formed from a mere inspec-

(1) *Macmillan's Magazine*, January, 1877 (p. 197).

tion of the rudiments. Whatever things may have been in their origin, they are what they are, both in themselves and in regard to their indications respecting other beings or influences, the existence of which may be implied in theirs. . . . A physiologist sets before us a set of plates showing the similarity between the embryo of Newton and that of his dog Diamond. *The inference which he probably expects us to draw is that there is no essential difference between the philosopher and the dog.*"

Contrast with this quotation the following passage. In Mr. G. H. Lewes's *Study of Psychology* (p. 147) we read—

"We may fitly look backwards and see how short a way the consideration of animal life alone will take us in the appreciation of the moral life of mankind, which is wrought out of innumerable closely-woven threads of feeling and knowing."

Again (p. 153):—

"Because psychology is interpreted through sociology, and experience acquires its development mainly through social influences, we must always take history into account. . . . The physiologist recognises the same organs and functions in the savage and the civilised, but not the same thoughts and sentiments. The brain of a cultivated Englishman of our day compared with the brain of a Greek of the age of Pericles would not present any appreciable differences; yet the differences between the moral and intellectual activities of the two would be many and vast. *These are not to be assigned to the organism and its functions.* . . . The Englishman has been nourished on the products of the centuries, his feelings and thoughts have taken form under conditions unknown to the Greek, so that what would have delighted the one is anguish to the other. The sight of a wounded foreigner, which agitates the Englishman, and prompts him by its very imagination to undertake hardship and danger in the effort to relieve the sufferer, would have excited no more emotion in a Greek than the sight of an injured dog."

With such inaccurate reading before us as Mr. Goldwin Smith's words present of the evolution doctrine, it appears, indeed, almost futile to attempt serious criticism or argument. For we find that a school which in its teaching insists upon the subtlety, multiplicity, and constant flux of relations, and the continuity of causation, is virtually credited with postulating a fixed rigidity of relation, and, by implication, with ignoring the re-formative action of ceaseless changes.

Mr. Goldwin Smith having, in his interpretation of its principle, thus precisely reversed the meaning of the theory he assails, further somewhat inconsistently calls upon evolution—

"To be true to itself, and to recognise the possibility of development in the future, as well as the fact of the development of the past."

"The series of developments has proceeded from the inorganic to the organic, from the organic upwards to moral and intellectual life. Why should it be arrested there? Why should it not continue its upward course, and arrive at a development which might be designated as spiritual life?"

We need not affect to misunderstand this. Mr. Goldwin Smith likes the theory of past development well enough to wish to build, so to speak, a scientific "heavenly hope" upon it. He would fain have evolutionists class among the corollaries of their theory the likelihood

of "spiritual" development of immortal individuals out of the human race as at present existing. His hardly tacit contention seems to be this—"Why, since brutes have become men, should not you and I become something as unlike and superior to men, as men are unlike and superior to brutes?" He overlooks the fact that developmental changes of such magnitude have, as found in nature, and as taught by science, a hereditary rather than an individual history. No individual brute has ever become a man; and the fact that a brute (which, living and dying a brute, yet) after the lapse of countless generations has a human posterity, affords no ground for supposing that a change similar in amount is to be effected within the limit of any individual life. Failing to discriminate between these two notions of development, Mr. Goldwin Smith is impatient at the small room left by the evolution doctrine for the spread and flutter of angelic wings.

But setting this aside, may we not in return call upon him to point to a single instance of an evolutionary teacher who considers either that "there is no essential difference between a philosopher and a dog;" or that nothing "considerable" has "intervened" since moral development began; or that man's race has already exhausted all possibility of further and increasingly progressive development? Does not the whole of this strange protest indicate on the part of any one who makes it a most inadequate conception of evolution, and a most superficial study of its principles, whether as set forth by its leading exponents or as exhibited in phenomena?

In its ethical teaching, science never loses sight of the fact that man is what a long, complicated, and changeful history has brought him to be. And although the truth that he was what he was at the commencement of that history is also kept in view (since it at once affords a helpful index to the direction in which progress is taking place, and a clue for the direction of further voluntary effort), yet, since the operation of various ascertainable influences has made him so superior a being to the primitive barbarian from whom he descends (or, to use Mr. Goldwin Smith's amended expression, 'ascends'), duty is but the more clearly seen to lie in the continuous use and encouragement of those civilising influences, the deepest and surest of which in our hands to-day is civilisation itself, in the shape of so much sympathy and humane aspiration as is found in our own hearts. In point of fact, while sociology offers explanation of the anti-social tendencies still left in individuals, by regarding them as surviving remnants of inherited brutality, it implicitly condemns them *by that very explanation* as unsuited to the vastly changed external conditions of human existence. Sociologically viewed, such tendencies are, among ourselves, unfit. Ethically viewed, therefore, they are hurtful, inhuman, wrong.

The brute force in exercise of which lay the primitive man's only chance of survival, was once his only moral tool; or rather, was the pre-moral agency which brought him far enough along his difficult course to reach moral beginnings. But brute force as a best means is superseded from the day on which barbarians find it possible and advantageous to effect peaceful exchange of goods or services. From that day forward it takes a second place of ever-decreasing utility, and of ever-decreasing rightfulness. And thus the charge brought by Mr. Goldwin Smith against evolutionists, that their belief in ancestral fierceness implies a belief in the continued necessity of such fierceness for bending one another's wills, is about as much to the point as would be a charge that evolutionists are wont to recommend the exclusive use of chipped flints, and to decry the adoption of more complex means for bending the forces of nature to their wills, only because chipped flints were the original tools of a race that has since invented the steam-engine and the telescope.

But not only does Mr. Goldwin Smith thus misconstrue the positive side of scientific ethics; he further maintains that the negative attitude of science towards the tenets of current European orthodoxy should, in consistency, involve also a negative attitude towards the belief in "human brotherhood," and in its implied code of duties. He couples with evolutional teaching the positivism of Comte, and accounts the sympathy with humanity upheld by evolutionists, and the worship of humanity taught by Comtists, alike preposterous.

"After all, without God or spirit, what (he asks) is Humanity? One school of science reckons one hundred and fifty different species of man. What is the bond of unity between these species, and wherein consists the obligation to mutual love and help?"

Again:—

"Humanity, it seems to us, is a fundamentally Christian idea. . . . The idea of the progress of Humanity seems to us to have been derived from the Christian belief in the coming of the kingdom of God through the extension of the Church."

To these quotations one is tempted to retort by use of that very argument of Mr. Goldwin Smith's which we have just been considering: namely, that whether man had this origin or that is not the question, since he is what he is, here and now; and that be the matrix of the *conscious belief* in human progress never so much the Christian Church, yet that our present business is not with origins and past facts, but with present possibilities and future developments.

But, in truth, a more serious reply suggests itself. This very doctrine of human brotherhood as upheld by orthodoxy it is which is theoretically arbitrary, and therefore practically ricketty, rather than the same doctrine as upheld by evolutionists. For the doctrine

that men are "one in Christ" tells merely of the bond of a common faith supposed eventually to be shared by all men alike. All its force hinges on the possession of convictions respecting an after-life—convictions which every advance of real knowledge, whether biological or psychological, tends indirectly rather to weaken than to reinforce. Such a doctrine implies that men's duty of mutual helpfulness is derived from a single teacher's injunctions; and that they are to feel and to act as "brothers," not because of the simple, natural fact that they are knit by their common needs, and mutual powers of helpfulness, but because one large-hearted, heretical Jewish artisan but yesterday was, by a section of humanity, declared a god, or a demi-god; and but yesterday, in that character, imposed the notion of the unity of humanity, declaring that all the slight varieties of men he knew of should love one another "for his sake." Needless to say that this limited idea of the obligation of "brotherhood" is an idea likely enough to be unseated.

I maintain, in effect, that in these days, when orthodoxy is obliged to confront scientific facts, our lowlier fellow-men run more chance of losing the practical sympathy of their theological "brothers" whose theory they so woefully strain, than of losing the sympathy of their evolutionary "brothers" whose theory they, in their very lowliness, support. Surely, if the theory of human unity, in this world or another, depends in any degree on the possibility of bringing all men's souls into harmony on matters of doctrine and faith, it becomes a hopeless ideal, alike in face of the semi-brutish barbarians who baffle all attempts at "spiritual" approach or communion, and of those very different other tribes who, we are told, display more than Christian virtues, while possessing no idea of a God or of immortality.

No; if in the face of scientific ascendancy we are to look for a decrease of humane sentiment and of equitable dealing, we must look for it among those who, themselves unable or unaccustomed to grasp the evolutionary ideal, yet feel evolutionary influence to be working havoc among their own doctrines. And this is precisely what we do find. From the orthodox or the semi-orthodox come all the querulous misgivings as to the natural foundations of duty; all the assertions that the reasonableness of selfish license and selfish tyranny begins to appear. Orthodoxy it is which in our time *has* reason to feel its own moral ground shaking under its feet, and consequently orthodoxy it is which, at any critical juncture, loses alike its faith in principle, and its hope in patience, and falls into action that is intemperate, national, sectarian, inhumane.

Recent history affords, we think, as many examples in this connection, as Mr. Goldwin Smith believes it to afford in the opposite

one. Indeed, the very cases he quotes, if fairly examined, not only admit of, but suggest, a reading the exact reverse of his own.

II. Having so far noticed Mr. Smith's evident misappreciation of the theoretical drift of evolutionary moral teaching, let us now observe the strangely-selected data he calls in aid of his thesis. In the essay entitled *The Prospect of a Moral Interregnum*,¹ he is even more minutely explicit than in the two former essays, in reference to what he regards as the evil effects of evolutionary belief. He gives the reader several pages of historical illustration, and one or two quotations of opinion, as bearing on his gospel of despair. It is remarkable that none of these quotations are from the works of leading men of science; but are the opinions of persons mostly unnamed. In the two or three instances where names are given, the selected opinions are those of persons not commonly credited with paramount scientific authority, but into whose views Mr. Goldwin Smith appears somewhat arbitrarily to have read evolutionism for the purpose of taking it out again ethically besmirched, and reeking with the blood of the weaker peoples. Among the authorities quoted are Napoleon I., Lord Beaconsfield, Sir Henry Elliott, and M. Thiers.

Having affirmed that an "incipient change of principle . . . is perceptible [in] the sentiment and conduct of England as an imperial country towards weaker communities and subject races," he continues—

"Nobody in the time of Wilberforce would have dared to avow that the rule in dealing with a Hindoo or an African was not to be equity, humanity, or respect for human life; but British interest and the requirements of British policy. . . . The slave trade, and afterwards slavery were abolished. . . . [and] had the same sentiment continued to prevail it is not inconceivable that conquest itself might have been relinquished as radically inconsistent with the rule of humanity and benevolence."

(Here, did space permit, we might fittingly inquire in detail by whom it is that this hope is now relinquished, and what section it is of the thinking world who on the contrary continue to cling to it.)

That the same sentiment has at any rate not continued to prevail Mr. Smith considers was evidenced at the time of the American civil war, when the "denunciation of *negrophilia* which resounded on all sides denoted not merely antipathy to Northern aggrandisement . . . but dislike of [slave] emancipation."

And again,—

"Moral phenomena of the same kind marked the controversy arising out of the Jamaica massacre, for the enthusiastic supporters of Governor Eyre perfectly recognised in him one organ of the sanguinary vengeance of the dominant race, even if they did not believe that he had committed a foul judicial murder." [In this controversy] "we had proof enough that the ascendancy

(1) *Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1879 (p. 638).

of science and a strong sense of human brotherhood might be very different things."

Before passing to the enumeration of the further British atrocities quoted as instances of the injury that scientific doctrine is doing to the political conscience of our own nation, it will be interesting to pause at this particular example of the Jamaica controversy, upon which (since he names it in essay after essay) Mr. Goldwin Smith evidently relies a good deal for the establishment of his point. Not that he indeed attempts any precise demonstration that the unjust cruelties committed in 1865 by a British governor, and defended by a certain proportion of British subjects, were in any definite manner associated with the holding of rationalist or evolutionist conviction. Such a demonstration would have been very hard to extract from the facts of the case. Had the perpetrators of such injustice, or its argumentative defenders been conspicuous rationalists, or even in all cases members of that political section of the community in which rationalists are most numerous, some colour might have been given to Mr. Goldwin Smith's allegations. But the very reverse of this was markedly the case, as the reader shall presently be reminded in detail.

Meanwhile, in the absence of any distinct reasons advanced by our author for connecting the events he deprecates with the opinions he mistrusts, we are reduced to accounting for his conclusion on the mere ground that the Jamaica scandal, as well as various other ferocities committed under British rule and commanding a large amount of British applause, have occurred since the evolution doctrine was broached. The argument as an argument is exceedingly absurd, a glaring case of *post hoc, propter hoc*. As well might be associated with the spread of the evolutionary doctrine the merciful action of British sympathy at the time of the Franco-German war, when our nation was astir with effort to mitigate the sufferings of the wounded in both armies. The probability is that in neither case was public feeling very definitely associated with theory, either scientific or orthodox. But if one had to choose between these two cases—of inhumane stirring in 1866, and of humane stirring in 1870—as to which was most consonant with evolutionary principle as held by evolutionists themselves, one must undoubtedly choose the latter.

Beyond its logical absurdity, however, a graver charge must be brought against the persistent citation of the Jamaica business in support of anti-scientific theory. The facts as presented in Mr. Goldwin Smith's essays seem to yield very different inferences from the facts as they actually occurred. I have before me the list of the members of the *Jamaica Committee*, whose object, it will be remembered, was to procure the prosecution of the unfit governor, whose

impetuous and ill-considered mode of dealing with the negro insurrection, and whose injustice in the execution of Mr. Gordon called forth the indignation of Englishmen at home, and fired their sympathies in favour of the weaker and half-barbarous rebels. The list of the General Committee is remarkable as including the names of most of the leading English rationalists—men whose theory either excludes or ignores precisely those moral sanctions and authorities Mr. Goldwin Smith deems most necessary to the support of humane principle. The chairman was Mr. John Stuart Mill, and the list contains, of conspicuous evolutionists, the names of Darwin, Herbert Spencer, Huxley, Lyell, and Bain; and of positivists, who equally come under the scope of Mr. Goldwin Smith's charge, the names of Frederic Harrison, Beesly, Congreve, and others.

Still more striking is the list of members of the Executive Committee. Of these, numbering altogether thirty, there are at least eight names of the rationalist class, and of these most took very conspicuous parts in the action of the committee.

There are meanwhile relatively few names of professional religionists on this committee; and among such as there are, I note chiefly those of unitarian and other unorthodox leaders of what calls itself "religious free-thought;" witnessing still to the tendency of modern rationalism, in whatever degree it exists, to enlist itself on the side of equity and humanity. The significant fact, in short, was, that the number of evolutionists on the committee bore a far higher ratio to the evolutionists in the community than did the number of Christians on the committee to the Christians in the community. Finally, of political sects, the greater balance of sympathetic feeling on behalf of the negro population of Jamaica, and the lesser tendency to subordinate the idea of its interests to that of British ascendancy, was undoubtedly evidenced by Liberals, among whose ranks it needs not saying that science and rationalism are more usually found than among the Conservatives.

Since Mr. Goldwin Smith's own name is on the executive part of the Jamaica Committee, and since the composition and the operation of the committee were alike well known to him, it is the more singular that so much adverse evidence should not have deterred him from repeatedly using the Jamaica controversy as favouring his allegation respecting scientific inhumanity. A half apologetic paragraph does indeed occur in one of his essays, in which he "gratefully remembers that among the foremost champions of humanity on that occasion stood some men of the highest eminence who are generally classed with the ultra-scientific school; but (he adds) they were men in whose philosophy we are persuaded an essentially theological element still lingers, however untheological the language of some of them may be."

This persuasion of Mr. Goldwin Smith's respecting the assumed theological leanings of scientific leaders is, however, based on pure hypothesis, and is backed by no particle of evidence. And even were the fact as he alleges, there would be disclosed the remarkable anomaly that whereas the class of men who not only have been brought up under the old theology, but who still adhere to it, showed on this and many similar occasions relatively little humanity, relatively much humanity was shown by those who, brought up under it, have abandoned it. That is to say, the effect of the alleged cause is the greatest where the cause has ceased to be in operation. Those on whom it continues to act show less of its effect than those on whom it long ago ceased to act. Had the Roman Catholics suggested when Protestantism arose that such virtues as Protestants displayed were due to the continuance of Roman Catholic discipline, it would have been quite as valid an allegation as that contained in this hypothesis of Mr. Goldwin Smith.

Before leaving the subject of the Jamaica controversy, it may be interesting to note the marked contrast displayed between the *Jamaica Committee*, and the *Eyre Defence Committee* whose object was to oppose the proceedings against Governor Eyre. What were the principles, and who were the strength of this antagonistic league? An unbiassed reader of Mr. Goldwin Smith's essays, approaching the matter for the first time, would expect to find science largely represented among its members, and Christianity utterly shut out. On the contrary, orthodox science-haters and heterodox science-haters met together in unanimity of ire against the Jamaica Committee, and in resolve to defend the inhumane conduct of the Ex-Governor. The *Eyre Defence Committee* was headed by Carlyle, who was not only a scorner of science and a ridiculer of evolutionist doctrine, but also most explicitly a disbeliever in the obligation of British rulers to deal sympathetically with subject races; and who, at the time of the agitation in question, wrote down the indignation then deeply stirring the gentler hearts of the community in behalf of the negroes, as "disgraceful," "blind," and "egregious folly." This position was of course perfectly consistent with Carlyle's general teaching, and with that anti-scientific spirit which is ever apt to advocate, at a difficult crisis, rough and immediate measures, rather than to trust to long-sighted or patient means for the accomplishment (so far as immediate fair play admits) of an obviously desirable end.

In the letter written by Carlyle, in October, 1866, to the Secretary of the *Eyre Defence Committee*, he remarks that—

"If the clamour raised against Governor Eyre could be supposed to rest on any depth of conviction, and were not rather a thing of repetition and reverberation, mostly from the teeth outwards, [he] should consider it of evil omen to the country and to its highest (*sic*) interests in these times." . . .

"None can say or compute what a vital detriment throughout the British empire is in such an example [as that afforded by the exertions of the Jamaica committee] set to all the colonies and governors the British empire has."

Further particulars respecting the *Eyre Defence Committee* have interest, as bearing indirectly upon the opinion we are maintaining—that a relatively deficient sensitiveness to the feelings and interests of other races and of other classes is bound up with that conservatism of feeling of which the natural obverse is more or less orthodoxy in opinion. A conspicuous feature was the large number of clerical names included in the committee-list, as also of other (largely aristocratic) names identified directly and indirectly with the maintenance of the current creed. Meanwhile, there was but one evolutionist on the committee; so that the immense predominance of anti-evolution opinion was a trait of the *Eyre Defence Committee*, as remarkable as was the converse a trait of the opposing committee. Any one who wanted facts showing the connection between evolutionism and humanity could not find more striking ones than those furnished by this Jamaica business, which Mr. Goldwin Smith names as showing the connection between evolutionism and inhumanity.

As further illustrating the same relative tendency, may be noted on the list of subscribers to the "Eyre Defence Fund" sundry anonymous donors who, with their contribution, sent in their reasons for subscribing. Here are some of them:—

1. "One whose sister was massacred at Cawnpore." (Here we have apparent vindictiveness against the negro for the misdeed of the Hindoo. One dark skin is to reap the penalty due to another dark skin.)

2. "One who detests the principles of Bright, Gladstone, and Russell." (This speaks eloquently for itself.)

3. "One who perceives the necessity of firmness and vigour in those in authority." (But overlooks apparently the more abiding necessity of patience and equity.)

4. "A lady who has suffered by the Jamaica insurrection, and believes Governor Eyre has saved Jamaica to his ungrateful country." (Personal retaliation, tinged by territorial feeling.)

It would be unfair to quote these individual examples as indicative of the feeling generally at work among the defenders of Eyre's "Black Policy," were there elsewhere any evidence of larger feeling having prompted that defence. In the total absence of such evidence, however, these pitiful published confessions may well stand as, so far, confirmatory of the charge of relative inhumanity here maintained against average orthodoxy. Whereas the principle which the scientific sections of the community invariably gave as ground for their sympathy with the negroes was simply that of merciful fair-play, the principle leant upon by the *Eyre Defence*

agitators took uniformly the lower and narrower ethical ground of "British interests" in one shape or another. Examples have not been wanting in later years, similarly illustrative of the Conservative tendency to ridicule as preposterous in matters of foreign and social policy any practical application of the belief in human brotherhood. Orthodox Conservatism is inclined to keep its theory of world-wide humanity for its wife and children to listen to, duly couched in Jewish phraseology, on Sunday. It seldom evinces a frank belief in it as a sound principle for nations to live by, and shows hesitation to countenance it as the basis of any large political measures. It is in the opposite camp that we oftenest find men boldly trusting in "human brotherhood" as in the main a sound workaday principle; even to the extent of hazarding its immediately-disadvantageous political issues. There are exceptions on both sides, of course; but the relative balance of feeling exists as here indicated.

There is, we say, abundant evidence. Mr. Goldwin Smith, however, filches for his own theory exactly such instances as appear to us to tell most strongly against that theory. He cites the injustice of British arms in Afghanistan, and British cruelties in Zululand, as alike the offspring of scientific belief. Writing in 1879, during the ministry of Lord Beaconsfield, he remarks respecting the first:—

"It is now averred by the Prime Minister of England that the real object of the [Afghan] war was a scientific frontier, and that Afghanistan was invaded, the villages burned, and the people killed in execution of that policy."

Are we to infer from this passage that to Lord Beaconsfield and his party—that is, to the main body of English Conservatism and its concomitant English orthodoxy—we should look for the most consistent exhibition of the very doctrine of which that party contains the leading repudiators? Was it science truly so-called, or "science falsely so-called," that thus claimed a frontier for our territory at the expense of international sympathy and of equity? If Lord Beaconsfield's view of the matter was the scientific one, what was that of Mr. Frederic Harrison, who, in his stirring papers on "Martial Law in Kabul," entered earnest protest against our Afghan misdoings?

"By what title (asks Mr. Harrison) [is it that we are] treating the Afghan people as rebels? By what law are our generals hanging men on charge of leading the enemy's forces to battle? And whence comes our right to kill priests who incite their people to resist us?"

The protest concludes with an indignant declaration that we will never accept the English crown as that of a "lawless, conquering, blood-stained Empire."

As to the cruelties in Zululand, Mr. Goldwin Smith makes much

of the opportunity taken by an English illustrated journal to create fun for us at home by depicting the bodily tortures of Zulu prisoners in the hands of British tars.

"It may (he says) pretty safely be said that these pictures, in which the inferior races are treated simply as game for the British hunter, would not have been produced for the amusement of Englishmen fifty, or even thirty years ago; and that their appearance now denotes a change in the mind of the nation."¹

Once more the question is unavoidable. Why, in the alleged existence of a causal connection between modern British philosophy and modern British cruelty, do the cruelty and the philosophy show such a perverse tendency to appear apart, and to repudiate one another?

That of late years there has been a lamentable return on the part of England to violent and predatory dealings with weaker peoples we are all too well aware. But, so far from such dealings having arisen out of, or been supported by, science, it cannot be too often repeated that we find the whole weight of scientific sympathies thrown into resisting and deploring them. A contrast is everywhere conspicuous between the passivity of the clerical body in presence of our various atrocities, and the active opposition of the rationalist bodies and their leaders. Next to nothing was said in orthodox quarters respecting our unjust breach of the treaty with the Ashantees, or the disgraceful acquittal against evidence of the man who shot three native children in Natal. The smashing of Coomassee was rejoiced over by a leading weekly organ of Christianity, while nothing was said by ministers of religion about brutalities committed by our officers in Perak. Meanwhile, I have quoted Mr. Frederic Harrison on the Afghan doings; now hear another rationalist on our exploits in South Africa. One of the earliest protests against the Zulu war came from Mr. John Morley, when in two articles in this Review² he condemned British conduct in the matter of that war as "one of the worst crimes that have been perpetrated in our history." After commenting on the "impious and sanguinary" utterances of an orthodox preacher in Grahams-town (to which utterances on the British position, rights, and duties in Zululand Sir Bartle Frere had drawn the attention of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach as the "outspoken opinions of a thoughtful, religious man"), Mr. Morley remarks—

"It would only be too easy to . . . make mock at the priests of the creed of brotherly love . . . wading through slaughter to a pulpit to preach how blessed are the peacemakers. But the spirit of mockery dies away in us, in shame and humiliation that we . . . are now once more embarking on that very course of policy towards a lower race which from our childhood upwards we have all been taught to abhor in the Spanish and Portuguese tyrants of the

(1) *Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1879 (p. 639).

(2) See *Fortnightly Review* for March and April, 1879.

sixteenth century.¹ . . . Even assuming it to be the destiny of England to supersede the poor germs of civilisation among these less fortunate members of the human family, it is not by the violent and precipitate annexation of kingdoms and provinces that such an end is to be gained. . . . Patience, caution, moderation—but before all else patience—these are the key-words of a true policy.”² . . .

Again,³—

“It is for the people of England to decide whether . . . the old realm which was once the home of justice and freedom is to be transformed into a Pirate-Empire, with the Cross hypocritically chalked upon its black flag.”

Such is the moral colour of modern philosophical heterodoxy, and so fast as a creed approaches the scientific standard, until it reaches that standard completely, does it show increased readiness to throw forth humanely vigorous action. Scarcely an English evolutionist or positivist of eminence has held his peace in face of our recent inhumanities in Africa and Asia; and the leaders and members of heterodox congregations, secularist and theological, have been almost equally earnest in the same cause. Public meetings are addressed, and efforts set afoot in repudiation of British atrocities by the politicians who are more or less formally detached from all orthodox churches; printed protests of the same character bear such signatures as those of Herbert Spencer, John Morley, Frederic Harrison, and Dr. Congreve; and from heterodox bodies emanate nearly all the petitions to Parliament to check governmental bullyings and colonial aggressions. But while rationalism of all grades, and apparently in proportion to its degree, thus evinces a leaning to national generosity and humane principle, orthodoxy is naturally bent chiefly on its own propagation, and that of British rule as conducive to its own propagation, among the weak tribes into whose midst it carries at once arms and Bibles.

Nor was the spirit of Christianity at the seat of war more consistent, or more inclined to make home-thrusts at actual wrong-doing. One Cape paper stated that “while the colony is making strenuous efforts to disarm the natives, the missionaries are giving away guns of a superior sort in order to induce the chiefs to allow them to pursue their labours in peace.” That the gospel of good-will and peace on earth may be verbally preached with ease and safety to the preacher, it is to be practically annulled beforehand by bribing with arms of war the heathen he seeks to attract! Truly, in face of this, one may long for the time when religion shall no longer have the power to paralyse the morality it professes to patronise. Again, also from South Africa:—

“The *Christian Express* reports fighting amongst the natives in the interior, in which some of the mission people were engaged.”

(1) *Fortnightly Review*, March, 1879 (p. 350).

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 352.

(3) *Ibid.*, April, 1879, p. 562.

Thus while orthodoxy at home was largely in favour of the war, orthodoxy on the spot fanned its fury.

We would not overlook or misappreciate those pleasant but too rare instances where ministers of the English Church have risen above the general current of orthodox passivity, and have spoken bravely against recent cases of inhumane British policy. Still less can be forgotten the earnest protests entered against the South African and Afghan wars by Protestant Nonconformists, who made common cause with rationalists, at the time of the last general election, in stoutly repudiating those wars, and the iniquities they entailed, as a disgrace to British arms. But the fact remains that whereas the *body* of orthodoxy and the body of its chief upholders have publicly shown relative indifference to the ferocities of English rule, and have again and again been, for the sake of British interests, found passive in face of the enormities committed in name of those interests; the *body* of scientific heterodoxy, and nearly all its chief leaders, have been invariably found on the side of humanity, and relatively eager in its defence. And it is here maintained that the contrary charge brought against science by Mr. Goldwin Smith is, in face of this fact, as unfair as it is unfounded.

L. S. BEVINGTON.

Common-Sense Country

By

L.S. Bevington

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Writers and Thinkers in the Socialist Movement.

Common-Sense Country.

There was a country where Common-sense had somehow got the upper hand. In that country sense was as common as lunacy is in a madhouse. There was a place for everything, and everything was either in that place, or else was on the direct way there--the shortest way, the easiest way, the cheapest way. In that country everybody was brought up with the notion that the simplest plan in everything served everybody's turn best, even the clever people's; and it was taken as a matter of course that if things did not go wrong people wouldn't. They read in their books of history and comparative sociology that in countries where things do go wrong, people go wrong too, in the blind, blundering attempt to straighten things back a bit. But in Common-sense Country it was always said when things went wrong that there had been some nonsense--that is, empty word-play--in the heads or habits of the people, which had diverted attention from realities, and caused the people to let things wander out of the way.

In Common-sense Country all the commodities and goods, all the instruments, utensils, and appliances--in short, all the "things"--had very simple and unadventurous biographies, and, if they could have spoken, they would not have had much harrowing information to impart about the ravages of their tissues and textures caused by moth and rust, not yet of

vicissitudes incurred at the hands of thieves breaking through to steal. "I was needed: I was made: I was conveyed: I was applied: I was consumed." That would have summed up the history of a thing in the country where things went right: only five short chapters. In most countries, of course, allsorts of distressing and distracting other chapters intervene. Thus: "I was coveted: I was done without: I was lied for: I was hated for: I was speculated in: I was adulterated: I was advertised: I was legislated about: I was sold (and my buyer with me): I was squandered: I was hoarded: I was quarrelled over: I was fought for: I was burgled: I was bombed."

In Common-sense Country there was a job for everyone, and everyone was merrily, ardently, or placidly doing that job. No one was doing mere "business" and calling it work. No one was doing real work and feeling it "toil". Dull jobs were done in short spells by an immense number of people; delightful jobs were worked at for the pleasure of the thing, in longer spells, and by a fewer number of people. It fell out so, naturally, and because of common sense; nobody had to be at the trouble of enforcing the arrangement. The man with the dullest or most fatiguing job, as a matter of course, got the longest leisure for re-creation of his naturally flagging zest for the job. The man with the most pleasureable and healthy job hardly knew leisure from job. The kindest and most able-bodied and jolliest of the people had common-sense reasons for attending to the least appetizing tasks. Everybody knew they wanted doing; and these kindly, vigorous, and jolly folks were those who cared most about getting them done, and cared least about minor disagreeables. They also liked the peculiar way in which other people shook hands with them for it, and more than made it good to them in the way of respect and hospitality wherever they went.

You never saw any feet without shoes in cold weather in Common-sense Country. And you never saw any shoes heaped up thousands thick in warehouses with no feet to put into them. Common-sense citizens had grave objections, not only to cold, discomfort, and disease, but also grave objections to the enormous expense of thought, time, material, and goodwill, necessarily involved in any and every measure for keeping empty shoes warm indoors, and human feet cold outside in the street. You never came to a place in any Common-sense city where, by turning your head to the right, you could see one horn of a dilemma in the shape of a lot of grain or fish being destroyed on the lunatic excuse that it could not be sold for more than it cost, while by turning your head to the left the other horn of the dilemma became visible in the shape of men and women (with their children) hungry, worried, and constantly at their wits' end, only because they could not buy back the comestibles they had ploughed, reaped, milled, fished, and otherwise laboured to bring within human reach.

In Common-sense Country there were no jerry built houses, because people could not see any reason for making insecure and unhealthy dwellings. There were no ground landlords to make it disadvantageous to any builder to build honestly; no builders so hard pressed, therefore, that they were obliged to cause the masons to scamp work, use limeless mortar, or unseasoned wood. No builder or mason, moreover, had (in the name of common-sense) any object whatever in view so immediately as the supplying of buildings wanted for use. He built houses for bakers, clothiers, artists, and all sorts of other useful persons; and these lived in the houses and produced food, clothing, works of art, and all sorts of other useful things for the builder in exchange.

There was no waste of any energy or of any talent in Common-sense Country. There were no churches and temples made with hands; because hands had better things to do than build prisons to shut up souls in. Also because in strict common sense the sky was holy enough to "sit under," and even to sing spiritual songs under. Besides, Common-senseites had discovered that you could not get the sun and fixed stars and all their lesser lights into the biggest of temples ever made with hands. In Common-sense Country people like daylight for their minds and morals as well as for their bodies; and found it cheapest in the long run.

There were next to no shipwrecks on the coasts of Common-sense Country; no one raced any ships to port in all weathers for the nonsensical reason of getting in before other ships. People on shore could always afford to wait a day or so for the weather, better than they could afford to kill men, sink ships, and spoil cargoes through running amuck at nature's meteorological arrangements. It did not matter a jot to any one which ship got in first, since all ships were full of supplies, and sure to drop in, in natural order, as fast as needed. What sense of hurry there was, founded of course on experience of the inconvenience of waiting, led to all possible improvements in the art and science of ship-building and engine-building, so that wind-and-wave difficulties had been reduced to a minimum. So there was no colliding in fogs, no bursting of boilers, no over-lading, and no un-seaworthy craft; also no "Lloyd's" agencies, to speculate on anyone's want of common-sense, and to live as parasites on the low moral vitality of the public, making profit at its expense. When folk talk of "insuring" in that country, they always meant making as sure as possible against chances of mishap. To insure a ship was to build her well, fit her well, man her well, to steer clear of shoals, and keep her in sound repair. Likewise with the insurance

of houses. And to insure your life, you had only to eat, drink, and clothe yourself on hygienic principles, to avoid the indolence or the over-taxing of any of your faculties, and to act fairly by every one of your fellow-creatures with whom you had to do. In common-sense language, insuring your life or property never meant to make it worth anyone's while to destroy either one or the other.

No visible teacher taught common-sense in that country. Children were born with it ready-made. It lay in their human nature. It taught itself. It "grewed" (like Topsy) because neither "business" nor "policy" existed to check or warp it--indeed neither the policy of business nor the business of policy were known at all, except as queer, sad, old superstitions, suffered through and done with ages ago, during the time when human generations were paying a big price in the purgatory of civilization, for the privilege of having beaten other creatures in the dangerous matter of language. Children in Common-sense Country were never taught to be "wise and prudent," because that was the way to prevent anything of any interest or beauty or high import from being "revealed." Their little, honest, ignorant, simple questions received honest, accurate, and simple answers, in language which they could understand, and which they never needed to unlearn afterwards. And this alike on all subjects. Every young man and young woman grew up with as much common-sense in his or her head or expectations as the elders could help them to. And each young man or young woman went on from a common-sense starting point to use his or her faculties as individual endowment suggested, so that each generation kept on fearlessly adding to real knowledge by experimenting in new directions as common-sense prompted; while the elders loved to have it so, and felt rewarded for their good faith to the children, and were sometimes in their own turn listeners, questioners, learners.

Common-sense citizens never said "Time is money." They said that money-minting, money-managing, and money-protecting entail endless waste of time and trouble; that they are an abuse of human faculty, resulting in a great deal of death--bodily, intellectual, moral, and spiritual. Also it was said these and like employments were as nonsensical in their objects as they were vicious in their effects. Money in Common-sense Country had no meaning, any more than it has in a beehive. No one said "Money is power." Sometimes it was said "Money is weakness." That was when Common-senseites were speaking of the doings and miseries of the inhabitants of Lunatic Land. (By the way, the word used was not money but mammon.) One objection they had to money, beyond its non-sensicalness, was its tendency--in proportion to the degree of its accumulation in a man's hand--to sap away his "soul," his moral individuality, his character. They said, "What can it profit a man to lose his soul, and become a moral paralytic?" They observed also that wherever in Lunatic Land mammon had accumulated in a man's hand, it had a tendency to put into his other a sceptre, a truncheon, a gatling gun, or some other preposterous implement, making of that moral paralytic a lord over two, or five, or ten cities, or markets, or communities--as the case might be.

As there was no mammon, there were none of those dismal things which are eternal essentials where mammon reigns. There were no arsenals, no armies, no police, no spies: no banks, no prisons, no poorhouses: no brothels, no divorce courts, no nunneries, no confessionals: no "rings," no strikes, no infernal machines, no gallows. Common-sense found no sort of use in any of these queer things. Common-sense knew by hear-say that mammon could not reign without them; but then common sense found no reason whatever for putting up with mammon, or paying its expenses.

There were many stores and depots where anyone who wanted anything for wear, or consumption, or instruction, or pleasure, or any other use, could go, or send and get it, or get it made. He never had to ask "What's the damage?" because in Common-sense Country damage was objected to. Everyone knew that no one had got what he did not want, because nobody was so insane as to cumber himself with the custody of anything that was of no use or pleasure to him; so that to ask him to give up what was of direct use or pleasure to him would damage him. No one was short of anything, because the world is very fruitful, and human beings are very numerous, very ingenious, and very industrious, and are able and eager to make it more and more fruitful. Wealth in Common-sense Country increased even faster than the population, so that there was more leisure for every new generation born. Whatever was not of direct use to the individuals who produced it, it was to the convenience of these individuals to place in care, and outside custody altogether, so that those to whom it was not superfluous might choose their own time and put it to their own uses. It is only in Lunatic Land that everybody (willingly or not) makes a practice of fining everybody else for the privilege of living alongside of him on the same planet. It takes a hereditary lunatic of many generations' standing to go shamming about in the roundabout, nonsensically solemn effort to convert man's natural home into a penal colony, by means of a cunningly devised system of fines all round for being alive and active and wanting to stop so.

In Common-sense Country there were born ninety-five per cent. fewer idiots, cripples, and otherwise afflicted mortals than are born elsewhere. The few there were, were not felt as a burden; for those of tender hearts found a natural pleasure in doing what could be done to make life tolerable for these sad and ever diminishing exceptions; and of course they were no

expense in a land of plenty, where access was free to whatever was wanted, without money and without price.

In Common-sense Country words were true, and purposes single; even newspapers expressed real opinions, and conveyed real information; fun abounded, and nobody preached. Every shade of individuality was respected and made welcome, variety being suggestive as well as interesting. No one wheedled, no one canted, no one flattered, or equivocated, or slandered; because none of these were necessary expedients. There was never anything to fear from either honesty or generosity in that land. People could have food, friends, fun, and freedom without little abject servilities. Every individual was, as a matter of course, left perfectly free on his capable side, while being courteously and gladly aided, by custom and common consent, on his weak side. So that there was nothing to prevent his voluntarily and naturally making common cause with others in the overcoming of common difficulties, and in the acquirement, production, and distribution of all good things.

There was no schism in that country, because there was no Church. There was a great deal of religion, because Common-senseites had time to try their best powers of life and mind on everything, and the more they knew, the deeper depths of sheer wonderfulness did they find beneath the new-won knowledge. They found that life, love, liberty, peace, progress, and everything worth having came as the reward of adherence to certain inexorable, universal laws, inherent in everything; laws in which there was no variableness, nor shadow of turning; and also no respect of persons. They had the intensest interest and zest in getting hold of these laws, and falling in with them as fast as they became visible; and

they never dreamt of making cheap and nasty substitutes for laws in places or cases where none

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appeared of their own accord. As neither the ignorance nor superstition of their fellows served anyone's turn in a country where citizens were free and trusted one another, no people in black were kept to purvey either the one or the other, not even to women or to the little children. All black arts were forgotten, and not missed. On the other hand Common-sense Country was rich in prophets, or poets, of the variety known as "born not made."

There was no sedition, because there was no State. Instead, there was every where a most beautiful order; for common-sense, left to itself, saw no use in a public muddle, or in a private scramble; such as exists everywhere and all the while in Lunatic Land. It was moreover found that there were a thousand simpler, cheaper, and surer (because more natural) ways of forestalling and discouraging any atavistic aggressiveness on the part of individuals, than bribing a number of strangers beforehand to be in readiness to retaliate by proxy.

There was no swindling because there was no competition. Instead, there was endless emulation. The results of doing any thing well, usefully, or admirably were wholly pleasant. The social results of doing anything that wanted doing better and more easily and swiftly than it had been done before, were so exceptionally pleasant that all the most energetic and able people aspired and endeavoured to experience those results at first hand. No man-imposed restriction thwarted or impeded any experiment, and in the end the community learnt something useful by every mistake made. General goodwill and prosperity were immense; because there were no reasons at all for tricking anybody--quite the reverse.

Human nature was never made a butt for satire, or a subject of regret, in Common-sense Country. No mud,

Page 12

no rotten eggs, no printers' ink were thrown at it. No one made a "living" by undertaking to convince others of their unsuspected depravity, with promise of cure for it in exchange for cash down and vows of allegiance. No one made any name or fame for himself by undertaking to keep human nature in others in order, by means of penal and restrictive regulations invented and imposed by human nature in himself or his set. Common-senseites saw that human nature was a branch of nature at large, and that to divide it against itself was the surest way to get it out of gear. Whenever a proclivity was found to be universal amongst humans, common-sense put the natural interpretation on the fact, and respected the proclivity, however superficially inconvenient in minor respects or exceptional cases. They respected it as due to some instinct, implanted and developed by the law of Lifewardness, and which it was therefore dangerous and disastrous systematically to nullify and oppose. Their endeavour was, instead, to become better acquainted with it.

The great pleasure of trustful, unchecked sympathy, and of spontaneous glowing kindness, was enjoyed nowhere to such a degree as in Common-sense Country. The old people, the little children, the animals and birds had a happy time of it; and there was free exchange of friendship and affection between the dumb and the human sharers of earthly life. And in the healthy, breathable, moral atmosphere of habitual good faith, fearless thinking, true speech, and sincere dealing which (by dint of simple good

sense) people had gradually instituted, the necessary love of self, which takes such crude forms in Lunatic Land, had overflowed at every point, and become indistinguishable from the delicious, zest-giving, and inexhaustible pleasure of love for those around.

There was Peace in Common-sense Country, and Goodwill among men; and Happiness and Fullness of Life had become the Natural Order of the day.

(back)

Printed by James Tochatti,
at 60 Grove Park Terrace, Chiswick, W

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Common-Sense Country

by L.S. Bevington

12 p.

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OF

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PREFACE.

"In proportion as we love truth more and victory less, we shall become anxious to know what it is which leads our opponents to think as they do. We shall begin to suspect that the pertinacity of belief exhibited by them must result from a perception of something we have not perceived. And we shall aim to supplement the portion of truth we have found with the portion found by them."—HERBERT SPENCER. *"First Principles,"* part of § 3.

THIS volume is published in response to requests from numerous friends who desire to have, in a permanent form, the Lectures delivered on Sunday afternoons at South Place Institute, during 1888-89 and 1891, on "Centres of Spiritual Activity," and "Phases of Religious Development."

The Lectures were first designed to explain and illustrate the different Religious Movements of the day, for though most thinking persons are fully persuaded of their own belief, they are often unable to understand the standpoint of others equally earnest, and thus fail to do justice to men of different creeds. After the current divisions of Christianity and Modern Ethical Philosophies had been treated, it was thought that Ancient Religious Systems might also be profitably studied in the same manner, especially as the general public have very little opportunity of becoming acquainted with them, and not unfrequently mistake their mere accidents for their spirit and substance.

Some of the Lecturers have been so kind as to re-write their essays for this volume, while the articles on the Religion of Egypt, Shintôism (second article), Zoroastrianism, Religions of Ancient Greece and Rome, Hittites, Quakers, Irvingism, and Evolution have been specially written for the present edition.

The willingness with which the various Lecturers have come forward, without fee or reward, to speak on his or her special topic, to audiences not always sympathetic—in some cases at the risk, almost certainty, of offending their own co-religionists—and the sympathy expressed by several eminent men, who from various causes were unable to take a personal part in the course, have been very encouraging to those who organized the series of lectures.

That a publication of this kind meets a distinct want is clearly shown by the fact that the first edition was exhausted within a few months of issue. It is hoped that the present work will, owing to its greater completeness, be even more widely appreciated. It is published simultaneously in England and America.

WM. SHEOWRING, } *Hon. Secs.*
CONRAD W. THIES, } *Institute Committee.*

THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS BEARINGS OF THE EVOLUTION THEORY.

BY MISS BEVINGTON.

IN trying to give an account of the great philosophical creed of our time one is tempted to write a volume. Its credentials seem to press for notice no less than its gist, and one would gladly offer evidence of its truth before describing the part it plays as creed and as code in the consciousness of its adherents. But in this book we are concerned less with the theoretical justification of our respective bodies of doctrine than with their presentation as they stand related to the moral and religious life of mankind. In the present chapter, therefore, the merest outline and the broadest general features of the evolution theory alone are given, the main effort being directed to making as clear as may be the precise way in which the holding of the theory naturally affects the will, the conduct, the conscience, and the religious sentiment of individuals.

Primarily the doctrine is not a religion. It is the least inaccurate account that can as yet be given of a general natural process. Scientific research arrived at its concrete evidences, scientific philosophy caught sight of its abstract significance, while engaged in the pursuit of natural, actual truth, "for truth's sake," and not for any other sake at all. But the vastness and the persistence of the uniformities that science brings to light do much to strengthen and deepen that "indefinite consciousness of existence transcending relations" which Herbert Spencer recognises as the "essence of religion." More than this is true. The theory of evolution brings with it implications which are calculated to affect religiously the emotions, and to affect morally the conduct of any one who has really grasped it, by giving him the most solemn and intimate sense of actual relationship with and participation in that supreme Energy of which the universe, within as without the mind of man, is the manifestation and the working aspect.

I. The process into whose regular workings evolutionists believe themselves to have obtained a glimpse, accurate even where not comprehensive, is nothing less sublime than that of the conversion of chaos—or featureless confusion—into form, order, life, thought, will, and all that lies on the hither side of these.

Even when, as in the hands of Herbert Spencer, the theory is comprehensively applied, and serves as key-note to a philosophy of the whole material, mechanical, mental, and moral universe, it still remains strictly scientific, since it is only this universe as knowable and thinkable—this universe, so far as our present powers can conceive it as built up out of observed natural factors—that is treated of.

As science, the first thing the doctrine appeals to is the hungry, truth-seeking part of the intellect, and the hardy, truth-loving corner of the conscience. The human mind at its best has already reached a stage of moral development when truth at all hazards is believed in as valuable, and its pursuit more and more encouraged by that "still, small voice" which makes so little of personal self-seeking. The moral doctrine inclosed within the theory is nothing other than the actual *law of life*—the law, that is, according to which life is developed and ennobled, its liberties secured, and its powers effectualized—as this law stands revealed in the open, but closely written book of natural fact.

The peculiar characteristic of the evolution doctrine is that it begins and ends at natural history. All that *is* is regarded as natural, and all that happens is regarded as resulting from the liberation of tendencies inherent in nature. It treats of the normal and constant workings of things everywhere and always among and upon one another. It discloses the part played by these constant workings in the origination, the development, the consummation, and the natural dissolution of this or that individual phenomenon. It notes the absolute constancy of relations, the invariable sequence in which changes occur. It points out how phenomena are everywhere and incessantly emerging *in one particular way* out of earlier phenomena, and as incessantly merging into yet others; and how all that is passes through phases without jolts or breaks,—no change anywhere or anyhow occurring without affecting a change also in whatever is in any sort of present relation to the incident agency.

The theory includes the natural history of morals, of conscience, of religious systems, and of the religious sentiment itself. The evolutionist preacher might take as his text the words, "This do, and thou shalt live"; but as a fact science is addicted rather to stating than to preaching. Yet it is this very fact, that a luminous and universally applicable code of righteousness has been come upon, so to speak, incidentally, growing naturally like a hardy wild flower right in the broad daylight and open highway of science *truly* so called, that gives to the evolution theory its special ethical significance at the present critical juncture of human affairs and of human speculation. Since it has been formulated, the actual meaning of conscience has loomed into sight. The natural history of that strange compunction which, within the individual, pleads independently of the individual in behalf of something more permanent than himself is spelt out between the lines of the natural history of Society—Society being an aggregate of interdependent individuals, each more or less at the mercy of all, all more or less at the mercy of each.

II. So much for a general indication of the gist of our doctrine. Now for an outline of the chief constituent *dicta* of the theory itself.

Inhering in everything and manifested in everything is an energy or cause, which, however, eludes scientific analysis, and remains in its entirety and its absolute nature for ever beyond the reach of thought and imagina-

tion. Its effects are perceptible to us under the aspect of nature and natural law. So far as these effects can be observed they are characterized by complete essential uniformity. Like conditions always and everywhere issue in like result. Hence the belief that the under-lying and all-pervading force is single and identical. It is also conceived as unlimited in time and space, and as absolutely *persistent* and *inexhaustible*: "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever."

Meanwhile the ultimate nature of the primal Energy eludes comprehension, because that which underlies, is antecedent to, and includes the very *conditions* of sense, thought, and knowledge eludes any possible or conceivable extension of these powers *as such*. That Power in which we "live, move, and have our being" is real, but is not "by searching" to be "found out." It remains unknown and unknowable.

III. The evolution story begins at the knowable. Inherent in every part or point of the known universe there appear to be two antagonist tendencies. Each ultimate unit of existence, whether we call it for convenience an "atom of matter" or a "centre of force," tends persistently to "gravitate," that is, to approach, combine with, and settle in with the rest of things; and yet it tends no less persistently to keep aloof. Even when and while in close combination, it still tends to release itself, as itself. Any aggregate of any kind is therefore, by force of these contrary tendencies in its contained units, constantly tending to pull together, and as constantly tending to go to pieces. If the former tendency is the stronger, the aggregate keeps together, consolidates, concentrates, and loses its superfluous motion; it gets less fidgety and loose, more and more busy and connected, adjusts its parts within itself, adapts itself to whatever it has to do with in its external environment,—in a word, ORGANIZES, and begins to act as a whole made up of parts having a common interest. This whole, once formed, develops more powers (and more *various* powers) of affecting its environment, and of effecting that which its own sustentation requires. If this process continue long enough unhindered, the aggregate goes on to what may be called its completion, consummation, or perfection. That is, it reaches a stage where its needs and proclivities are exactly balanced by external occasion; its function is entirely fulfilled. No further advance is possible, its harmony with the conditioning environment being at length perfectly established.

Evolution is the name given to the process by which the formative tendency takes effect. The opposite process, representing the antagonistic tendency, is called Dissolution.

IV. The transformation of chaos into cosmos is an "eternal" process; that is, it tends *at every instant* to go on *everywhere*, so far as not thwarted by dissolution. Its order is always alike. It can at every point be analysed into a definite mode of behaviour on the part of the "raw material" of the particular phenomenon under observation, which responds everywhere and always in the same manner on the same provocation. The uniform

persistent energy, or *principle of occurrence*, is manifested through all orders of phenomena, the mental, moral and spiritual no less than the so called material and mechanical departments of nature. The *least resisted* action of the evolving form of energy at any point whatever through the striving cosmos results constantly and instantly in the formation of a definite something,—a something possessing a greater or less degree of coherent persistence *as itself*—as a centre of influence affecting the formation and development of things subordinately related to it.

V. We are able with more or less precision to detect the process of evolution going on in its very various stages simultaneously. Here we seem to detect it in its crudest stage, where *matter-in-motion* or *motion-in-matter* goes swirling about nebulously in the way that is believed to eventuate in the formation of suns and systems of worlds, and all that come of these. Removing our glance, we find the identical principle again working, where a vague sensibility in some low order of animal is tending to concentrate itself into eyes and sight, ears and hearing, and all that comes of these. Again, a number of living beings—ants, bees, or men—are finding circumstance too strong for them severally, and are banding together to lighten one another's burdens, aid one another's endeavours, pull with one another, and for dear life's sake in each individual, to live agreeably to one another; and so are coalescing into a compact *society*, and all that comes of this. Again, a loose collection of facts and experiences in the brain of some thinker is tending to become coherent, and to take the shape of a definite and lucid theory, and all that comes of it.

All through space and time, all through the whole field of matter, motion, mind, and morals, this tendency to take on shape and being, and to become definite, effectual, and independent, is eternally going on. There is always the initial vagueness and blundering, the loose consistency, the waste of material and of motion. Then, if the progress be undisturbed, an increasing *concentration of essentials* and *dissipation of non-essentials* takes place, accompanied by better and better internal adaptation of structure to the work required, and better and better adjustment to the external conditions. It is the same whether we regard the sentient and intelligent forms of existence, or the works of their hands, or the modes of their association. The more excellent the steam-engine, the less clumsy and the more finely complicated is its structure, the less its noise and bustle, and the less its waste of fuel and steam in proportion to the work done. The finished artist, while producing a drawing precisely and beautifully essential to his ideal intention, has, by rightly directed efforts, got into habits of eye and of manipulation which make him able to fulfil his design without the false or superfluous strokes of the pencil which hinder the full effect in mere students' work, or the constant use of the eraser necessary to the achievement by raw beginners of still more inadequate representation. The higher a governmental ideal, the better is the opportunity afforded to the harmless activities of the

ruled citizens, the more adequate is their protection from antagonist influences at home and abroad, the fewer and the slighter are the restrictions on the liberty of citizens, while the legal code becomes more discriminate and more minutely adaptable to single cases. The more elevated a religious cult becomes, the less its need of pompous and irrelevant accessories in proportion to the strength of appeal it makes to the devout sensibilities of the worshippers. The better the man—the more perfect the moral character—the less is the need of side-inducements to beneficent conduct, the prompter and stronger are the conscientious decisions, and the fewer the injurious errors made in aiming at the due welfare of others or in claiming the due rights of self or party.

This then is the picture nature presents us everywhere of an evolving individual thing, as of the evolving universe as a whole. Featureless raw material settling into definite form; vague and simple motion becoming determinate and complex; dim sentience tending to intelligence and will; crudities of every kind in every department of social life giving place to well-adjusted, clearly defined arrangement; instinctive moral proclivities growing discriminate and appropriate: everywhere and persistently, however, thwarted and resisted by an antagonist tendency, inherent in the component parts, to reverse and undo and to make of none effect all that has been painfully, slowly, and at great cost secured along the narrow line that "leadeth unto life." The whole creation, in very deed, has long groaned and travailed in pain, before the glorious liberty of a chosen few, inheritors of "kingdom"—*i.e.* of power, right, light, and freedom—rewards the sacrifice. This is scientific fact, not merely dogmatic formula. The evolution doctrine does not "destroy the letter," but everywhere, so far as any "letter" happens fitly to express, and in permanently fit terms, the gist of a permanent natural truth, it fulfils or affords aid to the fulfilment of that fit letter. Along the line of natural force when working evolutionally lie amelioration and adjustment, the reduction of evil and harm and miscarriage at any point to a minimum, the adequate employment of resource for the next step forward, and so, the advance towards a consummation which, as a whole and at every conscious point, justifies all the time and all the travail that have been expended in arriving at it.

The moral question is: "Shall we, or shall we not, fall in with this process? shall we strive to understand Nature's infallible way of ordering, of vivifying, of ennobling, and finally of *liberating* her own material? Or, shall we go on refusing to learn, hugging our foregone conclusions, and prolonging the struggle—so wasting and weakening those very powers, mental, emotional, and volitional, which by the slow process of evolution have been so painfully won for us and committed to our trust to carry further? shall we yield up these powers (which are thus *not* solely "our own," but "bought with a price"), in the cause of opposition, retardation, or even reversal of the beneficent process to which we owe them? "Sin"—immorality—for the evolutionist consists in the voluntary hin-

drance of or resistance to the universal law of amelioration. And the wage of sin is "death," not by any arbitrary fiat whatever, but because death is the actual, natural outcome of sin so viewed.

VI. Although the end is better than the beginning, and though the ultimate outcome of evolution is the lessening of evils and the increase of welfare for survivors, still the process is characterized throughout by an awful severity. True, it is the very inexorableness with which all that is insufficiently adapted to the exigences of existence is "improved away," which eventually secures the supremacy and further development of the higher forms of life. True, that so there emerge on the scene, at last, intelligent beings able to look before and after; and moral beings, possessing compassions and compunctions, and able increasingly to soften the asperities of the cosmical struggle. But meanwhile, the irretrievable loss and defeat of the less adapted, by which the forward march of surviving races has been achieved, is terrific. The stern lesson must not be flinched that there is in the universal economy no respect of persons; that rain falls alike on the evil and on the good; that falling towers crush, and lava-torrents smother—not men rated by their fellows as specially sinners, but those whose carelessness or ignorance leaves them within the dangerous area. All who do not turn away will likewise perish. The severity of the lesson becomes even more suggestive when we note that this identical law prevails also in the moral life—not "ideal" morals, but fit morals being ever the surviving type. The severity of the lesson becomes even more suggestive, when we note that this identical law prevails also in the moral life—not "ideal morals," but fit morals being ever the surviving type. Nature recognises in the individual but one virtue: obedience, conscious, or unconscious—voluntary or involuntary—to the immediate demands of the law of life. She punishes in the individual but one vice: breach of the law of life. Error is never specially excused as unintentional. Helplessness (for the whole truth must be spoken) is never specially shielded. That race is helped which helps itself. Those escape whom a self-helpful ancestry has provided with a constitutional panoply. Whether an error be ignorant, or wilful, makes no difference to the immediate result of that error. Reward and penalty, as dealt by pre-human nature, are always "in kind."

Everywhere, the different existences in different stages of the process are meeting one another and fighting it out from their several achieved standpoints; and sometimes the less advanced is in stronger force than the more advanced, and the contest results in the discomfiture and dissolution of the better evolved, which is then once more reduced to "raw material" or dragged back to the simpler but less efficient point of vantage occupied by the conqueror.

This event, wherever it occurs, constitutes the pathos,—the "evil" of the universe. But the greater the degree of intelligent and moral—in a word, of human—evolution that is reached, the greater is the power of

avoiding such evil. Shall we not become as little children, and learn what is the actual law by which to ward off *catastrophe*, on one hand, and *degeneration*, on the other, that so we may do something towards consummating the total endeavour? Catastrophe, however, occurs most frequently at very early stages of the general advance; for instance, while the upheavals and submergences, the heats and frosts, floods and earthquakes, to which a comparatively young planet is liable sweep into painful, violent, and ineffectual death whole races of lowly animals. (It is said that the contorted attitudes in which whole generations of fishes are found fossilized in rocks evidences that these creatures, already possessing nervous systems, died *in agony*.) As the planet itself evolves,—that is, cools and settles,—it becomes better fitted for life, it exhibits less bluster of elemental forces, more and more firmness of surface, greater and greater precision of seasons; and so living forms get not only more and more opportunity of appearing (for they appear to be incidental to a comparatively very limited range of temperature), but are less and less hindered in the slow, hereditary work of developing into distinct races.

VII. The same contest reappears when, having arrived, several races find themselves competitors for the means of subsistence. So within the limits of an identical race, when the individuals find themselves competitors for mates. In each living creature the eternal Energy has effected a centre and starting-point for further exertion along the lifeward line; and the loftier and fitter the creature, the better is the channel grooved through its own proclivities for further progress. Life once possessed does not readily "let go"; and then there arises the already proverbial and generally recognised "struggle for existence" between life and life, species and species. In each case alike the successfully equipped competitor in the strife *survives* to leave a posterity; and so far as his strength, agility, or cunning become ingrain and organic does he, by the (still only dimly understood) law of heredity, hand on to his posterity the tendency to repeat the action which has been ancestrally successful, by dint of handing on the *organized innate aptitudes*—the natural habits or "functions" of a "structure" which, originally forced on the ancestor by the necessity of hard experience, is then finally inherited by the posterity ready-made.

Of course it is only very slowly that the active experiences of a living creature get thus consolidated into habit, whether martial, or wary, or defensive; and it is only so fast as habit becomes second nature, and considerably modifies nervous structure, that it becomes hereditary and instinctive. The very tissues of the living organism have to get into the required habit before this is the case. Nervous structure appears to be almost infinitely modifiable; it can be, so to speak, hardened and inured where useless but unavoidable friction is persistently repeated. It may be quickened, and rendered more and more sensitive and prepared for response to circumstance, in a thousand ways. And everything goes

increasingly to show that the mental, emotional, moral, and spiritual life of organized beings is bound up with and related to their nervous life as closely as the convex of a mathematical curve is related to the concave of the same curve.

VIII. The hereditary habits or instincts of the intellectual and moral life of man are set up in the same way and by the persistent working of the same essential principle of experience as are the hereditary habits or instincts of the physical life. Each instinct tends to establish itself firmly in proportion as it is of use to the organism in the exercise of its vital functions. It then gets spontaneously and constantly exercised; and exercise strengthens it and develops it further. In the moral sphere this amounts to the formation of character. If the organism, however, be so situated that its inherited instincts get in its way, are of no use to it further, or bring about more antagonism from its competitors than increase to its own resources—then does the instinct, though never so firmly rooted, *tend* to lose strength and persistence; and if its exercise be continuously disadvantageous to the general comfort or convenience of its possessor the structure in which the propensity sits loses its definiteness; the habit is “got out of,” the instinct lost, and this re-modification, if repeated long enough in the experience of successive generations of individuals, becomes in its turn hereditary. In this way man first learnt to be a fine fighting creature, and then as conditions of welfare changed, had to begin un-learning it.

Now when we consider that all this is exactly as true of moral characteristics, intellectual proclivities, spiritual cravings, and æsthetic aptitudes as it is of the physical instincts themselves, an enormous significance is given to such evolutionary expressions as the “survival of the fittest,” or to the stern and equally scientific truth, that “to him that hath shall be given, and to him that hath *not* shall be taken away even that which he seemeth to have.” Fitness to meet the emergencies of life is the one thing that nature demands in every organism which is to survive, to perfect what powers it has, and to develop new and higher orders of power. The longer any species, or any individual, remains master of the situation, the better fitted does it become to that precise situation. It wastes less and less resource; its action becomes ever neater and apter; its control of its environment becomes easier; it blunders less and less, and turns experience ever better and better to its own account. If, however, while still in a crude condition, it remains undisturbed long enough, it will get *so* “fit” and *so* comfortable and *so* masterful, that it will settle together into itself, lose its internal flexibility and elasticity more and more, and sink into that final equilibrium which precludes any further power of advance. It will, so to speak, fossilize. But in a world where so many orders of living beings are competing for like benefits, there is little opportunity for this “gaining of the whole world,” which, in a very real sense, and wherever it occurs, does indeed involve the loss of the gainer’s

"soul." The actual lapse of those activities in which intelligent moral and spiritual vitality consists, and on which the continuity of character and the possibility of ennoblement depend, is, as a fact, bound up with over-much prosperity as a normal consequence. The "soul" (or character), like the body, must keep on working in order to live; and when it has no longer to contend for survival, it tends to degenerate, and, as "soul," to disappear. This paradoxical fact goes far to justify, even from a teleological point of view, the grim universal law of struggle, and the continued atmosphere of opposition with which whatever is noblest is constantly surrounded. "God," *versus* "mammon": integrity, *versus* comfort: effort, *versus* repose; the "soul," *versus* the "world":—such is the choice eternally presented; and the utmost that science justifies us in desiring, is a condition in which the necessary lifeward effort of higher beings shall have come to be so far instinctive as to be itself a source of pleasure to those who have to make it; while, through the increasing accuracy of its direction, and oppositeness of its method, it entails ever less and less harassment and distress to such lowlier claimants on life as stand in its way.

IX. Evolution then is the *law of lifewardness* as evidenced throughout nature. I use the clumsy word "lifewardness" rather than "life" for two reasons. First, because the evolution of a world, as such, is already "in full swing" and some way advanced before any phenomena appear to which the word "life" is applicable. To the second reason for using the word I will return later. Meanwhile, the theory regards life as *on the way* wherever a world is cooling, wherever motion in masses of matter is externally lessening, and internally breaking up into complex vibrations; wherever a quivering tissue is responding more and more minutely to changes in the environment.

The life of any organism consists in its power of *carrying on the process of self-adjustment*. Herbert Spencer calls life "a moving equilibrium." Inside itself no aggregate is ever at rest; as it is at one instant it quite certainly will *not* be the next instant; and unless something happen to balance and compensate a change in one part of it, it will *tend* to go to pieces. But life is an ancestrally acquired tendency in the component parts of any living whole to respond in just such a way to any disturbing influence as to make good whatever loss occurs, to dismiss whatever is injurious or burdensome, and, in a word, to readjust continually, and even to derive benefit from changes in its environment.

The decay of this self-adjusting power involves an increase in the tendency to dissolution. There is no neutral ground; and there is no stability in a quiescently neutral or exactly balanced condition. What is not an active carrying-on of life is a slide towards death. Death is the total cessation of the adaptative and re-adjusting power on part of the organism to the conditions at work around and within it. This is as true of a man as of a fungus, and as true of a nation as of a man.

X. Exactly in so far as the lifeward principle in all things be identified

with "good" must the deathward principle be identified with "evil." And since no other measure of good is traceable throughout the natural history of religious, social, or philosophical moral creeds than life in some form or other, so does it appear that, in coming upon the truth concerning the actual normal laws of all life, we disclose incidentally the actual normal law of moral life and of duty.

This needs explanation. And, first, it brings me to my second reason for choosing the word "lifewardness" as the watchword of ethics rather than the word "life." All life is evolved on one principle and in one manner. But all life is not conducive to the general evolution of the highest life, that is, to the development of individuals possessing those functions and faculties whose normal tendency is to yield a maximum of well-being *all round* with a minimum everywhere of pain, mistake, and hurtful reaction.

Each form of life may be said to have an intrinsic right to fulfil the law of its own being, however narrow the limits of that being, and, having done so, to depart in peace. But there is, in very deed, *high* life and *low* life; *i.e.* life which, in the mere process of fulfilling its own bent, carries the beneficent, joy-enhancing, pain-removing cosmical process on farther and quicker; and life which, while in itself reaching no high or fine degree of awareness,—no definite faculty, on the one hand, nor adequate aim, on the other,—does also, in pursuit of its own less-alive claims, obstruct, baffle, and distress the normal progress of such forms of life as more completely and less wastefully bring about some long-delayed consummation which dignifies with meanings and appropriate result the cosmical struggle.

Happiness is the result of complete correspondence between constitution and occasion, between need and resource, between faculty and opportunity, between claim and recognition. In a word, it implies *adaptation*,—a fit adjustment between the living organism and the conditions of its life—and is so far intrinsically good wherever it occurs. But then comes in the rivalry between that which is only intrinsically fit, and that which is fit both in itself and in its relation to other fit things. Regard must therefore be had as to the kind of happiness sought and recommended; that is, to the sort of life to which any special form of happiness is appropriate. A contented condition of *life in particular* is not always conducive to *lifewardness in general*. There are low orders of living beings, the carrying on of whose own normal and vital functions entails distress and defeat to high orders. I need only indicate such living forms as fever-germs, tubercle bacilli, cancer-growths; as parasites, vermin, and deadly serpents; as locust armies and caterpillar plagues (such as that now working havoc in the forests of South Germany); further, in the social sphere as human banditti, swindling firms, anti-social drivers of lucre through the supply of adulterated foods, deleterious quackeries, desocializing literature, arts, and opportunities; or whose success involves discouragement and hindrance

to other and better-fitted forms of human nature. Against such the struggle continues, and must continue.

The reason why the advantage of highest life rather than the promotion of life in general is made a criterion of true progress is because the value of life lies largely in its *freedom from misery* and in its *freedom to operate*. And the more keenly sensitive and appreciative living individuals are, the better servants are they of the whole in both the above particulars; and obviously these better servants are best secured and encouraged by all that subserves that part of their nature which binds up their interests with that of the rest. Hurtful forms of life must be defeated, if only for the sake of leaving the field clear for beneficent impulses in life. The socialized being has the widest field of individual feeling,—is more *alive* than any less advanced type. His cosmical "rights" therefore come first. Development always presents like features, and whatever is not hindered goes on developing, and this in disregard of all extrinsic valuations whatever.

Not all life, then, is to prevail. Abstract ethic is, strictly speaking, the *adjustment, by means of human conduct, of the universal biological law to the requirements of the most highly evolved*, and to such creatures, human and sub-human, as can *exist together with mutual advantage*. In the supersession of lower kinds is the general lifeward law subserved.

The highest human beings are the most socialized; that is, those in whom that long-continued process of taming brought to bear on original barbarism (which operates by means of public opinion, penalty, and reward, and which is known as "civilization"), has evoked sensibilities which have the claims and the welfare of fellow-creatures for their natural object, and which, left to themselves, dispose the individual to behave in a manner consistent with the liberty and the well-being of those fellow-creatures. The best men and women are, in short, those whose welfare includes and implies the best chance of welfare for all the rest.

XI. Cosmical emotion has been called "a substitute for religion." It is no mere substitute: it is a more advanced form of the identical religious sentiment which inspired all the theologies, from fetichism to the most attenuated form of theism; a sentiment which has striven to give account of itself in system after system of transcendental dogma, and to express itself in the visions of one seer after another in all ages. This expression has varied with time and place; but its gist has always been identical. Whether it be Confucius, Buddha, Jesus, Paul, Emerson, or Spencer who speaks, the sentiment remains the same: a sense of one-ness (or *at-oneness*) with the incomprehensible and eternal power by which all things consist and persist, with the power which yields life and the law of life; and, further, a sense of submission to that power, of sympathy with its drift, and acquiescence in its law. Are we tempted to cavil at the apparently ruthless way in which all merit save that of present fitness is disregarded in the selection here of the victims, there of the survivors of disaster? We must remember that it is precisely by dint of thus keeping impartially to the case in hand that the

fortuitous flow of cause and effect has, in very fact, slowly yielded all the wonders of the living, conscious, and moral universe. Last of all arrives, as its result, that life whose *voluntary momentum* is actually along the very line in which this sternly-beneficent process eternally moves: that is, the life of conscious and perfect freedom; the life that works acquiescently, accurately, and joyfully with, and through, and by means of the cosmical or life-creating Agency. And this is *the religious life itself*. As to the cruel cost of the ill-adapted by the way, and the slowness by which result is achieved and the creature's intelligence, will, and free conduct at length shaped and won for the creative cause,—the evolutionist must sigh like the rest. But he sees in the inherent difficulty and awful painfulness of the effort by which life is slowly ennobled and liberty slowly secured, cause rather for wistful sympathy with the inscrutable Agency whose "effort is so displayed; and he values the more sacredly all beautiful and excellent things that have been thus won "as by fire." His sympathy will impel him to pull with the eternal power so fast as he learns better to understand its drift, direction and method; and so to do one human Will's utmost to diminish the cost of future amelioration.

All evolutionists are not religious; the cynic can argue glibly enough from cosmical facts evolutionally considered, and no evolutionist can logically trip him up. But then neither could a Muhammadan nor a Christian. The proneness to religious feeling either exists, or does not exist, in individuals; but the subject-matter of religion, being for ever precisely something which lies beyond the realm of definition, can, of course, never be demonstrated. "Wherefore," says the ultramontane, "let us *dogmatize*; for without religious dogma how are we to justify and support conscience and moral principle?" The evolutionist replies: "Fortunately for truthfulness and consistency, the scientific study of morality reveals it as *not* dependent on the fluctuations of the religious sentiment. The two are of distinct origin, and in their nature and function are largely independent of one another. True, advanced moralists, arising in periods and places characterized by a high degree of civilization, have enforced "morality," or duty to man, as the highest form of "piety," or deference to God. True, that such teachers have repeatedly and instinctively so blended the worship of the Creator with mercy and justice toward the creature as to give to each injunction the force and authority of the other. But still, on the scientific view, duty would still remain duty were religious sentiment extinguished to-morrow and for ever. For morality in its ultimate expression means the promotion of welfare in the social state through the agency of the individuals living in that state. Theories respecting the origin of the universe, of life, or of mankind do not affect the actual conditions of the relation between a man and his fellows in the least; and so morals remain independent of religious opinion and belief. Morality consists in aid actually rendered to, or evil hindered for the whole race, *through the conduct of individuals, but without regard to persons.*

XII. Theologians have represented conscience as the voice of God speaking super-reasonably in the heart of man. The inward monitor so regarded has, however, too often refused to be educated, and crude old canons of duty have been blindly clung to as piously admissible and socially sufficient long after social advance has shown them to be no longer fit, fair, or edifying. Conscience gains more than it loses of permanent authoritativeness when regarded as the Supreme voice speaking reasonably for man, through men, and so as maintaining a constantly rising standard, adapted to the increasingly complex needs of a progressive race.

To adapt conduct to the normal claims and ultimate advantage of human beings all round, and on terms equitable to self, neighbour, contemporary, and posterity, is, in short, the problem which conscience "truly so called" has at every moral juncture to solve. Whether individual indulgence be, socially regarded, right or wrong, fair or unfair; whether individual sacrifice be, socially regarded, right or wrong, fair or unfair; this is ever the characteristic gist of every question which the true evolutionist puts to his inner man, whenever "Dame Nature" and social integrity *seem* to pull contrary ways. Where society and individual are both in a healthy (that is, in a normally-developing and actively self-adjusting condition), these never do, in reality, pull in opposite directions. Where they actually and irreconcilably conflict, one or the other is in a morbid or a backward condition; and then the moral problem is to discover which, without the slightest partiality for either being permitted to influence the ultimate judgment and the voluntary conduct flowing from it.

The discovery of the fact that human society is an organic entity, existing and developing on principles precisely similar to those evidenced in the life of single organisms; and the further discovery that the human conscience in individuals is related to the needs of the community in much the same way as the sensitiveness of the palate is related to the needs of the stomach, or the perception of beauty to the demands of the eye, these twin discoveries have come as firstfruits of the evolution theory, and indeed not a day too soon.

The distinctive characteristic of evolutionist ethic is, then, the insistence on the *development* of conscience and of codes. The *relativity* of morals is the new point. The only fixed thing about duty is its relation to the requirements of general human life as affected by the voluntary conduct of individuals. As the vital needs of the community change, so must the detailed demands of that community on individual concessions, efforts, and compunctions also change. Always, however, the moral man is the dutiful citizen,—the individual who does no harm to and is useful to his contemporaries and his posterity.

The recognition of the natural relation of righteousness to human requirement is not new. It is as old as the days of Job. Said Elihu: "If thou sinnest, what dost thou unto Him? (God). If thou be righteous, what givest thou Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man as thou art, and

thy righteousness may profit the son of man" (the race). The universe can indeed right itself, whatever we do or fail to do. Not so our own soul, our fellow-creature, our race. The evolutionist teacher does *not* say, "Thou shalt abide throughout all generations by this or that temporarily fit rule of action"; but, "Thou shalt, even in thy breach or dismissal of the killing 'letter' of ancient or no longer fitted laws, honour and abide by the life-giving (lifeward) 'spirit' of all law." And the spirit of all lifeward law is this: Thou shalt *not* do harm; thou shalt not injure or destroy, oppress or restrict, defraud or betray thy race; thou shalt always and at every juncture do fairly by thyself, thy neighbour, thy posterity, or *anything else* which in its nature *does not injure these*; i.e., anything else which is not competing for dear life with these. Justice to harmless brutes is included in the ultimate code.

XIII. The evolutionist has not any strong hope to offer to the still numerous individuals who claim, each for himself, an indefinitely or endlessly prolonged conscious existence. This is a claim based, however little the claimant recognises its origin, on the present drawbacks and assumed unalterableness of terrestrial conditions. These drawbacks the evolutionist believes to be largely removable where they lie in the disposition of external things, and to be completely removable so far as they lie in the disposition of human nature. And he believes that as fast as the belief in a continued personal consciousness comes to be considered actually erroneous, and so fast as the cases of premature and painful dissolution of human lives are so reduced as to become exceptional, so fast will the very desire die out, in harmony with the law of disused function, which ultimately brings about the lapse of inappropriate instinct through atrophy of its concomitant nervous structure. In very many highly sensitive and highly moral natures the claim to and the desire for personal immortality is already totally extinct. Death has already lost its sting, and the grave its victory, in face of that view of the whole which imparts the sense of eternity to each moment as it passes, which floods with satisfying meaning every incident, and provides a mental consolation for and throughout any and every possible form or degree of personal agony, failure, or forsakenness, at any rate so long as such distress remains merely *subjective*, and so measurable by the limits of the affected consciousness, within which an evolutionally fitted Will reigns as master. All this is fact.

The evil of life is largely the result of human error and incomplete sociality. Pessimism is not encouraged by the natural history of society. On the other hand, it is a mistake to jump to the optimist's conclusion that all things are in train for inevitable improvement, and may therefore be let drift, as certain to come right in the end. There are twenty ways of going wrong for one way of going right. Nature, when thrown back, laboriously recapitulates old chapters in her tale of development, and meanwhile generations pass! There are no short cuts to perfection.

XIV. It is an awful truth that the reign of benevolence only began with

the reign of social man. In pre-human days, death, violence and wholesale catastrophe, accompanied with pain, overwhelmed whole races. And the struggle between such races as survived catastrophe was always accompanied by reckless cruelty, and unsoftened by compunction in the victors. As men, however, grow many (here, or there, or anywhere), they have to get on together; and the mutual punishing and rewarding, approving and despising of human beings by one another naturally occurs in proportion as each individual acts conformably with or antagonistically to the interests of the rest. But this recompense from outside, from the fellow-creatures his lot is bound up with, inevitably "educates"; that is, it sets up mental habits and characteristic emotional response in the individual who experiences it. Social feeling begins in the crude form of social fear and servility on part of those who are most at the mercy of the rest. Obedience is the earliest virtue. Later, inherited habit becomes second nature; the acts which are always approved and rewarded come to be willingly done. Their doing modifies the nervous structure in such way that at last they tend to repeat themselves as the natural function of that structure; and so serviceable impulses and kindly, honourable, and just conduct come to be the organic expressions of noble characters. This is the evolutionist's account of the origin of moral compunction. Conscience is the inward reflection of the social permission and prohibition; and sympathy, the spontaneous individual response to so much of the social needs and rights as lie within the field of the individual imagination. It is obvious that in a continuously developing community the precise forms of conduct, or types of character most useful to the welfare of that community must vary from age to age. Conformably with which fact the code of rules for conduct, and the ideals of what constitutes highest excellence in citizens, have also constantly varied, and in advancing communities have developed and grown constantly more discriminate. True, the average conscience comes up but slowly to any "improved" standard; that is, a standard demanding and recognising such fresh and finer forms of moral sensibility as shall be adjusted to the requirements of more delicately poised social conditions. Melioration in the department of morals takes place always and solely in the direction of *finer and fairer discrimination*, based on a higher degree of particular sympathy, and a higher conception of ideal welfare, always in harmony with the dictates of such sympathy. The man who is wretched till he sees an injustice redressed is more likely, if left untrammelled, to leave no stone unturned till at any less cost to himself it be redressed, than is a man whose individual sense of justice and whose sympathy is so little developed that he needs the dread of the "law," the support of a creed, or the spur of an example, before the evil *itself* can move him to effort or sacrifice. Character is the main thing. Character must be exercised, and initiative encouraged, in order to grow and to effect appropriately; and it is desirable to set free from all kinds of restraint as much initiative as exists in socialized individuals, both for sake

of making these individuals happy and free, and for giving the community the benefit of their example, influence, and works.

* * * * *

In religion, the true evolutionist is *agnostic* rather than dogmatic, repudiating alike the dogmatism of the theist and the dogmatism of the atheist.

In philosophy, he is neither materialistic nor spiritualistic, but recognises the possibility of giving a consistent account of the known universe in the chosen terms of either school.

In ethic, he is neither pessimistic nor optimistic, but *melioristic*; that is, he finds himself by no means in "the best of all possible worlds," and yet also by no means in a world where evil is inveterate and incurable: rather, in a world where all is in flux, where forces are plastic and effort remunerative, and which correct knowledge, steadfast will, and sympathy enable humans indefinitely to improve.

In politics, the evolutionist is neither conservative nor revolutionary. At the present critical juncture of affairs all over the civilized world, when the pressing point of the struggle between two claimants for "survival" in right of "fitness" lies, politically, at the point where Socialism and Individualism join issue, the whole weight of the evolution theory falls naturally into the *individualist* scale.

That ideal society towards which general progress actually tends, and actually has ever been tending, is a society composed of *autonomous individuals*, each possessing, by virtue of a highly socialized character, a socially conceded "right" to freedom; each spontaneously, voluntarily, gladly, and yet incidentally promoting the welfare of the community as part and parcel of his own idea of his *own* welfare. This is a consummation already attained in the cases of single individuals, attained even long ago wherever society, by hook or crook, had, apart from scientific theory, "happened upon" that sufficient degree of development which yields as its fruits such type of character. The type is more frequent, less out of the common, in our present society than it ever was before; and the evolutionist pleads for its right to survival. It is a type of character as concerning which the "kingdom of heaven" lies "within." But it is a type only to be met with where *individual character* has reached a high degree of development. And the process of this development is carried on most quickly and most efficiently where as much scope as possible is afforded to individual activity. The reason it is more common now than it was in the days of Jesus is because institutions are freer, and allow more initiative to individuals. The reason why it is commoner among Anglo-Saxons than among, say, Russians or Chinamen, is again because there is less pressure exerted on the individual consciousness and conscience by the regulations of authority, acting indiscriminately and autocratically. Any form of government (even that called "collective") acts autocratically, and in its own name, as Government. Wherever and so long as there

is a dearth of individuals able to effect the final aims of just government quicker and more surely without than with publicly and externally imposed reward and penalty, government was and is still "fit." But the European evolutionist of to-day perceives that this dearth is constantly diminishing, and pleads for the entire liberation of as much humaneness and of as much instinctive tendency to *go right* and to *maintain its own without governmental help, and on new and individual methods*, as exists. We have learnt pretty well how to act in order to "live"; it remains now to learn how to "let live." Character is the first social desideratum for the evolutionary moralist, and experience is the first condition of character-development. Due experience gained while in exercise of unopposed volition, while leading to no animosities, goes more home to the individual conscience, and is more likely to be further impressed and handed on through the agent's subsequent influence, than a hundred forced lessons.

To recapitulate. Evolution is, then, the law of lifewardness; *i.e.*, the law of that process by which worlds are fitted for life, and by which again life is developed, ennobled, and consummated.

The vital process, wherever in progress, shows itself as *adjustment of the organism* to the conditions in which its lot is cast.

Since everything, within as without the organism, is eternally in movement, such adjustment amounts to a "*moving equilibrium*." Directly this equilibrium ceases to be kept up, dissolution sets in; and the organism, *as such*, relapses into its elements. Everything therefore which is not keeping up with things is deteriorating.

Each organized thing has its appropriate "raw material." Mere matter-in-motion is the raw material of the solar system. Protoplasm is the raw material of living organisms. The raw material of human character is a chaos of unregulated brute sensibilities and propensities. The raw material of society is a loose aggregate of barbarians, whose interests are not yet mutually interdependent, and whose action is as yet uncombined. *One* mode of procedure organizes and vitalizes each of these.

The acceptance or rejection of the moral aspect of the evolution theory depends upon how much readiness there is in the mind of the morally disposed student to accept the actual constitution of things as a sufficient manifestation of that supreme Energy or Tendency upon which order, life, mind, and Will depend; and to see in the most ordinary and fortuitous facts of cosmical occurrence some hint or other concerning "the way, the truth, and the life." Any one who thinks that God and Nature are twain, and are at enmity, must of course choose between them. He is in the position of a child whose parents are in disagreement, and who has to decide between father and mother, with the certain prospect of disobeying and being punished by one or the other. Any one who regards himself as the child of a "fatherly God," all-knowing and benevolent, and also as the child of a "Dame Nature," all blind and stupid or desperately wicked, is of course in no position to welcome a doctrine which refers to natural

history for all its guidance. Meanwhile the evolutionist has reached a conception of things in which all appears consistent. For him the whole course of nature is *one*; and out of this natural course, and in spite of the stern and saddening facts witnessed to as incidental to that course, he believes that the ideas of "God," of "goodness," of "duty," and "conscience," have normally arisen. Each beautiful thing, no less than each blundering thing, has arrived naturally, and amounts, so far as it goes, to a warrant each time it arrives of a path rightly grooved and a momentum rightly directed.

The only way we can aid the cosmical endeavour is through the amelioration of human lot in our fellows and ourselves: ourselves with and through and in our fellows. For on our planet human history represents the vanguard of the eternal forces. We have to make our race the channel of "least resistance" through which the forward impulse can, with least hindrance and least liability to miscarriage, work, formatively and splendidly, toward that consummation which means the *fullest degree* of life, awareness, beauty, and will, with the *least degree* of pain, distress, and drawback of any kind.

But—the amelioration of human lot, whether "morally" (that is, for human creatures' own piteous sakes) or "religiously" (that is, for sake of awed and enthusiastic participation in the supreme cosmical Effort, sympathy with which constitutes the youngest and highest form of spiritual life), whether in the moral or religious count—amelioration of human lot can *only* be accomplished through amelioration of human character. As Herbert Spencer says, it is impossible to get "golden conduct" out of "leaden instincts." Golden instincts in human breasts would make of our planet a new earth in which dwelleth righteousness. Golden instincts depend, however, on character; and the amelioration of human character, though it has ever been going on, is a very slow process. There is no jumping to perfection. All reward comes to the accurate observer and courageous follower of eternal natural law; but as Jesus sadly said, "Strait is the gate and narrow the way that leadeth unto life," and (in proportion to those who miss it) those who find and follow it are still the very "few."

Meanwhile there remains the fact that there *is* a right and lifeward way; that it *is* findable, and that to pursue it is to reach, or to help reach, that which when reached is felt to be the consummate goal. The unhesitating onwardness of the natural casual process, the permanence of relations, the constant multiplication of effects, and the necessity of *clearing the way* for the developing whole, if one would not be crushed by it, remain serious facts. But it is at every instant and every juncture of events possible so to act as to make things in general better without making things in particular worse, and to make things in particular better without making things in general worse. This is *meliorism*. And meliorism is the moral principle which naturally and logically ensues on full comprehension and apprecia-

RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD.

tion of the doctrine I have in this article tried to set forth. The social sentiency known as conscience once actually established comes to put in its own claim for survival as a source of pleasure to the fit social being, and hence is clung to for its own sake. It then becomes (like all other habit, whether physical, nervous, or manual) *structural and organic*; it becomes "character" in the final sense—that is, natural and spontaneous; it becomes instinctive; it becomes imperative; and pain attends its repression.

And mark this: that solution of all human problems, that bearer of all burdens, that sight for all blindness—the Sympathy which, pre-eminently in women, "weeps with those who weep," and which, pre-eminently in men, "rejoices with those who rejoice,"—this very sympathy is one of the instinctively exercised functions which the benign but difficult process of evolution has, through the natural workings of this adamant universe, yielded as its supreme fruit.

The "Genesis" book of the evolution theory treats of the apparently blind, lifeward striving of *matter in motion*. Its book of "Revelation" points to the Sympathy which welds the fortunes of moral and socialized living beings; a Sympathy of the units with one another, and of each unit with the Supreme, Eternal, and Inexhaustible Totality.

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FORTNIGHTLY, ONE PENNY.

NOTES.

Suicide is ever a congenial subject to reflect upon. It is exhilarating when you hear that over 8000 people committed suicide in one year in one country, (France) in 1891. The Law is fearfully and wonderfully made: in France it has just been able to give us this information now, in this year of grace 1893—only two years later. How refreshing it is to remember that these deaths, in the vast majority of cases, are brought about by over-anxiety, the immediate outcome of a heaven-born civilization. It seems spring in the season when the greater number of these unfortunate beings endeavour to escape from this scene of hellish strife. They are in misery, they wish to die and they make their choice from many methods: under railway trains, from precipices and house-tops, by poison or knife, charcoal fumes or firearms, drowning or hanging. These 8000 corpses, one years crop of suicidal growth, we lay at the door of Government, as we can lay nearly every other horrible occurrence.

The state of the money market during the last few weeks, and we might say months, has been an evident sign of the times; one of the symptoms of the dissolution of our old friend Capitalism. The leading articles of the financial papers are filled with the utmost concern; they view the universal crumbling away of credit with the utmost consternation. Panic is succeeding panic in every country. Australian banks have been gaily smashing one after another, and only two banks of any importance remain, and doubtless these two have been secretly upheld by governmental power to prevent a plunge into the dreadful vortex of national bankruptcy. Finance in America is about as rotten as it can possibly be. The president and all his congress are looking forward to great financial troubles on every hand, troubles that they seem to feel will eclipse everything else that is great under the American sun. The Chicago Exhibition is going to be a complete failure, a miserable fiasco. Altogether, from a monetary point of view, the outlook is certainly a dreary one. The Bourses have been severely shaken during the past few months, the London Stock Exchange is in a state of complete exhaustion, and every manied man is holding his breath for fear of the terrible things that are coming on the earth. Good luck! Totter on, decrepit Capitalism, you are going to your grave.

What a "dog in the manger" is our paternal Government. The *Daily Chronicle* of the 14th inst. observes that "people are often shocked at the apparent (?) waste of 'good baccy' that the Custom House authorities are guilty of when they commit to flames whole parcels of the fragrant weed which has failed to yield the necessary duty, or has been captured contraband." Well, I think the people should certainly be shocked at such wanton destruction of what is an article of consumption by the people, and especially should they be shocked in they hear the Government loudly boasting, or trying to boast, how good it is and how it cares for the interests of the people, while it has tens of thousands of papers in its workhouses who have lately been begging for a few ounces of tobacco a week. The Government is caring for them. Give them tobacco indeed! That would be pampering them with luxuries, the poor creatures would be enervated, their constitutions ruined. No, no! with great gentleness of heart, we, the Government, will throw it into the river or burn it, not because it has not paid duty, no no! but because we care for the poor. Tobacco is not good for them (unless duty paid). We are also careful for the poor not only in the matter of tobacco and snuff but many other articles, and mind you it's only "apparent."

Governments are necessarily murderous as is proved by the following incident: 600 convicts, in quarries near Cairo in Egypt, made a daring attempt to escape on the 11th inst. The guard in charge fired upon them as they fled; and 39 were killed, 11 of the convicts got away, and the rest were thrown back into prison. Thirty-nine were killed, why? Because they attempted to get away from their prison. Why were they in prison? Because they had committed criminal acts which in nearly every case have the taking of property or the desire to possess property at the bottom of the motive. Therefore, it follows because they took property or wished to acquire property these thirty-nine men have now been murdered. This is the extreme to which governments always push their fearful and iniquitous game. Suppressing a man told a child not to take a certain crust of bread or else he would shut it up in a cupboard, and the child takes it, and he puts it into the cupboard. Then suppose he took a gun and threatened the child that if it dared to try and get out of the cupboard he would shoot its brains out. The child dares and is shot. Now, if such an incident took place, what would be the verdict of any sensible person who saw or heard of such a dastardly deed? What could be said but that it was a monstrous and diabolical murder? And so it is with all governments and all authorities who kill those who will not heed their unjustifiable threats. To kill fugitive convicts or others is nothing but horrible and ferocious murder, and will recoil on the heads of these murderers.

T.Q.

A PARABLE.

The following little parable, translated from the French, represents the absurd reasonings of governments, which, to protect their "patriotic" subjects from the attacks of their fellow-men beyond the frontier, tax them exorbitantly at home, competing with the hypothetical or prospective enemy in the costly quality of arms and armaments. Also, the craven way in which the subjects of governments put up with this extortion; fearing rather the sword of a possible foe abroad than the positive increase of poverty and starvation at home. "Jacques Bonhomme" (we may as well call him "John Bull" at once) represents the Government. His wife represents the loyal subject of the Government.

John Bull:—Our house is a fine one; it stands rather isolated; I shall buy a revolver.

His Wife:—All right, my dear.

J. B.:—I shall choose as expensive a revolver as possible.

Wife:—Perhaps, though—

J. B.:—When it is a question of protecting ourselves we must spend without calculation.

Wife:—Certainly, my dear.

J. B.:—I shall also buy some rifles; I wish to have more rifles than anybody else.

Wife:—But we have not the money at our disposal.

J. B.:—Then I'll borrow some.

Wife:—But yet—

J. B.:—No discussion when safety is at stake.

Wife:—Quite right, my dear.

J. B. (a few days later):—A new kind of revolver has been invented; I have taken that other one I bought to the old-iron merchant, and have bought the more perfect implement.

Wife:—But—

J. B.:—I have had it made of gold.

Wife:—It seems to me that steel—

J. B.:—Gold is more expensive. The more we pay the better we are protected.

Wife:—I thought we had no more money?

J. B.:—I sold the clock—

Wife:—You don't mean that?

J. B.:—COUNTRY! NATION!! THE FLAG!!!

Wife:—Quite right, my dear.

J. B.:—I have bought a field gun, the biggest ever made.

Wife:—What about paying for it?

J. B.:—I have sold all our furniture.

Wife:—Is not that going rather too far?

J. B.:—COUNTRY! NATION!! THE FLAG!!!

Wife:—Quite so, my dear.

J. B.:—A day or so later I want to buy a mitrailleuse—

Wife:—It is worth while, my dear. The agents have been here; the house is empty; we need no longer fear robbers; you may as well disarm yourself.

J. B.:—Never: we will save on our food.

Wife:—(a little time afterwards) I am dying of hunger.

J. B.:—So am I. THE COUNTRY! THE NATION!! THE FLAG!!!

Wife:—Quite right, my dear. (They die.)

TO A WORKMAN IN AN EAST-END HOVEL.

Man of despair and death,
Bought and slaved in the gangs,
Starved and stripped and left
To the pitiful pitiless night,
Away with your selfish thoughts,
Touch not your ignorant life!
Are there no masters of slaves,
Jeering, cynical, strong—
Are there no brigands (say),
With the words of Christ on their lips
And the daggers under their cloaks—
Is there not one of these
That you can steal on and kill?
O, ye Swiss mountaineer
Dugged on the perilous heights
His disciplined conqueror foes
Caught up one in his arms
And, laughing exultantly,
Plunged with him into the abyss:
So let it be with you!
An eye for an eye, and a tooth
For a tooth, and a Life for a Life!
Tell it, this his-tul strong
Contemptuous hypocrite world,
Tell it that, if we must live
As dogs and as worse than dogs,
At least we can die like men!
Tell it there is a woe
Not for the conquered alone!
An eye for an eye, and a tooth
For a tooth, and a Life for a Life.—FRANCIS ADAM.



the name of individualism or solidarity or any other good name used for an unworthy purpose.

We do not propose to enter into the merits of this or that way of action and propaganda. Everybody has his own ideas on that, and we may state ours on another occasion, but we deny that, however powerful and convincing anybody may set forth his arguments on this question, it is possible to make this or that line of argument prevail over the others. For people are different, and it is just the merit of Anarchism to take this difference as its basis and therefore to reject uniformity, legislation, etc. Also, the people on whom we want to impress our ideas are vastly different, and this again shows the necessity of many ways of action, always provided they exclude authority and compromise. One person will be convinced if he sees action, another requires theoretical argumentation, another friendly intercourse and the example of Anarchists living as free men even under the present miserable system, etc.

Let us therefore not waste time by trying to convince other Anarchists in favor of this or that way of action; even if we begin by the fairest use of arguments alone, we must finally end in this course by becoming authoritarians, using demagogic tactics, and trying to establish an official doctrine and code of Anarchism which will never exist; but let everybody act as he thinks best. We say in every exposition of our principles that no good can come from coercion and authority; let us be the first to act up to this principle to the benefit of the cause that sadly requires it.

THE STRANGER IN LONDON.

And this is London; and what a hellish pandemonium it is. To the untutored eyes of the stranger all seems bustle, hurry, worry and continuous vexation.

This is the great Babel of Commercialism, the metropolis of the mercantile world, the centre of moneydom, and tyranny, and wrong; the aggregation of all evils, the home of brutality and corruption, and the den of slavery and prostitution—this is London. And what a sight. A great vast sea of houses reaching out as far as the eye can see, a great concourse of people, and horses, and dogs, and fools, moving hither and thither in never-ending unceasing streams; a deafening sound of hammering, clanking, praying and cursing; a polluted atmosphere, a murky sky and a heavy dust and sulphurous smell reminding one of Dante's "Inferno." Kings, Queens, Aristocrats, Plutocrats and Swasters hurry on side by side with the workman, the tramp and the fool. What a conglomeration! Palace and hovel, idler and toiler, gnatton and faster, landlords and homeless ones, rulers and foolish ones, princes and paupers. And what a sight and what a smell!—And this is London.

I spent a few hours in the Central Criminal Court. A well-fed, well-dressed, individual sat in a raised position to the others. His position contributed greatly to his importance, and brought forth a great show of respect and deference to his orders and authority. A stranger like me cannot help being struck by the similarity existing between the occupants of the places assigned to the judge, prosecutors, and members of the legal fraternity, and the striking likeness existing between each prisoner behind the bars of the "pen."

The occupants of each part seemed to realize their various positions; so the judge advised, the prosecutor denounced, the defender apologized and the law took its course, and the unfortunate prisoners took their course to the jail—they were the losers. Some won, and ruled, and judged and sentenced. Many lost, and suffered by their losses; and lesser generally suffers by those who are most directly benefited by their misfortunes—poor losers.

What a hubbub! What's this! Bands, banners, and moving masses of humanity. The streets were blocked, the officers of the law worked hard—doing nothing, save now and then by their official preponderance, making the block worse than it was prior to their interference. I moved with the crowd, the crowd moved with the band until the Hyde Park was reached. I approached a rather official and austere looking gentleman, profusely decorated with blue ribbon and badges of authority. I questioned him about the moving mass. "Young fellow," replied the man in blue, "this is the greatest turn out on record; this is a demonstration of tea-totlers assembled to show their approbation of the efforts of goodfellow and the sincerity of our present government in attending to the needs of the people by bringing forward the desires of our hearts in the shape of the "Veto Bill." "Are the people in favour of this "Veto Bill?" "Of course they are, that's why the Government has brought it forward!" "Then what's all this row about?" "Why, to show the government that the people are in favour of their Bill." "But you have already said that the people are in favour of the Bill." "Of course I have, and that's what we are here for, to show the people and the government that we are in favour—" "But, my dear friend, what's the good of the people showing themselves that they are in favour of the Bill." "What's the good? Say young fellow, you want to know too much; there's Sir W. Harcourt over there, come over and ask him; he's a bright fellow, he is, he'll tell you what's the good, come on!" And away flew my informant in blue.

I went towards the largest platform; heard what was said—and thought a good deal. I met an old man who apparently knew everybody and everything. I questioned him regarding the words of the various speakers, the old man replied "Well my friend, look around you and behold the ignorance of the people. See, on yonder platform stand landlords, monopolists, factory-masters, swasters, and workmen, footlers and foolers; all testotallers, because it suits their purposes to do so. Some of these young 'mashers' are abstainers because they find a few good-looking girls attending the "band of hope" meetings. Some of these young girls are out for the day because their father, or mother, or sweetheart, or some other ignoramus is out with her. But stranger, listen to me. If it is wrong or injurious for one to imbibe of that drink which yonder ranters declare to be impure, it is equally injurious to eat of adulterated food, or breathe impure air, or to live in unsanitary houses, or to work in ill-ventilated worksheds; and among the speakers before us stand landlords of slums, vendors of adulterated food, swasters and tyrants, who before striving to point out the evils emanating from the misdeeds of others should strive to eliminate the slums which they themselves create. "Here my address, stranger; come and have tea with me next week, and I'll tell you something about London."

Well, well! Palaces and slums, masters and slaves, luxury and want—and this is London, the Hell of Commercialism. I. W. K.

DYNAMITISM.

A "Christian" lady, testament in hand, accused one of our comrades the other day, of disturbing, by Anarchist propaganda, that "peace of mind which passeth all understanding," and in which the orthodox and well-to-do followers of the Shepherd, or the Lamb, or—well, something pastoral—have a vested right to be left undisturbed by wicked agitators. The lady was clad in "silken shewn"; her husband was an ecclesiastical dignitary, besides being a successful literary exponent of abstruse theological "questions."

"Dynamitism" (as she was pleased to call Anarchism) might well shock the peace that was, at any rate, not beyond our profane understanding, being based seriously on the creature-comfort of herself and kith and kin. But when she proceeded to quote texts from her jewelled New Testament, our comrades remembered that two can play at that game, and responded as follows:—

"Dynamitism means the bursting of rotten 'old bottles' into which sound 'new wine' is being poured.

Dynamitism is a flash from the forge-fires of grim social experience. At that forge are being made new receptacles for the new wine which shall "make glad the heart of man."

Dynamitism means the breaking of old 'cups and platters' full of extortion and excess, whose, 'outlets' were being industriously 'made clean.' Breakage results, naturally, in damage to the bloodless fingers employed in the polishing process. We believe it will also result in the dispersion of the 'extortions and excess' hitherto so cunningly stored.

Dynamite aids in the removal of white-wash from corrupt old 'sepulchres' and other unsanitary abominations.

Dynamitism is that 'violence' which 'the kingdom of righteousness' (the kingdom that is 'within you' Anarchists) 'suffereth'—permitted. Permitted, since it is the only way. It is the 'taking' of that kingdom by the violent and 'by force.' Does offence come? It must nevertheless 'needs be' that such offence cometh, but 'was' to those through whose mammon-worship it cometh.

Dynamitism is the bringing 'not of peace but a sword' as a reply to the 'scribes, pharisees and hypocrites' who prate of 'peace, peace,' when there is no peace.

Dynamitism betokens the striving of 'the few' up the 'narrow way' toward the 'strait gate that leadeth unto life.' (Lark, we say; not merely bare existence.) Within the past 1900 years the way has become absolutely blocked by hearts of stone and accumulations of heavy metal. Those who have lived in mountainous districts know what the precise means are by which alone even the narrowest way can be made through granite obstructions.

Dynamite is the modern and scientific substitute for the 'escargo' of small cords' by which to drive out the 'money-changers and the buyers and sellers' from the 'temple' of the heart of man.

Dynamitism hints at the desperate, though not despairing 'struggle for survival' of those impulses and principles which, once freely able to do their natural work, would make of this 'groaning and travailing' world 'a new earth in which dwelleth righteousness.'

Meanwhile, dynamite is a last and very valuable resource, and as such not to be wasted on side issues. L.S.R.

AN ANARCHIST CATECHISM.

If people are fair and upright, do they need to be put under power to force them to act fairly?

If most people are fair and upright, can they not be trusted to deal properly with unfairness without law?

If wicked and foolish, will they choose rulers to govern wisely and well?

Does not experience show that the best laws do ill and are tools of fraud?

Is it likely that any good man will want to have his brethren in his power by becoming a ruler?

If "opportunity makes the thief", does not authority make the tyrant?

Is it not wrong for some to be privileged to have the rest in their power and some to be bound to obey?

Is it not easier for people who freely associate for any common purpose, to do what they really want without some being privileged to dictate and the rest bound to obey?

Is not Authority thin, needless, hurtful and wicked in its very nature, and are you not therefore now—AN ANARCHIST?—(Anarchy New South Wales)

CORRESPONDENCE.

COMRADES—I have been working upon the land as a farm-worker, and have looked upon the Social Revolution from a farm-labourer's point of view. The result is that I have come to the conclusion that all writers and speakers that I have ever heard or read, have been so much enveloped by town and city life, and so far removed from a knowledge of the circumstances of an agricultural labourer's life, that they have almost entirely overlooked a class of workers who possess a position for Revolutionary action immeasurably superior to that possessed by any other class. Let us analyse the case of Comrade Davis seizing upon the jewellers shop and contrast it with a supposed case of farm-workers seizing upon the produce of the land—although, in point of fact there is no such thing as a farm-worker taking possession of the land or the produce of it. He is in possession already, all the time he is working on the land. Moreover he is not like, say a cabinet-maker in a big city who is provided with material and machinery, etc., to aid him in his work, for the supply of which so many deductions are made from his wages, and his produce passes through so many different hands that he cannot tell how much is really due to him. The farm-worker can easily estimate that all the grain, horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, eggs and butter are the result of his own labour. Neither does he require to seize upon them; they are all in his possession already. What he has to do is to prevent others, the farmer and landlord from seizing upon them and dividing the spoil between them. Nowhere is the robbery of the worker so clear as in the case of the farm-labourer, who regularly allows himself to be despoiled of at least two-thirds of all that he produces.

Clearly there need be no more vague advice about "taking possession of the means and instruments of production" that what we Anarchists ought to do is to help the farm-worker to retain for himself the wealth he has helped to produce. To make an attempt to practise Anarchist-Communism by exchanging directly with the co-operative societies the produce of the farm for such things as we as farm-workers should require in return. A. H. ROLL.

[The ideas expressed in this letter, as well as in one from our comrade in the last issue, are very valuable to us, as showing the necessity for the earnest consideration of all comrades of the Revolutionary movement as applied to the agricultural workers of the country. Their assistance in a time of trouble arising from a national crisis of some kind, cannot be too greatly estimated, and we might do worse than invite some correspondence on this matter or even call a conference of all comrades interested so as to ensure a more general conception of the urgency and value of the help of the rural. —Ed.]

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THE CONTINUATION OF
MICHAEL BAKUNIN'S "GOD AND THE STATE."

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LIBERTY

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• A JOURNAL OF •

• ANARCHIST COMMUNISM •

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WHY I AM AN EXPROPRIATIONIST.

B. L. S. BEVINGTON

I advocate and I look forward to wholesale expropriation because I do not believe there is any such thing as a right to property, and because I hold that it is disastrous, nay, fatal, to the welfare of all individuals composing the community, to have to regulate their lives and affairs in accordance with a fictitious abstraction which has no warrant and no basis in the natural laws of life. I desire universal expropriation, not merely because the power that property-holding gives to man over man is wrong; hands, and consequently unjust, but because it seems clear to me that property-holding is an abuse in itself, and that to hold property is to make wrong use of anyone's hands at all. I desire to see the bottom knocked out of the serious property idea itself, for good and all.

"The love of money is the root of all evil." Why? Because the love of money is the love of Domination. Property is Government. Property—that is, the prohibitive custody by particular persons of any part of the general resources—cannot be shown to have any value at all for anyone, merely as "owner," except the power it gives him over the faculties and liberties of his fellow-creatures. And this is a false value—an illusion. It is a craze to believe that you are necessarily better off—the richer or the freer—through dominating your fellows by dint of keeping prohibitive custody of what may be of greater service (intrinsic value) to them than to yourself.

No true, nature-based title to property as merely such can be shown to exist. Perhaps even some Anarchists will deny to this. The belief still lingers that there is such a thing as a man's natural right to "own," to have the prohibitive custody and disposal of, whatever his industry or skill may have produced or constructed out of the raw material provided by Nature. "There is one true title to property—to custody of superfluity—and that is the labor title," too many say. It is a delusion. There can be no such thing as a natural title to what is after all an artificial and merely nominal relation between a man and his product; a relation having no basis in reality. That which at the outset is not anybody's cannot be made anybody's by manipulation. This is not a mere metaphysical quibble. He who produces anything useful has, other things equal, a first comer's economic right to use, consume, or enjoy it, up to the limit of his own ability to do so. Yet this use of his product is not what the world specially prizes in ownership. This is not the cursed thing that keeps the world poor and wretched and wretched. Ownership begins to be talked of (these disputes, these sorrows) just where the natural relation of a man to men's wealth leaves off—just where the limit of ability to use or enjoy has been fully reached. This natural limit once overstepped there is no other natural limit (save found over again, till revolution sets on). The moment that ownership, merely as trusteeship, begins to be stretched for, then, no matter what its "title" may be, property will be able and eager to defend itself by means of law; it will "govern," and ensure to the owner the opportunities of becoming indefinitely richer and richer, with the necessary result that the non-owner must become ever poorer and poorer. "Nothing more stable than conventional concessions, originally placed or left in the hands of individuals, whether producers or not, any power over that part of wealth which remains after satisfaction of requirement,—which the individual cannot use, and his fellows are in want of. Conventions remain unquestioned until some lurking burlesque, in them comes but as a gleam of social evil, and then, whether backed by government or not, the struggle for their displacement begins, and their doom is fixed.

As to the modern cry, "the product to the producer," it is surely all right economically and ethically, so far as it goes. But directly it is insisted on that "the whole of the product belongs to the producer as his property" (to use, make, sell, or hoard at his pleasure) and directly it is insisted that human faculties and the wealth the faculties (help to) win are of equal inalienability, then by one face to face with the worst of social superstitions, must come. The property holder will remain dominant, the property-holding class will remain the dominating class, and its weapon, the Government, will remain in existence until the idea that things or privileges can "belong" to persons or groups of persons, is seen for the frequent it actually is Government's only another name for property. You can make Government hop from one leg to another, and on the standing leg hop from one point to another. But it will sink at you and crush you, so long as Property exists. You can alter Property's title; what was Strength of Arms one day becomes Inheritance next; then Parellas. To-morrow perhaps it will be Labor. The poison is in it still. It casts a shadow still, on one or another side of itself—the dark shadow of Mungon's "law." It absolutely needs Government, to be alternately its protector and its tool; so long as under any form it remains a recognized institution.

At the present hour the notion that it is only the existing title to possession and not the institution of property itself, which cries for abolition is fraught with social danger. I am very sure indeed that in a community regulated by recognition of individual ownership, or estate ownership, (virtual ownership by a central company of officials), every citizen will be less free, less happy, less a man; than he might be as a member of a community where free access to products of industry should have become the universal rule. Reciprocally free access of individuals to personally superfluous products of individual industry, reciprocally free access of districts to the locally superfluous products of local industry, this is what we want for the well and solidarity and peace of our lives as a world full of friends.

I see as much danger in taking property from one class only to give

it another, as in taking Government out of the hands of one class only to give it to another. Nay, it is the identical danger under another name. The prohibitive custody of superfluous wealth, as now maintained in the case of landlords and capitalists, all Socialists see to be evil. To limit this prohibitive custody in the hands of an official class, would be virtually done under "Social Democracy," all Anarchists see to be evil. But to say to the producer: "Whatever personal superfluity you by the use of your personal faculties unearth or construct is therefore yours," to withhold at pleasure from the immediate use of those to whom it would be immediately serviceable—this is not generally seen to be evil. Yet it is only to conventionally make the producer a dictator of terms to his fellow men, and to leave the broad gate that leads to destruction wider open than ever. Let us cease to trade, and learn to trust. Let us have free access to opportunity and material for the constructive or productive exercise of any faculties I may possess, and then J. K. and L. only do me a service in coming and making free use of so much of my product as remains useless to myself. Of course this is an extreme position, but it is one on which Nature smiles in the case of communities of intelligent dumb creatures, and I am utopian enough to believe that we word-fogged humans have not yet so far spoiled our own impulses and ruined our own chances as to make it impossible or even very difficult to organize freely on these lines. That is, after once the existing cruel system shall have been paralyzed or broken up. It needs that we make up our minds to inquire less anxiously what is "wise and prudent," and to be quicker in response to the simple dictates of common-sense and good-will as they present themselves from day to day and from hour to hour.

A man who has made such use of material that a hat is the result, has made a hat. That is all he has made. He has not made a "right to property" in the hat, either for himself or anybody else. Before this exercise of his faculty there existed the materials, tools, and himself. There exist now, the tools, and himself, and the hat. He is related to the hat as its producer, not as its owner. If he has no hat and wants one, the obviously fit place for the hat is on his head. He then becomes further related to the hat as its wearer; and still the word "owner" remains a term without special meaning. But say that he already has a hat, and the first passer-by has none, and wants one, then the fit place for the hat is on the passer-by's head. It sounds absurd, but it is true. The latter has not produced, ever and above a hat, any such identical thing as a "right" to forbid the hatless man to wear the hat; apart from some arbitrary terms of his (the latter's) making, and which the hatless man, as likely as not, is unable to comply with except to his own damage. (Ah, "damage"—he must pay damage, must he? See how instinct links in language! Realize the unhealth of a community run on lines, in which damage results to some one at every turn of its minutest wheels.)

The latter's product is his product, not his property. His hands belong to him, but not his tools. His tools are, whoever made them, fifty and justly in his hands, his product is the product of his hands plus the tools which other hands have made; and the same justice and common-sense which is satisfied by the placing in his hands as a needer (then the tools which he did not make, but which he needs and which were not in request elsewhere, demands the placing of the needer hat on the head of the hatless stranger. None of us would object to this sort of method of distribution if we were sure that our pleasure in life did not consist in the abundance of things which we possess, but in the fitness of such things as we had to our real needs and enjoyments, and in the degree of freedom and enjoyment of our powers accorded us by our fellows. But we are not sure that our fellows would leave us free, would not take advantage of us, if we did not force them a little by means of withholding something that they require or desire until they have first paid for it in service to ourselves. And so we stickle for "ownership" (under one title or another) so that at a push we may have the wherewithal to compel or to bribe someone or other to do our bidding. It is a lot of trouble wasted. It is very poor economy. None of this is surely new, but it needs constant re-statement, even among Anarchists, by those of us who see the most vital of all social questions to be involved in it.

"Property is Robbery," said Proudhon. That is not the bottom truth about property. Francis Gray in his work on *Prejudices* justly points out that the word "robbery" solely connotes recognition of property. Expropriation should, for the true and radical Anarchist, mean something quite different from, something much more than, any mere retributive robbery, any seizure of possessions as such, any usurpation of title to possession as such. It should mean the total subversion of every vestige of this most solid and yet most insidious form of government, and the final explosion of the idea that there is or can be anything real or useful in property holding. Every pretext by which such an idea is still bolstered can be, and should be, by ruthless logic torn to pieces. Every action, political or social, purposing to reinstate cruel old pretensions under new sanctions should be unflinchingly opposed to the death.

I have in this article done no more than just step on the threshold of the subject. Space does not now allow me to justify the position. But I am an Expropriationist in the fullest sense that can be given to this clumsy word, because I regard the property idea as a craze—the very most pestilent delusion that the human mind, tricked by language has ever had the misfortune to entertain.

"The great political superstition of the past was the divine right of kings. The great political superstition of the present is divine right of parliaments."—H. SPENCER.



The Why I Ams



WHY I AM A COMMUNIST.

By WILLIAM MORRIS.

WHY I AM AN EXPROPRIATIONIST.

By L. S. BEVINGTON.

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The first of these two says, some standard of worth having been determined (of course not as a result of the immediate agreement of men living under such and such a system, but of the long development of many centuries) those who have attained to that standard are the masters of those who have not so attained, and live as well as surrounding circumstances, together with a quasi-equitable arrangement amongst the worthy, will allow them, by *using* those who have not come up to the standard above mentioned: in the dealings between the worthy with the non-worthy there is no attempt at any equitable arrangement (I was going to say no *pretence*, but at the present day that would not be quite true); the worthy use their advantage to the utmost, and it is a recognized assumption that the non-worthy are in a state of permanent inferiority, and their well-doing or ill-doing must be looked at from quite a different point of view from that of the worthy. For instance at the present day, the income which would imply ruin and disgrace to a member of the worthy class, would mean success and prosperity to a working man. It must be added that the standard of superiority is always an arbitrary one, and does not necessarily mean any real superiority on the side of the worthy; and that especially in our own days, when the unworthy or disinherited class is the one class which has any real function, is, in fact, the useful class; the functions of the worthy amongst us being directed solely towards their own class; they being otherwise a burden on the *whole* public.

Now this theory of society has been that held for the most part from early historical periods till our own days, though from time to time there have been protests raised against it. The standard of worthiness has varied, but the essential assertion of the necessity for inequality has always been there. In its two earlier phases, birth and race, i.e., the belonging, really or theoretically, to

WHY I AM A COMMUNIST.

By WILLIAM MORRIS.

Objection has been made to the use of the word "Communism" to express fully-developed Socialism, on the ground that it has been used for the Community-Building, which played so great a part in some of the phases of Utopian Socialism, and is still heard of from time to time nowadays. Of Communism in this sense I am not writing now; it may merely be said in passing that such experiments are of their nature non-progressive; at their best they are but another form of the Mediæval monastery, withdrawals from the Society of the day, really implying hopelessness of a general change; which is only attainable by the development of Society as it is; by the development of the consequences of its faults and anomalies, as well as of what germ of real Society it contains.

This point of mistaken nomenclature being cleared off, it remains to ask what real Communism is, and the answer is simple: it is a state of Society the essence of which is *Practical Equality of condition*. Practical, *i.e.*, equality as modified by the desires, and capacity for enjoyment of its various members. This is its economical basis; its ethical basis is the *habitual* and full recognition of man as a social being, so that it brings about the habit of making no distinction between the common welfare and the welfare of the individual.

I am a Communist, therefore, because—1st, it seems to me that mankind is not thinkable outside of Society; and 2ndly, because there is no other basis, economical and ethical, save that above stated, on which a true Society can be formed; any other basis makes waste and unnecessary suffering an essential part of the system. In short I can see no other system under which men can live together except these two, Slavery and Equality.

the lineage of the original conquering tribe, conferred the privilege of using the labour of those not so recognized ; and Chattel Slavery was the method of using their labour in Ancient, and Serfdom in Mediæval times. In our own days the method of exercising privilege has changed from the use of the arbitrary accident of birth, to the acquirement (by any means not recognized as illegal) of an indeterminate amount of wealth which enables its possessor to belong to the useless class.

It would not be very profitable to discuss which of these three systems of inequality, to wit, Chattel Slavery, Serfdom, or Wage-Earning, is *per se* the better or the worse ; it is enough to say that since the present one has come down to us in due course of development from the others, it gives us a hope of progress which could not have belonged to them. And in fact a new theory of Society can now be put forward, not as a mere abstraction, but as a root change in Social conditions which is in actual course of realization.

This theory is Communism ; which says : In a true Society the capacities of all men can be used for their mutual well being ; the due unwasteful use of those capacities produces wealth in the proper sense of the word and cannot fail to produce it ; this wealth produced by the Community can only be fully used by the Community ; for if some get more than they need, that portion which cannot be used must of necessity be wasted, and the whole Community is impoverished thereby ; and again further impoverished by the necessity for the producers having to work harder than they otherwise need ; which in its turn brings about grievous and burdensome inequality ; for all men feel unnecessary work to be slavish work. Again, though men's desires for wealth vary, yet certain needs all men have, and since we have seen that it is the *Community* which produces wealth in a true Society, to force on any class lack of these needs is to practically thrust them out of

the Community and constitute them a class of inferiority; and since we know that they can all work usefully, on what grounds can we do this? Certainly on no grounds that they as men can really agree to. We must *force* them into submission, or cajole them into it. And when force and fraud are used to keep any men in an artificial inequality, there is an end of true Society.

Communism, therefore, can see no reason for inequality of condition: to each one according to his needs, from each one according to his capacities, must always be its motto. And if it be challenged to answer the question, what are the needs of such and such a man, how are they to be estimated? The answer is that the habitual regard towards Society as the real unit, will make it impossible for any man to think of claiming more than his genuine needs. I say that it will not come into his mind that it is possible for him to advance himself by injuring someone else. While, on the other hand, it will be well understood that unless you satisfy a man's needs, you cannot make the best of his capacities. We are sometimes asked by people who do not understand either the present state of society or what Communism aims at, as to how we shall get people to be doctors, learned scientists, etc., in the new condition of things.

The answer is clear; by affording opportunities to those who have the capacity for doctoring etc.; the necessary cost of such opportunities being borne by the Community; and as the position of a doctor who has mistaken his vocation would clearly be an uncomfortable one in a society where people knew their real wants, and as he could earn his livelihood by engaging himself to do what he *could* do, he would be delivered from the now very serious temptation of pretending to be a doctor when he is not one.

I might go through a long series of objections which ignorant persons make to the only reasonable form of Society, but that is scarcely my business here. I will

assert that I am a Communist because, amongst other reasons, I believe that a Communal Society could deal with every problem with which a Capitalist Society has perforce to deal, but with free hands and therefore with infinitely better chance of success. I believe that a Communal Society would bring about a condition of things in which we should be really wealthy, because we should have all we produced, and should know what we wanted to produce; that we should have so much leisure from the production of what are called "utilities," that any group of people would have leisure to satisfy its cravings for what are usually looked on as superfluities, such as works of art, research into facts, literature, the unspoiled beauty of nature; matters that to my mind are utilities also, being the things that make life worth living and which at present *nobody* can have in their fulness.

I believe in the final realization of this state of things, and now I come to the method by which they are to be reached. And here I feel I shall be dealing in matter about which there may be and must be divers opinions even amongst those who are consciously trying to bring about Communal conditions.

In the first place I do not (who does really) believe in Catastrophical Communism. That we shall go to sleep on Saturday in a Capitalistic Society and wake on Monday into a Communistic Society is clearly an impossibility. Again I do not believe that our end will be gained by open war; for the executive will be *too strong* for even an attempt at such a thing to be made until the change has gone so far, that it will be *too weak* to dare to attack the people by means of direct physical violence.

What we have to do first is to make Socialists. That we shall always have to do until the change is come. Some time ago we seemed to have nothing else to do than that, and could only do it by preaching; but the

times are changed ; the movement towards a communal life has spread wonderfully within the last three or four years ; the instinctive feeling towards Socialism has at last touched the working classes, and they are moving toward the great change ; how quickly it is not easy for us, who are in the midst of the movement, to determine ; but this instinct is not leading them to demand the *full* change directly ; rather they are attacking those positions which must be won, before we come face to face with the last citadel of Capitalism, the privilege of rent, interest, and profit. Broadly speaking they see that it is possible to wrest from their masters an improved life, better livelihood, more leisure, treatment in short as citizens, not as machines. I say from their masters : for there is nowhere else whence it can come. Now to show sympathy with this side of the movement, and to further those who are working for it, is a necessity, if we are to make Socialists nowadays. For again I say it is the form in which the workers are taking in Socialism ; the movement is genuine and spontaneous amongst them ; and how important that is, those know best who remember how a few years ago the movement was confined to a few persons, of education and of superior intelligence, most of whom belonged by position to the middle classes. Neither need we fear that when the working classes have gained the above mentioned advantages they will stop there. They will not and they cannot. For the results of the struggle will force on them the responsibilities of managing their own affairs, and mastership will wane before Communal management almost before people are aware of the change at hand.

This will bring us at last to the period of what is now understood by the word Socialism when the means of production and the markets will be in the hands of those who can use them, *i.e.*, the operatives of various kinds ; when great accumulations of wealth will be

impossible, because money will have lost its privilege; when everybody will have an opportunity of well-doing offered him; and this period of incomplete Socialism will, I believe, gradually melt into true Communism without any violent change. At first indeed, men will not be absolutely equal in condition; the old habit of rewarding excellence or special rare qualities with extra money payment will go on for a while, and some men will possess more wealth than others; but as on the one hand they will have to work in order to possess that wealth, and as on the other the excess of it will procure them but small advantage in a Society tending towards equality, as in fact they begin to understand that in a Community where none are poor, extra wealth beyond the real needs of a man cannot be *used*, we shall begin to cease estimating worth by any standard of material reward, and the position of complete equality as to condition will be accepted without question. I do not say that gifted persons will not try to excel; but their excellence will be displayed not at the expense of their neighbours but for their benefit.

By that time also we shall have learned the true secret of happiness, to wit, that it is brought about by the pleasurable exercise of our energies; and since opportunity will be given for everyone to do the work he is fitted for under pleasant and unburdensome conditions, there will be no drudgery to escape from, and consequently no competition to thrust ones neighbour out of his place in order to attain to it.

As to what may be called the business conduct of Communism, it has been said often, and rightly as I think, that it will concern itself with the administration of things rather than the government of men. But this administration must take form, and that form must of necessity be democratic and federative; that is to say there will be certain units of administration, ward, parish, commune, whatever they may be called, and

these units all federated within certain circles, always enlarging. And in each such body, if differences of opinion arise, as they would be sure to do, there would be surely nothing for it but that they should be settled by the will of the majority. But it must be remembered that whereas in our present state of society, in every assembly there are struggles between *opposing interests* for the mastery, in the assemblies of a Communal Society, there would be no opposition of interests, but only divergencies of opinion, as to the best way of doing what all were agreed to do. So that the minority would give way without any feeling of injury. It is a matter of course that since everybody would share to the full in the wealth and good life won by the whole community, so everybody would share in the responsibility of carrying on the business of the community; but this business of administration they would as sensible people reduce as much as possible, that they might be the freer to use their lives in the pleasure of living, and creating, and knowing, and resting.

This is a brief sketch of what I am looking forward to as a Communist: to sum up, it is Freedom from artificial disabilities; the development of each man's capacities for the benefit of each and all. Abolition of waste by taking care that one man does not get more than he can use, and another less than he needs; consequent condition of general well-being and fulness of life, neither idle and vacant, nor over burdened with toil.

All this I believe we can and shall reach directly by insisting on the claim for the communization of the means of production; and that claim will be made by the workers when they are fully convinced of its necessity; I believe further that they are growing convinced of it, and will one day make their claim good by using the means which the incomplete democracy of the day puts within their reach. That is they will at last form

a wide spread and definite Socialist party, which will, by using the vote, wrest from the present possessing classes the instruments which are now used to govern the people in the interest of the possessing classes, and will use them for effecting the change in the basis of society, which would get rid of the last of the three great oppressions of the world.



WHY I AM AN EXPROPRIATIONIST.

By L. S. BEVINGTON.

I advocate, and I look forward to wholesale expropriation because I do not believe there is any such thing as a right to property, and because I hold that it is disastrous, nay, fatal, to the welfare of all individuals composing the community, to have to regulate their lives and affairs in accordance with a fictitious abstraction which has no warrant and no basis in the natural laws of life. I desire universal expropriation, not merely because the power that property-holding gives to man over man is in wrong hands, and consequently abused, but because it seems clear to me that property-holding is an abuse in itself, and that to hold property is to make wrong use of anyone's hands at all. I desire to see the bottom knocked out of the noxious property idea itself, for good and all.

“The love of money is the root of all evil.” Why? Because the love of money is the love of domination. Property is government. Property—that is, the prohibitive custody by particular persons of any part of the general resources—cannot be shown to have any value at all for any one, merely as “owner,” *except the power it gives him over the faculties and liberties of his fellow-creatures.* And this is a false value, an illusion. It is a craze to believe that you are necessarily better off—the richer or the freer—through dominating your fellows by dint of keeping prohibitive custody of what may be of greater service (intrinsic value) to them than to yourself.

No true, nature-based title to property as merely such can be shown to exist. Perhaps even some Anarchists will demur to this. The belief still lingers that there is such a thing as a man’s natural right to “own,” to have the prohibitive custody and disposal of, whatever his industry or skill may have produced or constructed out of the raw material provided by Nature. “There is one true title to property—to custody of superfluity—and that is the Labor title;” so say many. It is a delusion. There can be no such thing as a natural title to what is after all an artificial and merely nominal relation between a man and his product; a relation having no basis in reality. That which at the outset is not anybody’s cannot be made anybody’s by manipulation. This is not a mere metaphysical quibble. He who produces anything useful has, other things equal, a *first comer’s economic right* to use, consume, or enjoy it, up to the limit of his own ability to do so. Yet this use of his product is not what the world specially means by ownership. This is not the cursed thing that keeps the world poor and squalid and sordid. Ownership begins to be talked of (here disputed, there enforced) just where the natural relation of a man to men’s wealth leaves off—just where the limit of ability to use or enjoy has been

fully reached. This natural limit once overstepped there is no other natural limit to be found ever again, till revolution sets one. The moment that ownership, merely as ownership, begins to be stickled for, then, no matter what its "title" may be, property will be able and eager to defend itself by means of law; it will "govern," and ensure to the owner the opportunities of becoming indefinitely richer and richer, with the necessary result that the non-owner must become ever poorer and poorer. Nothing more stable than conventional concession originally placed or left in the hands of individuals, whether producers or not, any power over that part of wealth which remains after satisfaction of requirement—which the individual cannot use, and his fellows are in want of. Conventions remain unquestioned until some lurking hurtfulness in them comes out as a glaring social evil, and then, whether backed by government or not, the struggle or their displacement begins, and their doom is fixed.

As to the modern cry, "the product to the producer," it is surely all right economically and ethically, so far as it goes. But directly it is insisted on that "the whole of the product belongs to the producer as his property" (to, use, waste, sell, or hoard at his pleasure) and directly it is insinuated that human faculties and the wealth the faculties (help to) win are of equal inviolability, then we are face to face with the worst of social superstitions once more. The property holder will remain dominator, the property-holding class will remain the dominating class and its weapon, the Government, will remain in existence until the idea that things or privileges can "belong" to persons or groups of persons, is seen for the figment it actually is. Government is only another name for property. You can make Government hop from one leg to another, and on the standing leg hop from one point to another. But it will wink at you and evade you, so long as Property exists. You can

alter Property's title; what was Strength of Arms one day became Inheritance next; then Purchase. Tomorrow perhaps it will be Labor. The poison is in it still. It casts a shadow still, on one or another side of itself,—the dark shadow of Mammon's "laws." It *absolutely needs* Government, to be alternately its protector and its tool, so long as under any form it remains a **recognized** institution.

At the present hour the notion that it is only the existing title to possession and not the institution of property itself which cries for abolition is fraught with social danger. I am very sure indeed that in a community regulated in recognition of individual ownership, or even *state* ownership (virtual ownership by a central company of officials), every citizen will be less free, less happy, less a man, than he might be as a member of a community where free access to products of industry should have become the universal rule. Reciprocally free access of individuals to personally superfluous products of individual industry, reciprocally free access of districts to the locally superfluous products of local industry—this is what we want for the weal and solidarity and peace of our lives as a world full of friends.

I see as much danger in taking property from one class only to give it another, as in taking Government out of the hands of one class only to give it to another. Nay, it is the identical danger under another name. The prohibitive custody of superfluous wealth, as now maintained in the case of landlords and capitalists, all Socialists see to be evil. To land this prohibitive custody in the hands of an official class, as would be *virtually* done under "Social Democracy," all Anarchists see to be evil. But to say to the producer: Whatever personal superfluity you by the use of your personal faculties unearth or construct is therefore "yours," to withhold at pleasure from the immediate use of those to

whom it would be immediately serviceable—this is not generally seen to be an evil. Yet it is only to conventionally make the producer a dictator of terms to his fellow men, and to leave the broad gate that leads to destruction wider open than ever. Let us cease to trade, and learn to trust. Let me have free access to opportunity and material for the constructive or productive, exercise of any faculties I may possess, and then J. K. and L. only do me a service in coming and making free use of so much of my product as remains useless to myself. Of course this is an extreme position, but it is one on which Nature smiles in the case of communities of intelligent dumb creatures, and I am utopian enough to believe that we word-befogged humans have not yet so far spoilt our own impulses and ruined our own chances as to make it impossible or even very difficult to organise freely on these lines. That is, after once the existing cruel system shall have been paralyzed or broken up. It needs that we make up our minds to inquire less anxiously what is “wise and prudent,” and be quicker in response to the simple dictates of common-sense and good-will as they present themselves from day to day and from hour to hour.

A man who has made such use of material that a hat is the result, has made a hat. That is all he has made. He has not made a “right to property” in the hat, either for himself or anybody else. Before this exercise of his faculty there existed the materials, tools, and himself. There exist now, the tools, and himself, and the hat. He is related to the hat as its *producer*, not as its owner. If he has no hat and wants one, the obviously fit place for the hat is on his head. He then becomes further related to the hat as its *wearer*; and still the word “owner” remains a term without special meaning. But say that he already has a hat and the first passer-by has none, and wants one, then the fit place for one of the hats is on the passer-by’s head.

It sounds childish, but it's true. The hatter has not produced, over and above a hat, any such identical thing as a "right" to forbid the hatless man to wear the hat, apart from some arbitrary terms of his (the hatter's) making, and which the hatless man, as likely as not, is unable to comply with except to his own damage. (Ah, "damage,"—he must pay damage, must he? See how instinct lurks in language! Realize the unhealth of a community run on lines, in which damage results to some one at every turn of its minutest wheels).

The hatter's product is his product, not his *property*. His hands belong to him, but not his tools. His tools are, whoever made them, fitly and justly in his hands, his product is the product of his hands plus the tools which other hands have made; and the same justice and common-sense which is satisfied by the placing in his hands as needing them the tools which he did not make, but which he needs and were not in request elsewhere, demands the placing of the needed hat on the head of the hatless stranger. None of us would object to this sort of method of distribution if we were sure that our pleasure in life did not consist in the abundance of things which we possess, but in the fitness of such things as we had to our real needs and enjoyments, and in the degree of freedom and enjoyment of our powers accorded us by our fellows. But we are not sure that our fellows *would* leave us free, would not take advantage of us, if we did not force them a little by means of withholding something that they require or desire until they have first paid for it in service to ourselves. And so we stickle for "ownership" (under one title or another) so that at a push we may have the wherewithal to compel or to bribe someone or other to do our bidding. It is a lot of trouble wasted. It is very poor economy. None of this is surely new, but it needs constant re-statement, even among Anarchists,


by those of us who see the most vital of questions to be involved in it.

“Property is Robbery,” said Proudhon. To the bottom truth about property. François G work on *Prejudices* justly points out that “robbery” subtly connotes recognition of Expropriation should, for the true and radical ist, mean something quite different from, so much more than, any mere retributive robbery seizure of possessions as such, any usurpation to possession as such. It should mean the total version of every vestige of this most solid and insidious form of government, and the final of the idea that there is or can be anything real in property holding. Every pretext by which an idea is still bolstered can be, and should be less logic torn to pieces. Every action, political, social, purposing to reinstate cruel old pretensions new sanctions should be unflinchingly opposed to death.

I have in this article done no more than just the threshold of the subject. Space does not permit me to justify the position. But I am an E tionist in the fullest sense that can be given: a clumsy word, because I regard the property craze—the very most pestilent delusion that the mind, tricked by language has ever had the means to entertain.



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• ANARCHIST • COMMUNISM •

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Clay

GOD AND THE STATE.

EXTRACTS FROM UNEDITED MANUSCRIPTS OF
MICHAEL BAKUNIN.

(TRANSLATED FOR "LIBERTY" BY "N.")

(Continued from No. 1.)

What are the reasons of this deplorable slowness, which almost resembles stagnation, and which constitutes, as I think, mankind's greatest hindrance? There are many reasons for it. One of the chief causes lies doubtless in the ignorance of the masses. Being generally and systematically deprived of all scientific education through the paternal care of governments and the privileged classes,—who think it useful to keep them as long as possible in ignorance, piety, and credulity (three nearly synonymous words)—the masses ignore both the existence and the use of criticism, that instrument of intellectual emancipation without which there can be no complete moral and social revolution. The masses in whose interest it always lies to revolt against the established order, are still more or less attached to that order by the religion of their fathers,—the providence of the privileged classes.

The privileged classes, which, whatever they may profess, have no longer any piety or belief, are for their part attached to the existing state of things by their own political and social interests. But it is impossible to assert that this is the only reason for which they cling passionately to the predominant ideas. However low may be my estimate of the actual intellectual and moral worth of those classes, I cannot admit that interest alone is the main-spring of their thoughts and actions. No doubt in every class and in every party there exists a larger or smaller number of intelligently ambitious and knowingly dishonest exploiters—*homines fortes* (strong men)—who, void of all intellectual and moral possessions, and equally indifferent to all convictions, are ready to utilise any such, on occasion, and in order to further their own ends. But these distinguished persons never, even in the most corrupt classes, form more than a very small minority. The bulk of those classes is as sheepish as the proletariat itself. They are of course subject to the influence of their own special interests; and these make reaction a condition of their existence. But it cannot be admitted that in fostering reaction, they are prompted merely by selfish sentiment. No large mass of men, however corrupted, could collectively act in this depraved way. In all large associations, and especially in traditional, historical associations—no classes, and even though they have degenerated and become absolutely noxious and antagonistic to the rights and interests of all,—there exists a moral principle, a religion, a belief of some sort; no doubt an irrational and mostly a ridiculous and narrow-minded belief, but still sincere; and constituting the moral condition indispensable to their existence.

The common and fundamental error of all idealists,—an error which by the way is a perfectly logical consequence of their whole system,—consists in trying to find the basis of morals in the isolated individual, whilst as a fact it only exists, and can only be shown forth in the individual as a social being. To prove this, let us settle once for all with the isolated and absolute individual of the idealists.

This abstract and solitary human individual is a fiction of like character with the God-faction; both having simultaneously originated in the childish, unreflecting, empirically observant but fanciful mind of primitive mankind, and afterwards developed, expounded, and dogmatized upon by the theological and metaphysical theorists of transendentalism. Each, as standing for an abstraction void of all content, and corresponding with no reality, leads—nowhere. I think I have proved the futility of the God-faction. Later on, in the Appendix, I shall point out its still so glaring absurdity. Here I will demonstrate as both immense and absurd, the fiction of the absolute and abstract human individual, which the moralists of the idealist school use as the basis of their political and social theories.

It will not be difficult to show that the human individual, as held up and adored by those thinkers, is an entirely non-moral being. He is the personification of egoism, the anti-social being *par excellence*. Endowed with an immortal soul, he is infinite and complete within himself, in need of no other, not even God, still less other men. Logically, he ought not to suffer the existence of any equal or superior being,—immortal and infinite as himself, or more immortal and infinite than himself—beside him, or above him. He should be the only *unus* on earth, nay, in the universe. For the infinite, meeting with anything whatever beyond itself, meets a barrier,—is no longer the infinite. Two infinite meeting, annihilate one another.

Why do theologians and metaphysicians, who are otherwise such ardent logicians, consent and continue to commit this inconsistency of admitting the existence of many men all equally immortal,—that is, all equally infinite, and above them a God who is still more immortal and infinite? They are forced to do so by the absolute impossibility of denying the real existence, the mortality as well as the mutual dependence of millions of human beings who have lived and who live on this globe.

Continuation of Extracts

No man could be rich, no man could be poor, in Peru; but all might enjoy, and did enjoy, a competence. Ambition, avarice, the love of change, the morbid spirit of discontent, those passions which most agitate the minds of men, found no place in the bosom of the Peruvian.—Percival's "Conquest of Peru."

THE LAST GASP OF PROPERTYISM.

By L. S. BEVINGTON.

What do the Individualists mean when they talk of the right of personal appropriation of their own labor-product? What is an "own" labor-product? What is "appropriation"? What is a "right"?

In his letter to Liberty, on "Proudhon and Communism," Mr. Seymour takes for granted that these three words stand for universally discernible things, and stand in an indisputable relation to one another; and from a little three-legged platform so based, he puts a poser: "If the man who conceives and carries out the production of a commodity has no right to consume (sic) or appropriate what he has produced, how can some other men (the community so-called), have a right to consume or appropriate it who have not produced it?" In this conundrum several open questions are begged outright. My answer to it would be as follows: "Supposing you could find a man who had all by himself, conceived or carried out the production of a commodity, and suppose you could find something other and more than his need or fitness to be the consumer or user of that commodity hindering him to it when it is produced; and suppose you could further find this extra bond to be something other or more than a legal, conventional, and removable concession on the part of other people, then I will accept the term "right" as designating this bond. But the first step towards bringing my mind up to a level from which I might see and so have a chance of disposing of the aforesaid poser as it stands, is to find your individual conceiver or carrier-out of the production. (And by the way, which of these two wonderful persons, when found, is to have precedence as a more-than-consumer of the finished product?)

I am not quibbling. It is at this very point—the supposed "right" to the supposed "owning" of supposed "individually produced" wealth, that the not-so-very-ancient property superstition is to draw its last gasp. The air is noisy and heavy with the gasping already. I wish for all our sakes it were over, so that economic sanity might bless us all at last, and make our planet our home instead of our purgatory.

That conventional "article" of a transient economic creed which binds surplus goods (consequently opportunities) to the will or whim of individual "owners," is after all as irrelevant as it is dogmatic. It has, like most man-imposed dogmas, a sorry and shabby history; and it has no logical basis in actual relations between men and things.

To me it seems that there exists, to begin with, no individual producer. No one does, or can do more than put a finishing touch to something which the labors of countless others had brought into position for his hand, having provided him also with tools to work with, to say nothing of having fed, educated, and protected him up to the stage of ability required for his job. The job when finished, is a many men's job every time. Say it is a specially original and prophetic book; it is then a more men's job than if it is a wild fruit gathered in a jungle. The wild fruit, too, which one hand gathers, can be consumed by the owner of the hand. But the book that has taken the mental work of generations and the manual work of a great crowd to bring it into existence, will serve a great crowd and many generations, and will the more widely and easily fulfil its end and function of instruction the less its production and distribution get hitched on the thorn of the property hedge.

Thinker, inventor, able mechanic or husbandman, it is not for you to say who has not had part in the making of your finished product. "How can some other men (the community so-called), have a right to consume or appropriate it who have not produced it?" "Right to consume" means actual need and natural ability to consume, or it means nothing. "Right to appropriate" means law-protected ability to withhold at will; or it means nothing. The first—the title to consumption, may exist on the part of the finisher of the product, when it is good economy all round for him to put it to use as first owner; or, it may not exist, when it is poor economy not to let anyone have it who does need it for immediate consumption. In the case of appropriation the right is spurious, and exists nowhere. There are only three real terms—Men; goods; use. Men make goods. Goods belong where they are useful as goods; not as wares; not as merchandise; not as speculations; not as instruments, for profit making or for bribing. These uses are all wasteful of wealth and of time.

Proudhonians, says Mr. Seymour, "preach Communism in relation to land and natural products, for the reason that such are in no wise due to the efforts of individuals; and emphasize the right of personal appropriation of labor-products for the reason that they are due to personal effort." "Reason"? Why, reason? It seems to me that it is dogma rather than reason which speaks here. Surely the true reason for general and free access to natural products is general need. There is a positive reason for my drinking at your spring. I drink because I am thirsty, not because I did not make the water. I do not think a new principle comes in with regard to human products. I have made a walking stick. I keep it instead of giving it to my brother, because he has one already, and I have none; not because I cut the stick, and he did not. If I have another stick, and he has none, and wants one, my work is better rewarded in his fit use of it than in my unfit custody of it. Nor need he pay me "damage" for it.

No. Let us all say what we mean. There is no fitness in the property-idea if it is not good logic; it is not good economy; it is, in our day, awfully difficult, and disturbing, and dangerous, and morally disastrous to keep it enforced, and in working-order. To take away its grab-titles, and its pedigree-titles, and its business-titles, and to give it a brand new labor-title won't alter the nature of its tenure, as an *instru-*

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"THE PREJUDICE AGAINST PROPERTY."

(MR. SEYMOUR'S GROUND RE-ASSERTED.)

In your October number Mr. Seymour criticised some of my objections to the property idea—an idea which Anarchists regard as inherently incompatible with individual freedom, and consequently with social prosperity, but which Individualists regard as modifiable in such ways as to make it reverse the part it has hitherto invariably played in human affairs, and disclose itself as a means of emancipation and of true progress.

We Anarchists have controversial reason to grumble at our Individualist antagonists. We cannot get our questions answered. I asked Mr. Seymour what he meant by "owning;" what he meant by "appropriation;" what he meant by a "right." He did not reply. They never do. I have tried for years to discuss the basis of the property idea with different Individualists, but they always stop short of essentials, and slide off on side issues. Let me put the preliminary questions once more: (1) What essentially is it that is steeled for as property, if not the prohibitive custody of something not wanted by the individual for his own use or enjoyment, but which other people are needing for their use or enjoyment? (2) Why does anyone care about retaining this prohibitive custody if not as a means of bending and shaping to his own ends the activities and opportunities of those with whom he deals, from that point at which their need and his ownership of the proprietised utility meet, and compel them to deal with him?

Pending proof to the contrary, I continue to see in this relation of man to man an economic absurdity, and a moral atrocity—the root-cause, in short, of all human fault, and feud, and failure. I am aware of limiting the equal liberty of my fellows wherever I limit their free access to anything, whatever which awaits human use, and of which their need is greater or occurs sooner than my own. In a society freed of devices for centralising propertylessness (or the non-possession of superfluity) I would not burden myself with the precautionary custody of a superfluous pin.

It is fair to ask Individualists how, in the absence of any Government to enforce property-owning, and submission of all citizens to the property idea, they propose to deal with their Anarchists—those irreconcilables who are determined to repudiate respect for any property as "theirs," and are equally aware of the fitness of making use of whatever is necessary for life, locomotion, and exercise of faculty? What is to be done with the men (and there are more of them than day to day and from-hour to hour) who don't want to own property, or to control others, but who do want freedom to live, to work, and to hand on, as they choose? Are these servicable and inexpensive prisoners to suffocate to the aid of the chapter, in their entry false position as mendicants at the gates of the over-supplied bazaar-monger? Yet why discuss improbable contingencies? The deeper currents of human character and human tendency are to-day setting fast towards unalloyed freedom, and the economics of to-morrow will know no rules but the unwritten ones of conjunction, courtesy, and common-sense.

But now for Mr. Seymour. Waiving inquiries as to first principles, (1) explains what he means by the individual producer. (2) Supposes me to pretend that opportunities of production are limited apart from the incidental consequences of a vicious monetary system, and of "re-stating" the monstrous proposition of Malthus; and (3) declares that Communism is now impossible; primitive man "only tolerated it" because he had to; the communistic instinct is being "outgrown," and liberty will be reached in proportion to the outgrowing. "Civilized man could not go back if he would."

(1) Mr. Seymour's "individual producer" is, then, not necessarily the commodity-finisher, after all. He is only "each contributor to a product from beginning to end"; plainly, then, only an infinitesimal unit in a crowd of collaborators. It is pleasing thus to see the Individual Producer, that new pretender to future world management, throw up his hand directly he is challenged to show his title. The efforts of his forefathers, and his fellows, have helped him into the position of being able to buy what he needs in order to be a producer. "He has bought some material, fetched by others, bought some tools, made by others; and then, with the co-operation, either direct or indirect, of others, has turned out a product which he may or may not want, when produced, for his own individual use or enjoyment. If he wants it, Mr. Seymour would agree with us that he has the first comer's economic right to its use." If he does not want precisely it, but something else, we should say that, other things equal, his freedom is best secured by simply letting the product go, unmeasured and unweighed, wherever it is needed; as so to be rid, head and hands, of what he does not want, while receiving freely from some other quarter that which others likewise have to spare, and which he does want. Mr. Seymour on the contrary thinks that the individual's freedom (for he declares it is not mastership he desires) would be better secured by constituting himself the arbiter of that product's further utilization, and by being at the trouble of safe-guarding it in his own custody for purposes of merchandise. Each individual is to be denied free access to unemployed tools; he is not to be a free worker in a freely fluid, self-adjusting society; his fellows are to charge him for leave and means to support and occupy himself; and he likewise is to charge his own price on society, before he will let the product of his industry flow freely where it is of natural service. But mark, "come naturally," Nature will have her way "at warr all our dictatorial and perversities; and the commercial producer's own price for the

product will always be, virtually, the whole amount of everything he is himself in need of, minus only what he cannot induce society to give him. I mean he will always aim at getting as much as possible of things or liberties valuable to himself, in exchange for that which is immediately valuable to himself; in a word, everything for nothing. That is what putting one's own price on anything always, at bottom, means. It is only a perverted action of the natural law of self-preservation. It would be all right to claim all one wants every time, were it not for the artificial limitation of supplies by supposed possessions, which causes the natural tendency to work inharmoniously and disastrously. Well, is the sordid bargain driving, the squalid, self-regarded evasion, the sour old property-tussle to have no end? To Anarchists it is pain and grief—it is bondage—to be compelled to charge anyone anything. To Anarchists, individual buying and selling, weighing and counting, accumulating and safe-guarding, appear methods as barabrous and absurd as they are greivous and wasteful, in a world where there is enough, and might so easily be abundance, of everything for all.

Meanwhile, note that the question as to how buying the material or tool, or working on the product, make them "mine" to withhold, remains unanswered. "Purchase makes it his"—his to waste (if his innate sociality does not check him) while another perishes for need of it. "His?" How? Why? The dogma that a right of prohibitive custody, whether of objects or privileges, is acquired by something done or sacrificed by the individual, is re-stated. That is all.

(2) Then, what is that about Malthus? Where and how is it pretended that opportunities of production are limited in respect of all men's needs? The very opposite is what we Anarchists are always pointing out. Remove the artificial and legal disabilities which are inseparable from any property system whatever, and natural opportunity abounds. And the monstrous proposition of Malthus remains monstrous to all time.

(3) Lastly, Communism is impossible. "Primitive man only tolerated [this impossibility] through sheer necessity." It was due to a communistic "instinct," and man was driven by necessity to tolerate the gratification of his instinct(!). "Civilized man," having partly "outgrown" the instinct, has acquired some liberty instead. "He could not go back if he would." He must advance. If individual liberty has been found wanting by the worker it is because it has been denied to him.

Reud "property," for "liberty," in the last few sentences, and I agree. I perceive, however, that just in proportion as property has been the award of the minority who have tolerated and ignored the communistic instinct, liberty has gone on diminishing for the rest of mankind. Under even primitive communism—no starvation, and where food is, life is, and with it all the progressive possibilities inherent in that which lives. It seems to me that Mr. Seymour reads human history and human nature very superficially. For my part, I am struck at every turn with the indomitable vitality of the broad communistic instinct. It is born anew with every little child, and it is the last thing to go when Sisylock, in the eager process of gaining the world, says goodbye to his own soul. Civilization (cursus etc) never has and never will become hereditary or instinctive. It has consisted mainly in an attempt to run life for all in grooves marked out by the will of the least scrupulous. We look forward to a society in which the individual of finest social sentiment, and of truest conjunction, shall have the best and not the worst chances of success along the lines of his own individuality. Under any property-regarding system whatever, social scruple must go, cap-in-hand, begging for tolerance and a crust. We have for long centuries whined away from communism and freedom, and yet we have, howbeit lamely, progressed. Oh yes, I admit it. We have had other absorbing jobs on hand; we have made great way, despite property checks, in geology, astronomy, electric, neurology, and so on. We shall want it all yet. It is a ill store. Man does not go back on the whole, though he proceeds rather by indirection than straight-forwardly. In the spiral ascent of his nature, he is, at his best, already coming round again to a point where the painfully checked instinct of solidarity is once more claiming recognition and liberation, but on a higher plane. To ascend spirally is not to go back. Civilization or proprietism is not a final development. Already it is cracking and crumbling at all points, and the world-wide sociality that has been ripening within its confining institutions is fast preparing to force an outlet and try its wings.

Instinct does not speak in terms either of business, or of policy. All that appertains to these unhappy devices has to be sadly and slowly learnt afresh from the beginning by each growing youth and maiden; and in most cases a deal of teaching and terrorism is required to drive the lesson home. If, meanwhile, one wants to know where instinct lurks, and what it is that individuals, in intervals of non-consciousness, tend to be, watch the "every-day" mode of action and speech when your ordinary citizen (the man or woman of moral and intellectual mediocrity) is off guard—when legalities and conventions leave him at liberty to be natural, and when he is in no civilized anxiety as to the safety of his privileges or his property, for to-day or to-morrow. See him then very gladly "unbound"—yes, that is it. Instinct lurks in that word. It lurks in the simple modes of speech—"Yes, and welcome!" or "Pray don't mention it," in all the little gratuitous graces and courtesies and neighbourliness which prevent absolute

* That communism was, is, and ever shall be a deep-seated human instinct I heartily allow, but I had always imagined that sheer a casual prying touch without was in no wise needed to induce an instinct to seek its appropriate satisfaction; it being sufficient to remove extraneous impediment to assure its course securely. It is as the assure of an instinct to be its own jailer and its own sewer, and to grow ever stronger with exercise. In absence of forcible detention, its mandates, ever life-regarding, are spontaneously obeyed; and in the case of the communistic instinct, nothing but force has compelled it into prolonged but temporary abeyance.

social suffocation even under that sordid burden of "legal tender" with which our poor groaning and trawling lines have invested themselves. Social free access, as tacitly claimed and as granted before asking, by full-blown individuality, will truly, when established, differ widely from the primitive communism in which conscious individuality played no part. What was blind and haphazard will be conscious and discriminative. What was merely tribal and communal will be human and social; and whereas Nature was formerly a mere propeller, she will be at once the accepted instructor and the most effectual co-operator.

I am fully aware that all this that I have written contains nothing of "practical politics," or of business-like opportunism. Both of those branches of mental industry are likely to be sufficiently subserved by the "social" Democrat on one hand, and by the commercial Individualist on the other. I do not think we shall have freedom suddenly, or soon; but the goal has to be kept in sight, and the dust wiped out of our civilized eyes as we jog along. I think the individual producer, keeping his necessary force of hired "Pinkertons" to prevent non-commercial access to his superfluous product, could not but rapidly develop into one of the most "barbaric selfish and graceless tyrants before whom the stifling socialist has ever had to bow the knee. And I don't think his nostrils will ever admit of the wiping of tears from all honest faces, as some pretend. "In a society such as we are striving after, there will be no direct exchange of product for product—because the real worth of products cannot by any measure be determined,—but the different producers and groups of producers will bestow their finished articles in magazines, and every individual or group will take what he needs." But in order to call this new society into life the gangrened old one must be done away. That is our first job. Health does not grow out of disease. Freedom cannot be developed out of the apparatus of bondage. Evolution requires the forcible breakage and abandonment of the effete bean-pod—eggshell—chrysalis. This is revolution every time.

Down with Property.

L. S. BEVINGTON.

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF REVOLUTIONARY ANARCHIST SOCIALISTS.

This Federation has been started in Italy and is seeking to extend itself. The following is a copy of a manifesto just issued:

Considering: That the present social organization, the result of intestine struggles through which humanity developed itself, is the cause of material misery and moral degradation; and that it is urgent to substitute for it a new organization, based on co-operation and solidarity, that will give to all the means of reaching the highest possible development and be free to all future improvements;

Considering: That the primary cause of the present hatred and antagonism is the monopoly of the land and all the means of production and exchange in the hands of a few; and that to harmonize interests and live in brotherly love it is necessary that society should guarantee to all the means of working and freely associating with other workers;

Considering: That a social organization, answering as much as possible to the aspiration and the interests of all, cannot be invented and imposed by a government, but must result from the free action of all concerned, who agree and organize by the impulse of their sentiments and under pressure of their common needs;

Considering: That owing to the consolidation of the various economical and political institutions, it is impossible to substantially change it altogether by revolutionary means and by violation of established laws;

Considering: That the resistance of the bourgeoisie to every attempt of the workers to emancipate themselves renders necessary the use of force, in order to destroy the military and the police, who defend the present society by force of arms;

Considering: That a revolution which will give birth to new social conditions cannot be made by isolated individuals who act haphazard, nor can it succeed if it does not find in the people, at least in germ, the means capable of accomplishing, without an important break, the essential functions of individual and social life;

A Federation of Revolutionary Anarchist Socialists, proposing the following aims, has been formed.

(a) To propagate the principles of Anarchist-Socialism and to show the necessity of a violent revolution.

(b) To inspire the people with a consciousness of their rights and a sentiment of love toward all men, and of solidarity with the poor and oppressed.

(c) To encourage the working-class movement and stimulate the workers to organize for the three-fold purpose of: (1) resisting the pretensions of employers and authorities, and striving to gain as much comfort and liberty as possible; (2) taking part in a general strike or an armed insurrection to overthrow the present institutions; (3) taking over, on the day of revolution, the production and distribution of food, as well as other public services, without the need of trusting to new governors, who would of necessity be incompetent and who, in attempting to impose their own ideas, would impede the scope of revolution.

(d) To encourage and profit by all movements of emancipation to the advantage of Anarchist-Socialist propaganda, by all progress in ideas and facts which may be realized by the action of other individuals or parties.

(e) To co-ordinate the revolutionary efforts to attain a general insurrection, in which the people will drive away the government, take over riches now extant, and organize the new society in the interest of all.

The education makes use of all means not contrary to its principles, that will elevate the conscience of the people and bring the revolution nearer.

Although understanding the brutal actions, produced by the miserable conditions in which the people live, and by the examples of ferocity given to us daily by the bourgeoisie, and although, when they happen, trying to draw some good from them, the Federation declares that its work is one of love. It rejects every action, inspired by the spirit of hatred and vengeance, and admits violence only as a hard necessity imposed on it by present conditions and limited by the same necessity.

RULES.

I. Those who take part in the Federation must accept its aims and engage themselves to co-ordinate their activity with that of their fellow members. Everyone is free to leave the Federation as soon as its conditions or new convictions call for it; but remain pledged, on his honor, to maintain silence about secrets he has become cognizant of as a member of the Federation.

II. The members engage themselves to work for the aims of the Federation, and to take active part, save in impossible circumstances, in the working-class movement, in strikes, and in all manifestations of popular life that answer to the aims of the Federation.

III. The Federation is composed of local groups, that unite in district and in national federation.

IV. The various Federations will nominate "correspondents" whose duty it will be to transmit, to all groups, the proposals and resolutions which will be communicated to them by each group.

V. The groups of the Federation will understand one another, and decide upon a common line of action, by means of correspondence, by congress or by special delegates. No resolution of the delegates will be valid without the approval of the members.

VI. To enter into the Federation it is necessary to be accepted by a group already formed. If there is no group in the locality comrades must be accepted by a neighbouring group and take the initiative of forming a new group.

VII. The Federation provides for all its expenses by means of contribution levied on members, to be fixed by the groups or by the congress.

VIII. The existence of the Federation and its program is public. Its acts, names of members, the localities in which there are groups in existence, etc., will be public or secret, according to the circumstances of persons, locality, and political conditions. When, and where the organization is secret, or is exposed to danger, the correspondents will hand over the work to people known only to themselves, in case they are unable to perform it. Thus for correspondence, addresses, etc., all necessary precautions will be taken.

PROVISIONAL RULE.

The originators of this Federation have constituted themselves into temporary correspondents, who will find the first adherents. As soon as the first groups are formed, the regular correspondents will be nominated.

DECLARATION.

The members of this Federation know well, that many Anarchists, or men calling themselves so, will fight their program and their organization. They do not complain. What they want is, to unite for a common purpose with those who agree with them, and will be content if their initiative will contribute to destroy prevailing equivocations and will show the difference between principles, tendencies, and aims, often essentially opposed to one another and that go by the general name of Anarchy.

They desire, in other respects, that all theories and methods should be subjected to discussion and experience, and they feel a strong sympathy for all those, who, by whatever means, are fighting sincerely for the good of mankind.

Liberty Pamphlets.

16 pp., 8vo., printed on toned paper, Price ONE PENNY.

Jones' Boy: Dialogues on Social Questions Between an 'Enfant Terrible' and his Father. By "Spokeshave."

An Anarchist on Anarchy. By ELISÉE RECLUS.

"It is a pity that such men as Elisee Reclus cannot be promptly shot."—*Providence Press*. This criticism is sufficient to show that the pamphlet is a strong indictment of the present litigious system of private property and government.

In Defence of Emma Goldman and the Right of Expropriation. By VOLTAIRINE DE CLEYRE.

The Why I Am: Why I Am a Socialist and an Atheist, by Conrad Naewiger; Why I Am a Social Democrat, by G. Bernard Shaw; Why I Am an Individualist Anarchist, by J. Armsden.

The Why I Am: Why I Am a Communist, by William Morris; Why I Am an Expropriationist, by L. S. BEVINGTON.

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A JOURNAL OF

ANARCHIST COMMUNISM

a May-day meeting in the Park—and preached the meaning of it. In '94 the S. F. didn't like to be left behind, because the people are taking to the idea of "no politics" too fast for them; so they turned out too. In '95, there's us, and S.D.F., and I.I.P., and Unions; that's "dwindling," ain't it? And what puts you out worst of all is the obstinate fact that the rain washed away all the parliamentary demonstrators, and left us and our attentive crowd with the field to ourselves! It takes something wetter than a May shower to "damp the zeal" for truth, daddy. And as the people walked away, they were heard saying "it was plainer every year which lot was in earnest and which was only playing at it." Earnest is just about the mark; it's the anti-politicians what don't get fewer. "Insignificant" fact, eh?—Yours, etc., Frank.

INTERNATIONAL NOTES.

The Anti-revolutionary bill has been rejected by the German Parliament and a blow aimed not only at Socialist and Anarchist propaganda but, in no less degree, at the propagation of the results of science and every modern progress, has been frustrated. When this defeat of the Government, over which the Social Democrats are triumphant, leaves us cool and pessimistic as before, it is because the events of last year have shown that this Government needs no extension of its powers to do what they like to suppress Anarchist propaganda.

Thus whilst only the editor signing a paper is legally responsible for its contents, the printers and manager of the *Socialist* of Berlin were arrested and sentenced as well, and when this blow was parried by entrusting all these functions to one comrade, not only was he arrested but all the books, lists of addresses and correspondence seized which, finally, forced the comrades to give up the publication of the paper.

From an article in the *Paris Temps Nouveaux* we see that the last 15 numbers of the *Socialist* cost no less than 80 months of prison, and still, after the arrest of the last editor, when on his road to prison a dozen comrades volunteered to take over his post.

Unfortunately in the months of repression following, the old, long exploded idea of co-operation crept up again among the Berlin comrades, and some have published quite a phantastical appeal in favour of creating an independent power outside the State by free co-operation—as if, quite apart from the economic impossibilities, the political persecution would ever let such enterprises take root.

Under these circumstances the announcement of a new paper and new pamphlets to be published abroad comes not a moment too soon to prevent, by the consequent exposition of our principles, this movement which is only a few years old, from being drawn away in fallacious side-tracks.

No such voices of momentous despair were heard in the French movement, which is started again, and three of the comrades who in this monstrous trial of the thirty last summer were represented by the accusation as a band of criminals and threatened with transportation for life, are now as vigorous as ever at their work again. *La Revolte* is succeeded by *Les Temps Nouveaux* (the third number of which begins a series of articles by Elisee Reclus, entitled "Anarchy"), and *Le Pere Peillard* by *La Sociale*, and besides Comrades Grave and Pouget, the editors of these papers, Sebastian Faure starts a series of lectures and debates which are attended by numerous audiences.

It is not to be forgotten how many of our comrades are suffering in the prisons of the Republic, on the sun-burnt and fever-breeding islands off Cayenne, and in New Caledonia.

F. Pouget in *La Sociale* publishes a series of articles in reference to those who were forgotten by the amnesty, in which, leaving for the moment aside those who were sentenced for really having done something against the present system, he tells the story of those who are sentenced to long terms of prison whilst they never did anything even in the eyes of ordinary law, but were sentenced simply because the lies and excitement to hatred of the public prosecutors had influenced the juries to find them guilty!

At a time when the Italian Comrades suffer in the prison of Porto Ercole (sent there, not for having done something, but simply because of their opinions—sent there by the administration, just as in Russia), when all these horrors are exposed in France, etc., do we not feel tenfold confidence in the truth of our opinions, which will triumph like every good cause has triumphed in the end?

"Let Liberty alone: fanatics fear her more than they fear persecution: in her own unsold strength she knows how to overcome her enemies."—ERNEST REKMAN.

"No one is bound to live as another pleases, but is the guardian of his own liberty."—SPINOZA.

"Liberty" Sustenance Fund.

LIBERTY has up to the present time been carried on with considerable difficulty and heavy personal sacrifices in time and money, which only those who have some idea what editing, printing, and publishing a paper mean, can realise. We have received some few contributions and have acknowledged them. We give below a list of other sums just to hand, and at the same time make a further appeal to all who can assist us in strengthening our propaganda, and in tiding over the present difficulties. All subscriptions to be sent to James Tochetti, Carinsgale House, 7 Beadon Road, Hammer-smith, London. H. C. D., £1; "X. B.", 2s. 6d.; N., 5s.

SHEPHERD ANARCHIST GROUP.—The winning numbers in the draw are as follows:—

107, 111, 115, 330, 354, 364, 379, 383, 411, 479, 482, 566, 744, 844, 842, 911, 973, 987, 1076.

THE WHEREABOUTS OF PROPERTY ETHICS.

By L. S. BEVINGTON.

In Mr. Seymour's useful rejoinder (see April No.) to my recent survey of his position, he charges me with "sophistry." Which may pass: readers will judge.

The present article concludes my share in this particular controversy, and before saying farewell to my courteous opponent, it may be well to draw our mutual readers' attention to the valuable verbal concessions we free communists have obtained from him. The preliminary questions have been answered precisely in the fashion which was to be foreseen. They were awkward questions. To ask Property what its identical use is, if not to force your own way with, is much like asking Government how it would get on if Property didn't hire its services. No answer is possible, in either case, which, when honestly analysed does not "give away" the property position, as inimical to the progress of men, and of Man.

The original questions put to Mr. Seymour as an Individualist were these: "What is an 'own' labor-product? What is 'appropriation'? What is a 'right'?" I prefaced the controversy by challenging Mr. Seymour to trot out a man who should have "conceived or carried out all by himself the production of a commodity;" and who, further, should be bound to that commodity, when produced, otherwise than by his "need or fitness to be its consumer or user."

And I challenged him to show that any extra bond (beyond this of need and fitness) between a man and a product, should be "other or more than a legal, conventional, and removable concession on part of other people."

In LIBERTY of Oct. '94, Mr. Seymour gives the desired reply as to the "individual producer." He admits that the term cannot be taken literally, since he means by it "each contributor" to the joint product of indefinitely many individuals, each of whom shall have paid his way as a worker; buying his tools, and, by expenditure of personal energy, acquiring—what? The natural fruits of such conduct?—increased aptness as worker and purchaser?—increased usefulness as producer and cooperator?—increased personal facility as economist of personal powers and resources? No; it is something perfectly irrelevant to his activity which Mr. Seymour conceives him to

have acquired; namely, a "right of appropriation"—of withholding, for individual purposes (which may or may not be anti-social purposes), that which society has enabled him to produce. In my view such a man appears simply as an active and efficient citizen whom it is to everyone's advantage to leave well-supplied and free. But he is not thus shown to be an independent producer, and there can be no object in insisting on calling him an individual producer, apart from the difficulty of finding a theoretical pretext for perpetuating the property craze. His activity suggests to the open mind no natural reason for regarding him as exclusive custodian of surplus opportunity (for means of domination) as lodged in the excess of his product over his individual power of consumption, and as based on a purely conventional system of trade-privilege.

Having thus helped to confirm our disbelief in the "individual producer," Mr. Seymour, at last (in April's LIBERTY), gives his answer as to the meaning of the other two terms, "ownership" and "right." My words in September were those: "Right to appropriate means law-protected ability to withhold at will, or it means nothing." I also said that the supposed right to exclusive custody (even of a labor product on which a man has worked) depends on a "legal, conventional, and removable concession on part of other people." Compare now Mr. Seymour's definition (in April). "What I mean by 'own,' is to 'appropriate,' to one's exclusive custody." You see what immeasurable leagues this carries us forward in our comprehension of these two mystic terms! We now know that to "own" is to "appropriate," and to "appropriate" is to "own." *Abra-cadabra, in short, is—Abra-cadabra!* But since we were in quest, not of a synonym, but of a meaning for either term, and a meaning moreover that should ethically light up exclusive custody, this reply might make us cry if it didn't make us laugh. And then, as to his elucidation of a "right," Mr. Seymour's brilliant and conclusive rejoinder is as follows: "A right in this economic connection is the individual limitation (in the reciprocal relation between all men) to such appropriation; such limitation being set by an equality of opportunity between all men." A right to appropriation then is a limitation to appropriation. Hm! We had hitherto imagined that, ethically speaking, limitation came in where "right" left off; and vice versa.

Passing this by, however, as perhaps a mere piece of careless diction, we may be glad at Mr. S's honest admission as to the purely conventional basis of property "rights." He thus throws up the sponge, admitting that "it is conventional," adding "but so is [Individualist] Anarchism" (in so far as the latter, to avoid egotism, must include contract).

Truly, to portion out *admittedly conventional rights* by a pre-established dogma as to equal opportunity is a task which may well be expected to tax the ingenuity of that "free Government" to which Mr. Seymour elsewhere pins his prospective faith and allegiance: "a government to be somehow 'supported entirely' by 'criminals,' and to favour the reign of the individual property producer. But we don't see where the Anarchism comes in in so fan-fal a scheme. We Communists may emphatically deny that Anarchism is conventional. Real Anarchism—that is, Natural Order freely establishing itself, and from moment to moment *freely re-adjusting itself* in social life—must, in our view, be as unconventional as the play of the vital forces in nature at large. And after all, Mr. Seymour's definitions bring us no whit nearer to the individual's right to limit (or be limited—which is it?) with regard to access to redundant human products. The limitation-right is to be "set" by an equality of opportunity between all men. Another myth. Opportunity has its subjective as well as its external conditions; and in the particular case of property-getting, it is ever the less social citizen, the man or woman most backward in the development of anti-bacterial conceptions, whose subjective checks are small, and whose opportunity is thus greater. No man can pre-judge another's opportunity as a competitive scramble. Nature knows nothing of equality. She works out all her problems and reaches all her best effects by rule of thumb. Every organism that prospers does so by means of the constant and free equilibration of such initial disparities as disturb its vital powers of resistance. Human society is, in a sense, subject to like conditions with organized life. Herbert Spencer calls life "a moving equilibrium." Sound economy and sound ethic consist, I think, at our present pass, in the making good of unequal social opportunities on the part of social units, all alike interested in the healthy coherence of the community on which they depend. In basing our social methods on the arbitrary and false assumptions (1) that equal opportunities can spontaneously exist in a ready-made social medium to which the degree of individual aptitude is never twice alike, (2) that all honest men have equal opportunity of keeping or utilizing for self even such chances as they are dealt with (and this in a society in which a "conventional" property system leaves initiative all along the line) we confuse the issue both economically and ethically; instead of jelling up opportunities in one direction while thinning them out in all other directions. Mr. S. waxes irritable over my "deplorable ignorance" of the [purely commercial] law of value, and my supposed "justification of a general scramble." (!) As to the general scramble, it is going on hideously enough at present, and there is not a civilized adult alive who is not in some way maimed or mangled by the exigencies of the scuffle. It will continue so, with ever less and less room for scruple, so long as competition for property remains the keynote of industry, and until free communism, by doing away with all pretext for scrambling, shall give men time to draw a full breath, come to their senses, and catch sight of one another's human

faces. And as to that "deplorable ignorance" concerning market-values. What if it be as deliberate as it is deplorable? implying a matured contempt for respectable current pretences by which the business theorist tries to sever the artificial exchange-value from real use-value, by imposing the dogma that value is somehow honest & separable from needs, which are as Mr. Seymour admits "as variable as they are indefinite."

There is no other real measure of value than need. Think right home to the core of the matter and you will have to discover that cost is only need differently written. Only that really costs me anything which I cannot produce, or part with, without deduction from my own personal resources or liberties, and which I therefore need either to keep intact or to replace as fast as I lose it, under pain of being to that extent disabled. I make myself needy, also why "pay" me for the benefit my work affords you? Why have the theory lurking in your mind that it is fair to pay me? And how should my work be of any value or benefit to you if you do not need it? Let us never forget that the property ideal distinctly discourages hearty co-operation on part of all who value freedom more than power, and renders unnaturally rare the direct voluntary application of aptitudes to their social ends. Note also that at our existing stage of material advance, individual innocuousness is a far sfer test of the "right" to live, than is individual productivity. The avaricious producer is a more noxious creature than the non-aggressive loafer, cripple, simpleton, or other social infernal.

Meanwhile, needs are, to use Mr. Seymour's own words, "as variable as they are indefinite." (LIBERTY, April.) And this statement brings us to the real crux of the question. What is the soundest scientific basis for the ethico-economic system of the future? "No ethico-economic system," says Mr. Seymour, could be founded on human needs, "because the needs are variable. Will some Individualist tell us in what ethic or economics consist? and why they exist in the absence of human need? What is economy *per se*, if not a method of fulfilling needs unwastefully? Apart from needs, why bother about supplies or distribution? What is ethic *per se*, if not a theory as to the due conduct-relations between the individual and his fellows as concerning the needs of each? Apart from their needs, why bother about men's relations as citizens? What are needs but incomplete life-and-liberty supplies? What is economy if not the best means of completing the supplies by means of human action? What is ethic if not the principle by which motive and character may most easily yield such action as shall keep un-supplied need of every kind at a minimum, without violence done to the life-chances of any? Divorce ethics and economics from human needs as capable of fulfilment by human action, and what basis, in the name of common-sense, will Mr. Seymour pretend to unearth for either? "O absurdity! it is there any length," etc., etc." (LIBERTY, April.)

I have headed this article as above, because the discussion seems to have changed its axis since it began, and to have become a question as to the relative fitness and survivability of two opposed human propensities or tendencies, one of the other of which has to be taken as the present touchstone of economic and ethical progress. Mr. Seymour, in common with Individualists at large (whether they style themselves Anarchists or not) believes that the ethic of the future, continuing to recognize the legitimacy of private property (of course with a labor title) will increasingly discontinue whatever impulses to communism now exists; and that general and particular welfare will be increasingly subserved by leaving men's chances of access to food and all else, more and more at the mercy of free competition among those able to compete, i.e., more and more at the disposal of those individuals whose aptitudes and tastes are of the commercial kind. My belief is that the withholding of finished products for purposes of individual trading, means roundabout and incomplete economy, as well as miserable morality. It cannot but tend to hitch and retard distribution, to aggravate the initial disadvantage of citizens whose small powers need special facilities to bring them up to efficiency, to starve out incipient new aptitudes of any kind that has not yet reached market value, and, by the perpetuation of the military involved in any system based on property, to perpetuate human suffering. And whatever perpetuates human suffering has the disastrous effect of making life painful for the sympathic, of making the comfort, of which all are in quest, depend in the foremost individuals on the eaning of the social sensibilities; and so, (as Herbert Spencer has repeatedly pointed out) is checked the free development of that altru-egoism in individuals, on whose maturity and free exercise the ultimate triumph of man over misery, and the ushering in of a thoroughly harmonious social state, will depend.

Property or exclusive custody of personal superfluity is monopoly so far as it goes, though in an incipient form. As an institution it must follow the general law of its own evolution, and there will emerge from it monopoly in the glaringly anti-social form which even Individualists deplore, as surely as a chick will result from a well incubated egg. Leave property, and it must maintain its conventional existence and claims by force, masked as law. Leave law, and in the interests of the law machine, property must be privileged. Leave privilege, and the path to monopoly of markets must in the natural course of competition be traversed. Altering the title to property will never—can never—alter the law of its evolution. This is truth. Is it also poetry? If so, let us willingly accept Mr. Seymour's impatient suggestion, and "stick to poetry," finding courage to leave market-values (as also the economics and ethics which shall have no foundation in human needs) "severely alone." Amen.

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ANARCHISM AND VIOLENCE.

By L. S. BEVINGTON.

What? bomb-throwing—killing—violence, useful? What sort of Anarchists are those who say that? Where is their Anarchism, their belief in freedom, and the right of every living man to his own life and liberty? Anarchism is not bomb throwing, violence, incendiarism, destruction. Odd that anything so self evident should need saying. Odder still that one set of Anarchists should be obliged to turn round in the thick of battle against the common foe to say it to another set. Real Anarchists too, not hybrids, with one eye on freedom and the other on property. Of course the capitalist press has naturally found it convenient to identify Anarchists with bombs, and equally of course, some of our "social" democratic friends have said within themselves, "There, there! so would we have it." All the same, Anarchism not only is not, but in the nature of the case cannot be, bomb throwing. An "ism" is an abiding body of principles and opinions—a belief with a theory behind it. The throwing of bombs is a mechanical act of warfare,—of rebellion, if you like;—an act likely to be resorted to by any and every sort of "believer", when the whole of his environment stands fore-armed against the practical application of his creed. The two cannot anyhow be identical; the question of the hour is—Is one of them ever a rational outcome of the other? Can anyone professing this particular "ism" resort to this kind of act without forfeiting his consistency? Can a real Anarchist—a man whose creed is Anarchism—be at the same time a person who deliberately injures, or tries to injure, persons or property. I, for one, have no hesitation in saying that, if destitute because of monopoly, he can.

I go even further. It seems to me that under certain conditions, (within and without the individual) it is part and parcel, not of his Anarchism but of his personal whole boardedness as an Anarchist, that he feels it impossible in his own case not to abandon the patiently educational for the actively militant attitude, and to hit out, as intelligently and intelligibly as he can, at that which powerfully flouts his creed and humanity's hope, making it (for all its truth, and for all his integrity) a dead letter within his own living, suffering, pitying, aspiring soul. I may be wrong, but it seems to me that there are now and again conditions under which inaction on the part of Anarchists amounts to virtual partisanship with the "reaction", and this, even though the only kind of effectual activity left open to them be of the directly militant kind.

The extraordinarily rapid spread of our Ideal during the past few years seems to me to have been indirectly, but clearly traceable to the quickening effect of the militant but generally intelligible acts of a few mad and individuals on the thousands of minds in all countries which were already unconsciously hungry for the Idea, and which found themselves thus compelled to closer reflection and aroused to definite self-recognition as Anarchists.

For what is Anarchism? Belief in Anarchy as the ultimate solution of all social and economic difficulties. A belief, that is, that Anarchy (or freedom from laws made and fixed by man for man,) is the ideal state in which alone complete harmony and a self adjusting equilibrium between our individual interests and our social instincts can be secured and maintained. A belief that nearly all human depravity on one hand, and nearly all human wretchedness on the other, have been brought about through men's bondage to the coercive regulations imposed by feeble, perblind humans on one another, in the interests, not of general progress and universal friendship, but of this or that imposing class. Anarchy, which claims the full release of the

majority from the dictation of the minority, and likewise the full release of the minority from the dictation of the majority means, further, the removal of all the enervating restrictions and excuses which have hitherto hindered the individual from developing his self-controlling tendencies in spontaneous obedience to the inevitably social and peaceful instincts of his own humanity, as a creature who from time immemorial has been necessarily dependent on his fellows for all the necessities and amenities of life. Anarchy means a life for man analogous, on a higher plane, to the life of bees, beavers, ants, and other gregarious creatures, who have not only all natural resources, but also one another's products freely and peacefully open to them, and who do but cooperate the more perfectly and happily in securing the common interests of all for the fact that they are free, as individuals to follow their inherent instincts and inclinations untrammelled by considerations so foreign to their well being as property laws within their own communities.

Despite its supreme advantages, our faculty of language has immensely complicated and confused our development as social beings, since it has decoyed us by means of dangerous and misleading abstractions from the surely and safely educational paths of actual experience, causing a long and painful digression from the natural high road of our progress as a species.

Language!—hence, on one hand, the abstractions, "property", money, credit, law, subjection, crime; and on the other, those sad resulting concretes,—poverty, parasitism, degeneration, despair, and the wholesale tormenting of man by man. Nature shows us that among wild creatures, destitute of true language, and so safe against abstractions and prejudices, it is precisely the most social which have become the most intelligent. We human beings cannot develop wholesome customs, at once tough and flexible,—self modifying and fitted to our individual comfort and our reciprocal protection by one another, so long as we are harassed by the crude provisions of artificially coercive law. And we are, one and all, the poorer for this.

For, surely, the world's wealth should be at least as freely accessible to every human creature as it is to every other creature. Surely the natural human being should be as free to use his whole set of faculties from the first, and so to be a joy to himself and a welcome "fellow" to his fellows, as is the more bee or beaver. It would be possible enough if once we could explode that property superstition which involves, and ever must involve government—or the coercive regulation of everybody's life and chances so as to suit those who can obtain prohibitive custody of the natural and produced capital of the race.

But now—what is there about Anarchism which should suggest, justify, or render intelligible the use of violence in any of those who profess it? Anarchy in itself bodes peace; with happy, amicable co-operation. Where Anarchy is already the rule with an intelligent species, deliberate violence, whether organised or not, can never be needed between the members of that species, but only in casual self-defence, or in the repelling of aggression from without. (Even under Anarchy, I fear we shall sometimes have to kill rattlesnakes, tigers, and noxious vermin!) Anarchy, however, means—No more dividing of a race against itself, through the contentions and antagonisms of nations and classes; no more dividing of the individual against himself, as a luckless creature who can only be his best, socially at his own risk and cost; or, egoistically, at social risk and cost.

Were the conditions in which we live our present lives a condition of freedom from all laws that fall short of, or are in conflict with the natural and salutary laws of life—then indeed would violence find no place in our conduct towards our fellow mortals.

But we live in a world where property-getting is made virtually compulsory, under penalty of one kind or another: and to us also, who abominate property-seeking and property wielding as the poisonous root of every misery and turpitude. We who are full of the spirit of what shall be, and who ceaselessly and hungrily press towards its realisation, cannot—dare not—be frankly and fully ourselves in our dealings with our fellows, because some of these fellows have decreed that neither industry nor good citizenship shall be the passport to food and freedom—solely and simply—money, or its phantom "credit". But, so long as Government exists, we cannot, even as an experiment, establish Anarchy; we cannot live our individual lives as Anarchists,—freely, uprightly, simply, generously, bravely—in the midst of a political society where it is virtually punishable with death or misery to turn one's back on legal considerations for the sake of moral considerations. We cannot live as we wish in an artificial society presided over by any unpunishable set of punishers—any Government. Government, whatever its form, is Property's body guard and hireling, and in the nature of the case cannot admit the independent freedom of any citizen whatever without self frustration. So long as artificial Law exists, every citizen falls perforce into one of two categories, he belongs virtually either to the property seeking, law abiding class, or to the law breaking, law ignoring, "criminal" class. The law may not legally be experimented upon or even improved upon by extra-legal methods; it will punish you if you ignore its provisions in any of your dealings on the plea of having discovered a shorter or better way to well-being. And another desperate feature of the Anarchist case lies in the fact that Government is a permanent necessity so long as property remains a recognised and tolerated institution. So long as this purely conventional bond between any man or men, and any thing or things, has to be recognised as a preliminary to every kind of action, and is made to usurp the place of, and to crowd out natural and simple purpose on every occasion, such recognition must be maintained under penalty—by force—against those who would go their way, however harmlessly regardless of its bars and boundaries.

Meanwhile, the Anarchist is not a mere claimant for intellectual liberty of thought and speech respecting these things. Even these lesser boons are not fully granted by those in power, for the idea of freedom is as attractive as it is sound; nature takes care to award a specially intense kind of happiness to the consciously attained correspondence of logical Idea with vital and ineradicable instinct; and Anarchism strikes home, and takes deep root in precisely most discriminating minds wherever it gets a chance of propagation. The State, like its sinister coadjutor, the Church, fears full daylight, and is perfectly consistent in discouraging plain-speaking—diplomatically.

But the Anarchist, as I said, claims more than the right to hold and expound his creed; he feels no rest, and he will give us no rest, until way be made for its natural expansion, and is practical realisation, as a principle of life. For he feels, sees, knows, and at no moment forgets all the evils caused by the laws of property, and by the Governments which in cold blood concoct, and cruelly enforce them. He is heartily tired of being made an unwilling party to that which he repudiates as monstrous.

So we see that the Anarchist is in a unique position. Of all would-be experimenters, benefactors, or deliverers, he alone is a person who by virtue of the principles he holds must be a revolutionist, and so must have, not one party, but all parties, not one sect, but all sects, not one nation, but all nations, as such, dead against him. For he would overthrow or break down every frontier, as well as every form of law-making and of prosecuting domination. The law, if you tease it enough, will

help you slowly to minimise every minor evil contained within its own provisions, but will never aid you one step towards its own eradication as the chief evil of all. It is as useless now as it was in the days of the revolutionary Galilean to look to Satan for the casting out of Satan. Nature is against that plan. No evolving thing stops in mid-career of development along its own lines, and puts an end to its own existence just because you tell it to. A cancer that has got a good hold of the living tissues which its foul life is torturing and disabling, will not dissipate itself merely because the physician and the patient join their hands in prayer to it to do so. The cancer is, so to speak, quite within its rights if it replies—"Why, I am quite as much part of the general order of things as you are. The law of evolution regulates my development just as truly as it does yours. I have got a hold on you because you are just what I require to feed on; and I shall not die of my own accord until I have eaten you up first." So then the surgeon is sent for, and the enemy is audaciously and summarily dealt with.

Similarly, you cannot blame Capitalism for developing after its kind. The Property-Tyrant may cease to call himself a ruler and law-maker. A sect of Mammonites, which would be a pestiferous sect if it could, is now in the world, declaiming against the government, not of man by man, but of the propertyist by the politician, and sometimes assuming the name of Anarchist—but demanding, under all disguises, Absolute rule by the Property-holder.

Another sect declaims futilely against private property while proposing the official direction of all property holding in the common interest. Those two things, Individualism here, Democratic Communism there, seem at a first glance opposed in principle. They are not. The evolution of the idea of domination has developed two branches from a parent stem; there are ideas nowadays of how the governing is to be done. One is plutocratic, and says—"Leave me my purse, and leave me free to do my will with you by its means." The other is democratic, and says—"Give me your purse, and leave me free to do my will with you by its means." But we will listen to no 'crat at all; the wage system is developing after its kind, so is the Government superstition. In their nature intimately dependent on one another, in destroying the root of one, we destroy both. Capitalism must evolve—but if we love its victims, and either through experience or sympathies participate in their sufferings, we shall see to it that the cursed thing be laid low in mid career.

The enemies of our cause are exceedingly anxious that no moral distinctions be drawn on this burning question of Anarchist violence.—The big, indiscriminating, morally inert public are encouraged in their prejudices by the capitalist press, which is at once their sycophant and their deceiver. For the blind and their leaders all violence is held to be vile, except legalised and privileged violence on an enormous scale. Cordite, manufactured wholesale by poor hired hands for the express purpose for "indiscriminate massacre of the innocent" in the noble cause of markets and of territory, is regarded with stupid equanimity by the very same public who are taught by their pastors and masters to cry "L. a. s. t. a. r. d. !," when a private individual, at his own risk, fights a cordite-manufacturing clique of privileged rogues with their own weapons.

Of course we know that among those who call themselves Anarchists there are a minority of unbalanced enthusiasts who look upon every illegal and sensational act of violence as a matter for hysterical jubilation. Very useful to the police and the press, unsteady in intellect and of weak moral principle, they have repeatedly shown themselves accessible to venal considerations. They, and their violence, and their profess

Anarchism are purchasable, and in the last resort they are welcome and efficient partisans of the bourgeoisie in its remorseless war against the deliverers of the people.

But let us stick to our text—"Bomb-throwing is not Anarchism"; and whenever violent action is unintelligent and more-overly rancorous, it is as foolish and inexpedient as it is base.

Killing and injuring are intrinsically hideous between man and man. No sophistry can make "poison" a synonym of "food", nor make "war" spell "peace". But there are cases where poison becomes medicinal, and there is such a thing as warring against the causes of war. No Anarchist incites another to violence, but many an Anarchist repudiates, as I do, the hypocritical outcry against Anarchist militancy raised by those who pass their lives in active or passive support of the infamous institutions which perpetuate human antagonisms and effectually hinder the arrival of that peace and prosperity for which the world is waiting.

Meanwhile let us leave indiscriminate killing and injuring to the Government—to its Statesmen, its Stockbrokers, its Officers, and its Law.

REPORTS.

A Public Meeting of the London Anarchist Communists was held at the Institute Union Hall, Holborn, on the 14th ult., to bid far-well to Louise Michel and Pietro Gori or their departure to America on a lecturing tour. Among the speakers were Sebastian Faure, Louise Michel, Pietro Gori, James Tochatti, J. Caplan, and others. They were announced by James Tochatti, who acted as Secretary. Sebastian Faure made a long and eloquent speech which we have no space to reproduce here.

It Caplan said that the departure of our comrades to America was a clear proof of international solidarity independent of any desire for pecuniary gain. He was pleased that women were getting more and more interested in the cause of humanity. Anarchy was a doctrine that would emancipate women as well as men. Louise Michel had done a great work for Anarchy and for humanity, and he hoped that she would be enabled to continue that work in America, and to show the American workmen that their emancipation from the slavish conditions under which they existed lay in the realization of Anarchy.

Will Hanham said that to him this far-well meeting, though small, was of great importance to all interested in the propaganda of Anarchism, since our comrades were going to spread their ideas in a land where the economic development is fast compelling the alk producers to seek out the causes of their present situation, and to fight, if needs be, for the realization of those principles which, they think, will bring them prosperity and a free life.

To-day, the conditions of the American workers, the bitter feeling against trusts, syndicates, and the "robbers", together with the enormous increase of wages-paying machines, and the consequent increase in the vast army of starving proletarians, all showed that the comrades would be able to do far more really good work in America than they could do at present in England. So a strong movement had sprung up in all the most important parts of America during the last few years, and to-day the demand for Anarchist speakers was so great that it could not be supplied.

Mr. Perry said that he had been said that they, as Anarchists, appreciated personalities, they did, but considered that the persons without the idea ceased to be important, that the idea descended to form the personality, and in return, great personalities were attracted to a movement outwardly expressing their belief, that it was in regarding this view, that they bade far-well to their comrades, Louise Michel, and Pietro Gori.

Louise Michel, after thanking the audience for their good wishes for a prosperous journey, said that she and her comrades would work the better and with the more courage because of them. She alluded to the general prevalence of misery, and the recent barbarities of the French in Madagascar, but then she very speculatively of such misery showed that it would not will a much longer. They were living in the heroic epoch of a social transformation, and the voice of liberty resounded through the world. The next morning, the

cause were republics like those of France. Those who had heroic hearts should join the true friends of liberty, ashamed to speak uselessly without doing anything. They believed that it would be more useful to go yonder to America to speak of the union of earth's disinherited ones than to hold conferences in France. She would not say how much she hoped from the voyage, but early in January, would render an account of it in that same hall, and should be glad to be once more among them.

A humorous and telling speech by E. Leggat brought the meeting to a close. Bad weather and short notice, owing to limited time, prevented it from being as well attended as it would doubtless otherwise have been.

COMMONPLACE ACCEPTANCES.

We do not as a rule fully appreciate the value of a commonplace acceptance.

It is a key to the collective character of a people. It is an effect which, following natural law, becomes an ever increasingly prolific cause. To ensure its existence, or to effect its annihilation includes the whole of progress.

What, for instance, is the predominating modern commonplace acceptance? It is surely the ideal of individual pseudo-prosperity accompanied by an entire disregard of collective well-being. "To get on" is the supreme goal set before a child and impressed on his character: this impression is fostered at school, and contact with the world ratifies and clinches the falsity almost irrevocably.

To-day this ideal is omnipotent. It is stronger than the love of God or the fear of hell wherever it is opposed by them, and it generally moulds both into the shape most advantageous to itself. Its poisonous grasp is upon science, upon the arts, commerce, thought, liberty, truth; it translates knavery into commendable astuteness, lying into discretion, and murder into valour; it has monopolised life and only stops short at death; it is the root from which springs an incalculably vast growth of evil.

The commonplace acceptance that should include the ideals of every school of revolutionary thought is—true communal prosperity necessarily co-existent with true individual well-being. A community of individuals whose actions are regulated and governed by this axiom to the extent that modern so-called society is influenced by the former commonplace acceptance, is utopian to the Utopists; almost beyond the dreaming of dreams.

This ideal is all sorts of Revolution reduced to their common denominator. It is on this single broad platform that we are able to call "comrades" many whose more superficial ideas are as wide asunder as the poles from our own.

If, as its apologists assert, the idea inculcated in the modern axiom is an eternal and immutable natural truth, we are fore-doomed to failure; but against the real pessimism which declares this, we oppose the optimism of revolution. As regards methods, that is another matter; let us not forget however, that our cause and our aim is but the substitution of our commonplace acceptance for another.

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our readers, some of them for the spirit and vigour with which they are written, and others, again, for the grace and beauty with which they convey lessons, not less effective in moulding our lives than many a wire-drawn homily in prose.

We venture to add, as a fitting termination to this summary of his works, the aspiration with which Whittier concludes his notice of "The Quaker of the olden time":—

"Oh! Spirit of that early day,
So pure and strong and true,
Be with us in the narrow way
Our faithful fathers knew,
Give strength the evil to forsake,
The cross of Truth to bear,
And love and reverent fear, to make
Our daily lives a prayer."

C. R. BAKER.

SONNET.

I used to wonder when I was a child,
And saw a tempest mounting in the sky
Black-robed, and solemn-voiced, whether, if I
Could peep behind the clouds so grimly piled,
I should behold the Power that made them wild,
And if the brow of Christ look'd gentle *then*,
When He sent storms that quail the hearts of men!
Since then at mine own infant thought I've smiled:
Yet may that thought a parable reveal,
Lest 'neath a too fair sky man should forget,
God sometimes in his life dark clouds doth set
That he the want of Heaven's light may feel;—
Then climb the cloud that doth thy Christ conceal
And look beyond, to where He lives and loves thee yet.

L. S. B.

and which is darkened by the present mistranslation—the truth that the Lord is *the living God*. We are not the residuary legatees of a dead Testator; we bear a covenant-name, we may claim covenant-rights, we are bound by covenant-duties, being by adoption and grace the children of a living and loving Father.

A DOUBLE SONNET.

I.

PATIENCE! wild wayward heart! Be still, be still;
 Clasp not against the fetters of thy fate;
 Learn thou the harder task of those who wait
 Content to *be*, and nothing *do*, until
 God hath made clear the part they must fulfil.
 Call not the time spent waiting, all a waste;
 He wills it so, Who never doth make haste;
 Perchance 'tis thus He educates thy will.
 Thou wouldest fain help forward what should be,
 But art withheld by chains of destiny!
 Just so! O little feeble human heart,
 Art thou so sure thou *canst* fulfil thy part?
 Perhaps God bids thee now rest patiently—
 That thou may'st work for Him the better by and by.

II.

Should the still soul that waits God's holy will
 Abide in idleness? Oh! never so!
 Doth the unblossomed blade forget to grow
 For thinking of the treasure that shall fill
 Its future ear? Or doth the dancing rill
 For dreaming of the ocean, cease to flow
 Towards that ocean? As the moments go,
 Need for each moment's action riseth still;
 'Tis possible to wait, the while we *work*;—
 Hast thou a thought, inclined all deeds to shirk?
 'Tis Sloth, not Patience! Though thou let alone
 All selfish means to ends which are thine own,
 Thou shalt yet do the duty of the hour
 Leaving results to time, and God's unfettered power.

L. S. B.

ties have been smoothed away by the same agency which has planed the rocks everywhere. Only the *roches moutonnées* have been left furrowed and scratched upon one side, whence the abrading and engraving tool advanced, but upon the other unscored, and hidden beneath a tail of fragments ground from their opposite slopes. The significance of this we shall see later.

Thus, imperfectly described, we have reviewed the most prominent features of a comparatively modern period, viz., the widely-grooved and polished condition of northern rocks, especially hard-grained rocks, which retain these impressions; the occurrence of wandering boulders, transported longer or shorter distances from their primitive sites, and the detrital matter from continental abrasion deeply burying the rocky face of the country, and in ridges, mounds, and sheets, extending east and west, and along the greater water-courses, stretching itself down into the Southern States in irregular tails and projections. We will now venture to examine the theories advanced to explain these singular phenomena, and describe that one which best accounts for these facts, with many correlated ones, offering an hypothesis which rationally secures their complete and harmonious agreement.

TEACHINGS OF A DAY.

BY LOUISA S. BEVINGTON.

MORNING.

WHAT'S the text to-day for reading
 Nature and its being by?
 There is effort all the morning
 Through the windy sea and sky.

All, intent in earnest grapple,
 That the All may let it be:
 Force, in unity, at variance
 With its own diversity.

Force, prevailing unto action:
 Force, persistent to restrain:
 In a twofold, one-souled wrestle,
 Forging Being's freedom-chain.

Frolic! say you—when the billow
 Tosses back a mane of spray?
 No; but haste of earnest effort;
 Nature works in guise of play.

Till the balance shall be even
 Swings the to and fro of strife ;
 Till an awful equilibrium
 Stills it, beats the Heart of Life.

What's the text to-day for reading
 Nature and its being by ?
 Effort, effort all the morning,
 Through the sea and windy sky.

AFTERNOON.

PURPLE headland over yonder,
 Fleecy, sun-extinguished moon,
 I am here alone, and ponder
 On the theme of Afternoon.

Past has made a groove for Present,
 And what fits it *is*: no more.
 Waves before the wind are weighty ;
 Strongest sea-beats shape the shore.

Just what is is just what can be,
 And the Possible is free ;
 'Tis by being, not by effort,
 That the firm cliff juts to sea.

With an uncontentious calmness
 Drifts the Fact before the "Law ;"
 So we name the ordered sequence
 We, remembering, foresaw.

And a law is mere procession
 Of the forcible and fit ;
 Calm of uncontested Being,
 And our thought that comes of it.

In the mellow shining daylight
 Lies the Afternoon at ease,
 Little willing ripples answer
 To a drift of casual breeze.

Purple headland to the westward !
 Ebbing tide and fleecy moon !
 In the "line of least resistance"
 Flows the life of Afternoon.

TWILIGHT.

GRAY the sky, and growing dimmer,
 And the twilight lulls the sea;
 Half in vagueness, half in glimmer,
 Nature shrouds her mystery.

What have all the hours been spent for?
 Why the on and on of things?
 Why eternity's procession
 Of the days and evenings?

Hours of sunshine, hours of gloaming,
 Wing their unexplaining flight,
 With a measured punctuation
 Of unconsciousness, at night.

Just at sunset was translucence,
 When the west was all aflame;
 So I asked the sea a question,
 And an answer nearly came.

Is there nothing but Occurrence?
 Though each detail seem an Act,
 Is that whole we deem so pregnant,
 But unemphasized Fact?

Or, when dusk is in the hollows
 Of the hill-side and the wave,
 Are things just so much in earnest
 That they cannot but be grave?

Nay, the lesson of the Twilight
 Is as simple as 'tis deep;
 Acquiescence, acquiescence,
 And the coming on of sleep.

MIDNIGHT.

THERE are sea and sky about me,
 And yet nothing sense can mark;
 For a mist fills all the midnight,
 Adding blindness to its dark.

There is not the faintest echo
 From the life of yesterday:
 Not the vaguest stir foretelling
 Of a morrow on the way.

'Tis negation's hour of triumph,
 In the absence of the sun ;
 'Tis the hour of endings, finished,
 Of beginnings unbegun.

Yet the voice of awful silence
 Bids my waiting spirit hark ;
 There is action in the stillness,
 There is progress in the dark.

In the drift of things and forces,
 Comes the better from the worse,
 Swings the whole of Nature upward,
 Wakes, and thinks—a universe.

There will be *more* life to-morrow,
 And of life, more life that *knows* ;
 Though the sum of Force be constant,
 Yet the Living ever grows.

So we sing of Evolution,
 And step strongly on our ways,
 And we live through nights in patience,
 And we learn the worth of days.

In the silence of murk midnight
 Is revealed to me this thing :
 Nothing hinders, all enables
 Nature's vast awakening.



HISTORY OF THE DYNAMICAL THEORY OF HEAT.¹

By PORTER POINIER.

II.

ABOUT one year after the reading of the famous paper of Rumford, in the early part of 1799, Sir Humphry Davy, then but twenty years of age, published his first scientific memoir, entitled "An Essay on Heat, Light, and the Combinations of Light." Clearly enunciating the two systems of hypothesis previously held, he chose to follow Newton in rejecting the materiality of heat, while still clinging to the corpuscular or emission theory of light.

His position with respect to the existence of caloric he asserted in this thesis :

"THE PHENOMENA OF REPULSION ARE NOT DEPENDENT ON A PECULIAR ELASTIC FLUID FOR THEIR EXISTENCE, OR CALORIC DOES NOT EXIST ;"

¹ Introduction to an unpublished work on Thermo-Dynamics.

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NOTES.

The "peace" of nations hangs on truly slender threads, which may be severed at any moment, by those ambitious individuals who take upon themselves to govern peoples.

A vessel of unknown nationality recently came down the Hudson River carrying a flag (mainly green). It was saluted, and a suggestion was made that this was done as an insult to Great Britain; green being the colour of Ireland, and the saluting being a mockery. Now, if the politicians of Great Britain found it to their interests to look upon this incident as an "insult," they would have ready to their hand a good pretext for war, a splendid *casus belli*: "how could they permit the national flag" to be insulted by "contemptible foreigners?" For many years the politicians of Great Britain waged a bloody conflict with France and other powers of Europe for the supremacy of the "Union Jack;" to have the grand (!) title that England was the mistress of the sea. Millions of money were wasted, blood flowed like water in order that some rags should be lowered when other rags hoisted in sight. And at the present day this fatuous idea leads them to wring untold wealth out of the workers of Great Britain to keep the Navy the largest and most imposing in the world, yet the fluttering of a piece of dirty linen could throw the world into the throes of a terrific struggle, reddens the oceans with human blood, and strew continents with carnage. Such is one of the anomalies of international law.

And the following is a sample of national law. This is a copy of a leaderette in the *Star* on Saturday, the 27th ult. — "Sir Peter Edlin has over and over again sent a man to prison for years for stealing goods not worth a shilling. He apparently used to go on the principle that the more petty the larceny the heavier should be the punishment. He has another principle which he put in force yesterday, namely, that of all thieves the police thief who may have supplied Sir Peter with victims should get off the lightest. He had before him yesterday Alfred Scroves, ex-policeman, for stealing a pocket-case with cheques value £47 from a woman, and sentenced him—no, not sentenced him—only bound him over to come up for judgment when called upon. This is not making the punishment fit the crime. Had Scroves been a coster-woman he would have got ten years certain." No comment is needed, except to say that Anarchy is amply justified by such freaks of government.

And yet another freak. Really the ways of law are past finding out. Mr. Denham sentenced Dan O'Connell, a ticket-of-leave man, to three months' hard labor for the heinous crime of not reporting himself, having been detained in a lunatic asylum by that same kind and considerate law. After his release (doubtless not until he well deserved it) he went to America and starvation, came back to London and persecution, because Law had branded him a gaol-bird. At last he attempted suicide to escape the diabolical torments created by the workings of a mild and gentle system. He did not succeed, and to teach him that he must not try and get rid of his misery that way, Denham has given him some more. This is Law and Order, and what a job lot they are.

T. Q.

The most important thing just now is certainly the forthcoming marriage of Prince George and Princess May. What do you say? Not the most important! Goodness gracious! man alive, there's nothing else doing, positively nothing. Do you know that trade in the West End is at a standstill, all because people don't know what to buy. What sort of new-fashioned gown or bustle or bonnet will Princess May wear? And what color and material will Prince George wear to go away in? Why, these are questions of national importance. Shall there be a national holiday declared on Thursday, July 5th? Why, certainly! hip, hip, hurrah; long live the whole blooming lot, say I. Will I go out and show my loyalty, my patriotism, my love for the young pair? What do you think!

Robert G. Ingersoll, the Secularist orator of the United States, who cannot "understand" Anarchist Communism, denounces war as being inhuman and unnecessary. Yet he is one of the heaviest stockholders in the Gatling Gun Company. This seems to us as not squaring

principles with practice, but he perhaps is of the opinion that ample war equipments are the best means of preserving peace.

And will not those who hate royal paupers and other parasites and blood-suckers go out too, and show their love and loyalty, &c.? If not, why not! If all those workers who are made to lose a day's wages through the fulsome "patriotism" of their masters, who will close their works, &c., on that day, would only use their enforced idleness in showing their contempt and hate of all these exhibitions, all these wirepullers and marionettes, they would help considerably in the work of showing our exploiters how truly loyal and contented are the workers even of the West End.

H. S.

Nothing like blowing your own trumpet! Here is Passmore Edwards, the proprietor of the *Echo*, a few days after giving a blast of scorn at us for not saving his poor rates by subscribing to support the starving workers whom he and his fellow thieves do not see their way to exploit, giving a list of his benevolent gifts to various towns in the neighbourhood of his country seat, and telling the readers of the *Echo* what a good man he is for so doing. Just like these hypocritical scoundrels always to reverse the fact that if they had not first made the people poor, they would not be rich, and there would be no need of their "benevolence."

T. C.

THE STRANGER IN LONDON.

London is a strange place, and is apparently inhabited by strange people. To one like myself, accustomed to the homogeneity of the rural district, the heterogeneity of the Londoner is inexplicable.

Last week I attended a meeting at a street corner in the neighbourhood of Drury Lane, and with earnest men gave heed to the imprecations of an impeccable little man, who called down the wrath of God upon some people who did not deal with him, and continued to thank the invisible giver (who gives in such a mysterious way that you don't know even when you do get it) for the many blessings and comforts which he enjoyed in life.

I wandered towards the Marble Arch, and there I met another strange sight, and heard still more strange things. Here a gaunt and animated speaker roundly denounced both God and the State for robbing him of all comfort and happiness [hitherto enjoyed by him through life.

Over Hyde Park towards the "Reformer's Tree" a concourse of people had assembled. I mingled with the crowd, and soon found myself listening to a local leader of the Federated Building Trades, imparting to the audience a conglomeration of facts about something—it was really hard for me to say what. I questioned one of the audience who wore a badge. He knew nothing beyond the fact that "this was a demonstration, and he had turned out with his union." What do they intend doing after this demonstration? Don't know, 'speaks they'll go hoam! What is the demonstration intended for? Don't know, maybe to show our masters how strong we are! Have they done anything since you arrived in the park? Why of course we hev, we've passed nine resolutions!

A little to the left of this meeting a young Anarchist speaker dealt with the trade-union question from his own standpoint, but the total depravity of the Londoner was once more made manifest, for the trade-unionists battling against tyranny as they say they are, assumed the role of the petty tyrant, and began a despicable series of interruptions in order to prevent the speaker from laying his ideas before the public.

In London it is pretty hard for a workingman or woman to get a helping hand from anyone when moving into a new room, or house; but when it comes to leaving through non-payment of rent, volunteers to help you with your furniture crop up on every hand. The other evening a poor widow woman was evicted in Virginia Row, and two stalwart policemen stood by and nodded approvingly while two besotted brutes hired by the landlord tossed the poor woman's furniture into the street. The imbecility and cowardice of the London corner sympathizers was made manifest on this occasion, they stood by pitying the poor woman. Down my way we would have helped her, and treated the landlord and his employees to a shower of bricks.

O.W.R.





Articles and letters dealing with any phase of the social problem are invited and will meet with serious consideration. They must be written on one side of the paper only, and accompanied by the name and address of the writer, not necessarily for publication. No money will be returned if a stamped directed envelope accompanies them.

We will be glad to receive from correspondents and sympathizers newspaper cuttings, extracts from books, magazines, and journals, facts and quotations bearing on the Revolutionary movement in any part of the world and on the struggle between Capital and Labor generally.

The Journal will exchange with all Anarchist or Socialist papers sending their address.

All literary and business communications to be addressed to H. S. WATSON, care of T. G. Wentworth, 1414 Massachusetts Ave., Gray's Inn Road, W.C.

SINCERITY.

If sincerity ever shows itself under any form, even among individuals pursuing so-called liberal careers—such as impressionist artists, realist authors, critical thinkers (who have not sold themselves), progressive artisans, and so on,—at once it is strangled, villified, ostracized, killed. And the means employed are always the same.

The individual whose natural bent is toward emancipation is at once checked by (1) routine, and (2) narrow speculation; and he inevitably succumbs, defamed by the first, starved by the latter.

For instance, do you suppose that a man in the position of professor would have the courage to tell his pupils that he could not teach them anything final in the domain of science or art; and that the educational field is as wide as the entire universe! Do you believe that an art teacher would dare to say to his pupils that he is of no use to them; and that nature is the only master and the only guide that they really need; that what in his eyes might seem a defect, might in other eyes appear as originality, eccentricity and a charm! If he tries to check a tendency to exaggeration, he kills in you for ever the chief sense by which any particular art appeals to you and edifies you. All this is the result of insincerity. If every one were to take care of his own education we should arrive, not at natural categories, but different individual kinds and styles of art. According to the different aptitudes and affinities we should have, here a simplicity which is charming, there an impressionist who is true; further a caricaturist who is droll; we should have narrators, satirists, laughers, weepers, musicians, singers; gentle artists, timid ones, violent ones; in short, all kinds—which mere routine has never allowed to live.

Few indeed are the young who, after making useless efforts and miserable struggles, do not for ever renounce their own individuality in order to fall in with the intractable taste of the day, or the still more exasperating pocket of the editor. A youth prostitutes brain and heart, gets disgusted, and finding nothing to satisfy his aspirations (which would have been such a stimulus,) he applies himself to working anyhow, just to live; he works without a will, thinking only of his pocket.

In other cases he panders to license so as to get occupation and remuneration. He accepts, cherishes, and enjoys the impure excesses of modern society. And what can be expected of him remaining in the atmosphere of imposture, and habituated to be constantly untrue to himself. His smile is an irony, a lie; his tears a comedy. His anger, which might have been beautiful, dies in his breast, choked in accumulations of bile.

Watch such a man wander further and further astray, always afraid of offending the incoherent and stupid prejudices of others. A dissiminator in every sense, he loses himself; satisfied with scanty enjoyments gathered from paltry sources, he renounces both his spirit and his happiness, only to satisfy his stomach.

Revolt, then! What are you waiting for! Death, slow and sure; after all your self-abnegation. Oh, rouse yourself! react! Say—"I am! I have the right to live, to think, to love. I will be a man; and no longer a poor, timid, lying thing, which you bourgeois exploiters and thieves can crush at your leisure. My life shall at any rate be useful and yield results for the future." Yet, alone, what can I do! If only I had one friend,—some one to encourage and help and understand me,—I would indeed repay him abundantly!"

Come, then! Come! The Anarchists reject no one. All men are our brothers who come to us renouncing cowardly egotism and filled with the love of freedom.

A number of ambitious and intemperate self-seekers under the borrowed name of "Socialists" aspire to powers which intoxicate them with vanity, the valets want to become the masters; and to reach their end they make use of lying, fraud, awe and slander that coward's weapons! They have not shrunk from the dirty trick of calumniating our companions, who have incited the murmuring and famished people to frank and open revolt, and to claim their right to live. They have applied the remedy of parasitism; that plague-spot which eats into the life

of the proletariat under pretence of guiding it. They have not hesitated to accuse comrades of being police agents when they tried to expose the hypocritical ways of the labor leaders. These men have accused us—those men who have always temporized with the aristocrats and the middle-class.

Ah, you pretend to doubt our sincerity; you impostors, who seek by infamous intrigues to substitute yourselves for the present monarchs. Where are the proofs of your disinterestedness! You, who aspire on deputations, and seek sham honors, in order to satisfy the appetite of your vices! Do you tell us that you will be better tyrants! Traitors, you will indeed be terrible masters. I fear your narrowness, your ignorance, and your coarseness, even more than the arrogance and the idleness of the present rulers.

In this instance you have acted as we expected. You have helped the oppressors to muzzle the people. Judas! You have divided the cake, waiting a favorable moment to swallow the whole. And as ever, it is the worker who is gulled by the fraud; it is to cure his poverty and still his hunger that more words have been foisted on him, and a mere semblance of independence. He has gulped it all down with revolting good-nature.

To the fine saviours of the people, to the great leaders, to ambitious persons of every type who accuse us of bad faith, we have this to reply, which witnesses to our disinterestedness. Do we court honors! No; for we deny human superiority. What do we gain by being Anarchists! (apart from the joy of satisfied honesty.) Prison; the hatred of the exploiting classes; the animosity of the working classes, who do not understand persecution, exile, and death. That is it! Enquirer,—seeker,—thinker,—proletarian—read our journals and pamphlets. Instruct yourself in our ideas. Be a man. If you are not convinced, come and tell us your objections. Do not condemn us without a hearing; that would be mere levity and cowardice. They paint us black, in order to frighten you and make you avoid us; but have no fear, we are not politicians; we will take nothing from you. We are humanitarians.

GUILAUME MOI.

POPE AND KAISER.

[BERLIN: May 30th] With reference to the different accounts published on the subject of the conversation that passed between the Pope and the Emperor William at the Vatican, another version is published in a Catholic organ here to-day, the writer of which states that two points were touched upon in the interview in question, namely (1) the import and bearing of the social question as affecting the labour and peasant classes, and (2) the question of a general disarmament as a preliminary to a settlement of the social question. This latter point—continues the writer—notably formed the subject of the conversation, lasting nearly two hours, that took place on the following day between the Pope and Baron von Marschall, the German Foreign Secretary, etc., etc.—Daily Chronicle.

Two things are here noteworthy. Either this Catholic paper lies about the subject of that interview; or else it tells truth. If it lies, proof is afforded that Catholic policy wants people to think that the Pope and the Kaiser care about the social question, and so to look steadfastly to them as the "benefactors" to whose wise ordaining disarmament (should it come about,) is to be ascribed. The mere invention of such a conversation would show that wits are being stretched in the hopeless effort to "be even with" the awaking proletariat. Meanwhile, if any such conversation really did take place between the Imperial and Imperious Prig from Berlin, and the Chief Priest of the Powers of Darkness at Rome, why it does but confirm our argument—that Force and the fear of Force was, is, and shall continue to be the nature-appointed means by which alone concessions are extorted from the biggest tyrants.—In either case, it concerns us not to know what these folk discuss in private interviews or public assemblies. That which they have not ordained is at hand, in spite of them. Deliverance is at the door. The People will free themselves; and War, Mammon, and Priestcraft shall be no longer. With cheerful hearts we may hymn the episode:—

Army Bill went to the Pope of Rome,
And what did he do when he got there?
"Father, Father, I've come to confess!
I've got things at home in a terrible mess,
I'm making it rather hot there."

Scratched his top crown did the Pope of Rome;
("Dear! dear!—And those bombs alarm me!")
Swore by his Pence and St Peter's dome
That Billy had better go quietly home
And sit down and daband his army.

"It's 'the People' here, and 'the People' there;
We never again can please 'em:—
To keep your Thrones and to keep my Chair
We must slyly put on a Socialist air,
For it's getting unsafe to tease 'em."

L.S.B.

ON THE WAR PATH.

In all movements, whether Social, Economic, Political, or Religious, it is the lot of the more enthusiastic minority, which is generally actuated by the highest and truest ideals, to lead the van, often in the face of strong and not too scrupulous opposition from their faint hearted contemporaries.—Anarchists supply no exception to the rule, indeed in our case it is more remarkable. Radicals, Republicans, Social-Democrats, in fact all who worship authority, affecting to regard us as Irre-

agreed that work should be resumed at once, and on the old terms. And so the strike came to an end. Braithwaite soon after got a berth in London, but Todd remains there to this day.

H. B. SAMUELS.

The moral of this tale is clear: if the factory had been rased to the ground, the plot would have collapsed and Leninism been ruined as it deserved. The men's club money would have been saved and they could at once have been sent by other manufacturers in the town or elsewhere, and all concerned would have taken the lesson to heart for future guidance.

H. S.

SOCIAL CONTRASTS.

Last week the Duchess of Sutherland was released from Holloway Prison. Immediately after her release she was presented with a framed address and a purse containing £250, from the ladies of Teakridge Wells. Numerous saris and equipages of her noble friends awaited her exit from the jail, by whom "Her Grace" was accorded a hearty welcome.

James Bennett, a poor ex-convict, was arrested last week for failing to report himself while a "ticket-of-leave" man. In the Central Criminal Court the prisoner recited a painful and pathetic tale of misery and police supervision. To quote the words of the prisoner, "Upon my liberation I was shadowed to the railway station, while in the train I was continually kept under the surveillance of lynx-eyed detectives. My meeting with wife and children took place under the eye of the law. I was shadowed home, and for weeks was accompanied in my search for employment by the merciless watcher. The shadowing continued until I fled from home, seeking safety and comfort elsewhere until the same watcher has brought me to the prisoner's dock again."

In connection with the approaching Royal wedding, the Lord Mayor of London has opened a subscription list for the purpose of raising enough money to make a suitable wedding present to Prince George and Princess May. An earnest appeal has been made to the citizens of the metropolis to subscribe as freely as their means will allow them.

A newly married couple, named Watson, were found wandering about in a starving condition last week in the East End. Immediately after marriage the bridegroom was thrown out of work at Northampton where he had resided for more than 12 years. He sought for fields and pastures new and with his bride of a week found his way to London, when, after a fruitless search for employment and much privation and suffering, they found themselves homeless and penniless in the heart of the greatest commercial centre of the world. They were sent to the workhouse.

The Chancellor gave a full dress dinner on June 23rd in honor of Her Majesty's birthday. About 500 guests were in attendance, and the official residence at Downing Street was elaborately decorated, floral decorations were profuse, and the bill of fare was of a princely style consisting of 18 courses.

In the Central Criminal Court James Thorne was brought forward charged with stealing 10s. from a little boy. The prisoner produced witnesses who proved that he was in a starving condition and that he had purchased food for his wife and children with the proceeds of his theft. He was sentenced to three months imprisonment with hard labor.

CORRESPONDENCE.

IS AGITATION AMONG TOWN-WORKERS A MISTAKE?

DEAR COMRADES
Now that so many men of good standing in the revolutionary movement have ceased to look upon Trade-Unionism with satisfaction, it will no longer be unreasonable to ask "is proletarian agitation a mistake?" especially when we reflect upon the fact that the proletarian, with all his gigantic strikes and lock-outs, has undoubtedly failed to raise his wages to the level of that of the agricultural laborer, who seldom or never revolts except if he individually. If we are to persist in a voice and paper propaganda, is it not time that we considered whether it is best to leave the proletarian to the "hard-headed leaders" and devote ourselves to the hitherto neglected farm-worker?

From a revolutionary point of view, the value of the economic position of the miner, who goes on strike 90,000 at a time for three months and then submits to a reduction in wages, is nothing in comparison with the economic position of the farm-worker. Whilst the miner and other town-workers (since their stomachs cannot digest shoddy or coal) starve in the midst of the wealth they have produced, the agrarian worker can live, and live comfortably, on the produce of his toil, and herein lies his strength. Whilst the town-worker is forced to exchange his produce in order to obtain food, the farm-worker has his food at hand, and by refusing to leave the land he strikes a blow at once to every hostile force.

His strike a death-blow at landlordism by rendering the farmer unable to pay rent, and by keeping back the food supply of the great towns does more to open the eyes of the proletarian to the necessity of a revolution than could be done by almost any length of argument.

Yours faithfully
A. H. HOLT.

**TRADE-UNIONISM FROM AN ANARCHIST STANDPOINT.
ANOTHER VIEW.**

Comrade Barker's strictures on Trade-Unionism I believe to be, on the whole, correct. His conclusion, however, is wrong.

Yes, it is true that Trade-Unionism, as a rule, have no higher aim than an increase of wages. It is true that, by pursuing sectional interests, by taking no part in the agitation of the unemployed, they defeat their own ends (one might say, that Unions have the blacklegs they deserve.) It is true that they sadly neglect educational work, while wasting thousands of pounds on labor M. P.s. Finally, it is true that their leaders have often betrayed their class to climb into office and sinecure. Yet, I contend that these are no good reasons for us either to attack Unions or to hold aloof from them, as it were, for fear of contamination. On the contrary, there is a large field for good work,—for work which Anarchists only can do.

Why is it that Unions are what they are? If it is because Unionists are not educated, we ought to try and educate them. If it is because the present organization of the Unions is bad, we ought to change that organization. And if it is because the capitalist system does allow no better, than the question comes to

this: can we hope to change this system without the co-operation of the workmen of the Unions, who, if they are not necessarily among the best, are not even among the worst of their class?

The evils Barker complains of are not peculiar to Trade-Unions. Leaders more or less corrupt or ambitious are to be found in and out of the Unions, in and out of the House of Commons, the County Council or other bodies politic, in and out of the S. D. F. Nay, they may be found in any group, or society, or party, where there are men who wish to be led. To suppress leaders Barker wishes to suppress the Unions. So, we ought to do without our papers, and even without public meetings, because it is just possible that by these means some men may come to the front and then use whatever influence or popularity they may acquire for self-aggrandisement.

The only effective way, in my opinion, to suppress leaders is to cease believing in them, to accustom people to do their own thinking and to act as free men. By keeping aloof from labor organizations we but leave to the leaders a free hand.

After all, if the workmen stick to their Unions in spite of all the drawbacks of these organizations, it is because they feel unable to carry on severally the struggle against the organized forces of Government and Capital. They wish to be sure that if some of them start fighting, they will be followed, not left in the lurch. They see that their only chance of victory lies in simultaneousness of action, and for this they look to their Unions. Can we give them another rallying point? Can we start another organization, public or secret, answering to that purpose? If we can, let us do it by all means. If not, let us make the best of existing organizations. But in no case ought we to hold aloof from the labor movement. This would be a suicidal policy. It has been proved such during the last strike in Belgium. While the workmen were in open rebellion against their masters and their leaders secretly plotted their surrender, where were the Anarchists? Well, the Anarchists were obliged to remain inactive in most cases, they could not even join in the demonstrations as they were not known to the rank and file, and the "leaders" spread the rumour that whoever advised the people to fight was a police spy.

Far from opposing the Union among the workmen at large, we need it for ourselves. Our groups might be made to work much more effectively, if they included but those who agree on questions of tactics, and know and trust each other. Let those who agree and feel disposed to work harmoniously, join together and carry on their propaganda with a friendly spirit among themselves. A little more practical solidarity in our ranks would, I believe, do no harm. Not that I ignore that our comrades are always ready to help each other whenever they can. Not much more could be done if we were more strongly united. S. MULLINS.

[Unwillingly I have inserted this response from our comrade Mellino, firstly because I opened a correspondence on this subject in April *Freedom*, where this should really have gone; and secondly, because our space at present is so limited, and the drawer is nearly full of very instructive and inspiring copy waiting for publication. We are considering the necessity of enlarging the *Wood* for future issues and if all comrades will try their best to sell the paper and bring the money for same promptly to us we shall be better able to do our part of the work, for which we have already solicited the help of many of the best writers on Anarchist Socialism—past masters in the art of revolutionary journalism.—Ed.]

REVIEW.

We have received from comrade J. Skitchley of Hull (People's Book Store 52 Salthouse Lane) one of his new pamphlets on *The Crimes of Governments*, and, although there are but 32 pages, there are enough of facts and figures to satisfy the most exacting student of this question of Governments. The quotations culled from various old-time authorities, the scathing criticism of Governments in all their ramifications show that comrade Skitchley retains his old vigour and intuition, so necessary in dealing with these apparently intricate subjects. All comrades should certainly possess themselves of a copy, which in my opinion is invaluable to us as propagandists. One quotation I cannot refrain from (page 8) "It is often said that Parliament grants this or that. Take the Reform Bills of 1832, 1867, and 1884. Now all the governments in the world cannot create rights. Governments or Parliaments can create privilege,—can aid in the formation of monopolies. But rights are inherent in the individual, are inseparable from the individual, and are antecedent to all Governments and even to Society itself. These rights of the individual cannot be alienated, they cannot be transferred, not even to so-called representatives. No one can transfer to another his right to life. The priest may claim to think for the sinner; the representative may claim to act for the willing slave; but the free man thinks and acts for himself." H. B. SAMUELS.

[THE CRIMES OF GOVERNMENTS. By J. Skitchley, Price 2d. Whole sale of the author at 52 Salthouse Lane, Hull, and retail at this office.]

OPEN-AIR PROPAGANDA.

Anarchist meetings are held at the following places.

Saturday at 8 p.m.	Hyde Park near Marble Arch
Hyde Park	Sunday morning at 11.30 a.m.
Regatta Park	Kenal Green
	Finbury Park
	Mile End Waste
	Triangle, Pockham Rye
	Sunday afternoon,
Hyde Park, at 2.30	Clerkenwell Green, at 5.
	Mile End Waste, at 7 o'clock

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our readers, some of them for the spirit and vigour with which they are written, and others, again, for the grace and beauty with which they convey lessons, not less effective in moulding our lives than many a wire-drawn homily in prose.

We venture to add, as a fitting termination to this summary of his works, the aspiration with which Whittier concludes his notice of "The Quaker of the olden time":—

"Oh! Spirit of that early day,
So pure and strong and true,
Be with us in the narrow way
Our faithful fathers knew,
Give strength the evil to forsake,
The cross of Truth to bear,
And love and reverent fear, to make
Our daily lives a prayer."

G. R. BAKER.

SONNET.

I used to wonder when I was a child,
And saw a tempest mounting in the sky
Black-robed, and solemn-voiced, whether, if I
Could peep behind the clouds so grimly piled,
I should behold the Power that made them wild,
And if the brow of Christ look'd gentle *then*,
When He sent storms that quail the hearts of men!
Since then at mine own infant thought I've smiled:
Yet may that thought a parable reveal.
Lest 'neath a too fair sky man should forget,
God sometimes in his life dark clouds doth set
That he the want of Heaven's light may feel;—
Then climb the cloud that doth thy Christ conceal
And look beyond, to where He lives and loves thee yet.

L. S. B.

and which is darkened by the present mistranslation—the truth that the Lord is *the living God*. We are not the residuary legatees of a dead Testator; we bear a covenant-name, we may claim covenant-rights, we are bound by covenant-duties, being by adoption and grace the children of a living and loving Father.

A DOUBLE SONNET.

I.

PATIENCE! wild wayward heart! Be still, be still:
 Chase not against the fetters of thy fate;
 Learn thou the harder task of those who wait
 Content to *be*, and nothing *do*, until
 God hath made clear the part they must fulfil.
 Call not the time spent waiting, all a waste;
 He wills it so, Who never doth make haste;
 Perchance 'tis thus He educates thy will.
 Thou wouldest fain help forward what should be,
 But art withheld by chains of destiny?
 Just so! O little feeble human heart,
 Art thou so sure thou *couldst* fulfil thy part?
 Perhaps God bids thee now rest patiently
 That thou may'st work for Him the better by and by.

II.

Should the still soul that waits God's holy will
 Abide in idleness? Oh! never so!
 Doth the unblossomed blade forget to grow
 For thinking of the treasure that shall fill
 Its future ear? Or doth the dancing rill
 For dreaming of the ocean, cease to flow
 Towards that ocean? As the moments go,
 Need for each moment's action riseth still;
 'Tis possible to wait, the while we *work*;
 Hast thou a thought, inclined all deeds to shirk?
 'Tis Sloth, not Patience! Though thou let alone
 All selfish means to ends which are thine own,
 Thou shalt yet do the duty of the hour
 Leaving results to time, and God's unfettered power.

L. S. B.

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A REVOLUTIONARY JOURNAL OF Anarchist-Communism.

VOL. I, No. 15 NEW SERIES,

SATURDAY NOVEMBER 11, 1893.

FORTNIGHTLY, ONE PENNY.

NOTES.

To legal forms your rights in vain you trust,
For who shall keep the very keepers just!

Comrades all over the country who have been counting on Nicoll's assistance at their Chicago commemoration meetings will doubtless accept with the deepest sympathy the only excuse he can offer, which is that the 18 months imprisonment and torture, mental and physical, that he has undergone has left him very weak, so he feels obliged to abstain from any active public work for a little time when he will make arrangements with provincial comrades for meetings and lectures. Our comrade's courage is as great as ever before and he is anxious to take his place in the revolutionary movement that is growing up all over the country. When our comrade has settled down somewhat and has shaken off the depressing influence of the past 18 months he will find out what strides the movement has taken and what impression we have made.

Some comrades, doubtless, will be surprised at our not making the editorship of the paper at once over to Nicoll, but I would remind them that, since a year and a half ago, Anarchism in England has taken a new course and steamed into broader channels, we have a different crew on board now, capable determined men, with our look-out always on the alert. When he has examined our past course and become acquainted with the crew and engineers, and the reasons for their being, he will then be able to form an opinion as to the value of our cargo and the risks we have undertaken; in the meantime our comrade must be allowed to have what rest he desires and needs, and to write what and when he feels able to.

The free speech fight still goes on at Manchester and our comrade Stockton was fined 40/- and costs on Monday Oct. 30th, for attempting to hold a meeting at the now famous Ardwick Green. On Sunday last a comrade of the Labor Church, named J. Birch, volunteered and was arrested. With their usual impudence the Anarchists laughed the court to scorn. When the authorities intend to stop this persecution I do not know, but certainly it is a tremendous advertisement for us and brings huge crowds to all our meetings with a great demand for literature. What is more, we have the sympathy of the workers; and a pious sneak who makes it his business to create disorder at our meetings was ignominiously hustled out of the square by the indignant people, while a temperance orator, who attacked us at New Cross and abused us, had to run for his life. *Go ira!* It goes.

Our comrade Pallas—when standing with his back to the firing party who, at the word of command, shot him in half a dozen places and so ended his life—turned his head just before the signal was given and said "Terrible will be the revenge!" and so it has been. In less than three weeks after these words were spoken a bomb has been thrown which has ended the lives of 30 and injured 80 persons sitting at the Opera House in Barcelona, Spain; thrown from the highest gallery by a person unknown. Full particulars were eagerly sought for here on last Wednesday night and the Anarchists are, quite naturally, charged with being the perpetrators of this terrible deed of vengeance. Ah, my masters, the killed will not be all on one side! When we have fuller particulars from the spot David Nicoll and myself will be better able to say something on this matter in next issue.

At the last meeting of the *Commonweal* group it was decided to hold a general conference of Anarchist-Communists of the United Kingdom on Boxing day, December 26th, at the Autonomie Club, 6 Windmill Street, Tottenham Court Road. John Turner has undertaken the secretaryship, so all comrades had better send all communications, suggestions, &c., to him at 7 Lamb Conduit Street, W.C. A full agenda is being drawn up which will be published in the *Weal* as soon as possible in order that the various points may be fully discussed by all the comrades and groups previous to the conference.

"Time proves all things," and it has proved the Fabians to be among the reactionaries. Their last manifesto in the *Fortnightly* means nothing if not a very useful weapon indeed to the Tory party, who are very

joyful over it, as the Fabians must have expected. Political party-work may be very useful and exciting work for some of the other side, but we were really not prepared for this from such acute thinkers as they boast they are. Even Reynolds devotes, in its front page leading article, a few words to "a small knot of gentlemen calling themselves the Fabian Society, and believed to hold some form of Socialistic opinions..... who are dramatic and musical critics, civil service clerks, and other persons..... who are emulating the tactics of the Three Tailors of Tooley Street." This is rather hard on the Fabians, who themselves have been employed on several occasions to write, and have written these very front page leaders for Reynolds during the last couple of years. We may expect to see similar treatment vested out to the Social-Democrats before long, although they seem so very friendly just now. H. S.

A WORD TO OUR FRIENDS THE OPPOSITION.

You condemn us as agitators because you do not see any sense in or need for agitators, don't you! And you get wild as anything because we condemn the methods you are using in your intercourse of life, don't you! Well, we are rather caustic sometimes. We do occasionally speak you with a fact that leaves you quivering with rage. But if you could think, you would either disprove the fact, which is impossible, or change your ideas to fit it. Getting cross don't help you, but the only way we can get you to think about labor problems is to keep reminding you of them, even if you do lose your temper, which we think is far better than losing body and soul altogether as well as your children's.

We don't want to make you cross; but so long as you act as you do, you help to maintain a system that we know and can prove to be so cruel, false, and injurious that, were you only to think a little, you could see it as clearly as we do. If you knew and felt we were right you would probably be with us. But you don't. You have to learn these facts. You say that you have read some of our papers and books and you can't get to understand, and that our schemes are visionary and won't work; but the plainest language cannot convey to an uninterested person the simplest thought. If you are a physician I would reply that you didn't master the science by reading books and papers, but had to concentrate your whole mind on them and study. Have you read our literature with a view to learning, as you did medicine! I think not. To master this science men have devoted as many years as any other specialist. But you have not time to spend years! You need not, but you must recognise some certain truths. You, doubtless, could not prove that the earth is round, yet you accept it just the same. You dispute with men on questions of which you are as ignorant as you are of astronomy, geometry, telepathy, geology, and other sciences. How do we know! How does the teacher know about the advance of a pupil! When the pupil tries to demonstrate a problem, is it difficult for the teacher to discover what class to assign him! But, you say, you are men. Very well! Men learn like boys. After leaving school young men have to train their minds by application before they can master any subject requiring thought. So we'll keep you thinking until you understand us or leave off reading us. You can't wipe out facts by denying them, and the sooner you get converted and become an agitator the sooner will you be doing your duty. "Com. Nat."

AN ANARCHIST'S PRAYER.

Our fellow worms who are in power, and enslave us, hallowed will be your names if you will help our *Commonweal* to come. Our just will be done instead of your unjust. Give us this day our land and natural products. Recognize our claims as we recognize ye guiltless in being but creatures of a bad social system. And lead us not into the temptation of cutting your throats, but deliver us from this great evil of meeting disguised force by open force, and yours shall be the glory for ever and ever. Amen. T. BARCLAY.

The 'Commonweal' Group meet at Autonomie Club on and after Tuesday Nov. 21st, at 8 p.m.



same lesson, which is now and ever will be—"Vote for the right man!
(that's ME!)"

"The classes are merciless and unscrupulous. We must be equally so. Let us, then, neglect none of the means at our disposal, that are really means.....
.....let us press earnestly and steadily forward, without haste and without rest, with all weapons and by all roads to the goal we have set before us."

Amen, brother Quelch, but we'll keep an eye on you and your party, just the same, as we have been told the similar tales before by men like Burns, Hardie, Mann, Champion, and others too numerous to mention.

And now to point out the differences between us; and the meaning of MEANS and ENDS.

Firstly, then, the end we Anarchist Socialists aim at is the utter destruction of Monopoly and Monopolists, Landlordism, Capitalism, and Governments of all kinds, without which none of these other monstrosities could exist. Against Government, therefore, we must wage incessant war, personal and public, individually and collectively, at all times and on all occasions just as we are prepared to take the consequences be they great or small. Are Politics means? Is bomb-throwing means? Is smashing shop windows means? Is political assassination means? Most assuredly not. I maintain that these are not means to an end, they are ENDS in themselves. In politics, parliamentary government is the end, and cannot be a means to an end: the end we speak of.—The Social Revolution. Bomb-throwing is an end in itself, if it finds its mark or not, it is not a means to an end. Smashing windows, robbing misers, coining counterfeit, or smuggling, are not means, either, to the end; they are acts and ends in themselves; and, though we do not claim them as means, as Mr Quelch seemingly does, still we welcome such acts of daring and lawlessness, as they do not strengthen but weaken the present machinery of government and exploitation; whereas politics, no matter whether you win a seat or lose, tends to strengthen the hands of our exploiters and prolong the present terrible conditions in some form or another.

Friends of the S.D.F. and others, we tell you that there is but ONE means, and that is EDUCATION—which gives knowledge and leads to action. The education that bitter experience teaches us, the education that is gained by strikes and lock-outs and revolts, the education that makes us think and act like men, the education that can only be acquired by learning the lessons that the struggles of the past and present teach us; and this education cannot be gained through the ballot-box or through legal enactments; those who say that it can, are liars, rogues, and cowards, and prove our natural enemies.

Fellow wage slaves, we Anarchists appeal to you to throw in your lot with us; for the sake of our little ones and our wives, for the sake of our helpless fellows all around us, for the sake of those who in the past have struggled, suffered, and died for the particles of freedom that we enjoy to day, for the sake of those who have given up home, wealth, and opportunities for distinction on behalf of Humanity, we appeal to all convinced comrades to throw aside all their petty and paltry fads, and work unceasingly and untiringly by precept and example for the overthrow of all exploitation and domination of man. He who would be free himself must strike the blow.

H. B. SAMUELS.

GOVERNMENT IS MURDER!

All governments are equally corrupt; but their immorality shows itself in different ways. In America we heard of bribery so common that even the name of its democratic president is mixed up in questionable affairs. In France the late Panama scandals are familiar to every one; never was a more deliberate fraud practised upon a confiding people. Well may our comrades Sketchley speak out on the crimes of government; well may we each and all of us in the movement do our level best to assist in killing this hydra-headed monster; for the crimes of government are beyond all computation, and they are being perpetually renewed. No sooner is some pernicious action leading to crime detected and checked than, like foul disease, it breaks out in other, sometimes most unexpected, quarters.

The government of England is more serpentine in its action, more fair-faced, perhaps than any other; but hypocrisy is in its heart, and its hands are red with innocent blood. Who can read of this horrible massacre of the Matabele without a shudder, without an inward curse upon the government of this land! How futile to try and make us believe that Rhodes and Jameson, monsters though they are, can be made scapegoats, in face of recent South African history. We had no millionaire robbers to blame when the might of Zululand was broken. The disaster of Majuba Hill, the dishonor of the Boer war went home to the right place; the government of England was admittedly to blame. The English people, however, would not stand a repetition of such open aggression as that in vogue a few years ago; for the moral conscience of the nation is at last beginning to develop. Therefore it becomes necessary to have recourse to underhand means if annexations are to continue.

Schemes more subtle than the logic of Satan could be dissected out were it thought worth while to go into this Matabele affair thoroughly; but it is not. We wonder if Lord Randolph Churchill went to Mashona and shot lion only, some time ago! We fear he must have smelt the treasure of Matabeleland and heard of the simple, straightforward, trusting Lobengula.

This latest crime in South Africa is too hideous for one Rhodes, one company, one government alone to commit; it required a trinity of devils, backed up by their innumerable spawn.

We must not rest content to cry Shame! A stop must be put to this sort of thing. Let the Chartered Company know, and the government also, that if they persist in this outrageous policy of murder in South Africa they will have to reckon with a sterner foe; against whose weapons their Gatling and Maxim guns will be as useless as native spears.

-F. M.

IN MEMORIAM.

LINGG, RAVACHOL, BERKMAN, PALLAS, and others.

Mad, as the world calls mad,—
See Anarchy's few;
Fighting the False and the Bad
In all that they do;
Forcing a way for the Glad,
The Pure, and the True.

Bolder and clearer it grows—
The Anarchist task;
Liberty's plausible foe
To assail and unmask;
Handing the torch as it glows
To all who may ask.

Great! oh, exceedingly great,
The Anarchists claim!
Fusing the falsehood of State
In unquenchable flame;
Breaking the fetters of fate
In Humanity's name.

Breathing with fiery breath
On the mammonite crew;
Fearless, in splendor of faith,
Of the worst they can do;
Blessed, in life and in death,
O beneficent few!

L. S. BEVINGTON.

THE NECESSITY FOR AN AGRARIAN AGITATION.

Apart from the efforts of the working classes to obtain political power, strikes have been the most conspicuous means adopted by the workers to maintain or to improve their position, and to protect themselves from the oppression and power of the governing and capitalist classes; but the manner in which they have organized themselves has been such that the means have defeated the ends. Organizing according to different trades and occupations, each trade is apt to look only for benefits for its own immediate members and locality. Their actions have not been guided by the knowledge to be derived from a study of the social and economic position of the whole of the people. To be able to act intelligibly we are bound to have a knowledge of things and circumstances which are far beyond the limits of our own immediate surroundings; and so long as the desires and necessities of our daily lives are acted upon by all those influences which constitute Capitalist Society, it is imperative that we take into consideration the whole of society. If we do not, our actions and endeavours to improve our condition are liable to be of an abortive nature. For proof of this no better lesson could be put before us than a retrospective study of the numerous and gigantic strikes of the last few years. One by one having for a time engaged the attention of the whole world, they have rolled away into past history, to be remembered only as a saddening and fruitless expression of unintelligible discontent. By the lapsing of the present dispute in the coal trade we are drawing towards the close of another such expression of the dissatisfaction of the worker; the same events, the same patient forbearance on the part of the workers, and the "wise" counsels of their leaders not to do anything revolutionary have again characterised this last demonstration of the helplessness of the workers to gain any material benefits by what are hypocritically called "constitutional" methods. That Anarchists are not satisfied with the drift of the labor movement is evident from their denunciations of the labor leaders for the reactionary influence they exert upon the workers, who as yet do not recognize that instead of being leaders they are misleaders, who try to deceive them by endeavouring to hide the roguish trickery and humbug of the politician and place-hunter beneath the veneer of social quackery and hollow economic frauds of reform. But as justifiable as our blame is of labor leaders, I think there are other faults and obstacles which prevent the workers from putting an end to the miserable wage system which oppresses and defiles the whole of the present time.

Assuming that the "fussy lickspittles," called labor leaders, had stepped down and out, what prospect would have the people, say the miners, of carrying into effect the Anarchist teaching of seizing on the means and instruments of production? To me they seem to be to a great extent useless. The argument generally used by Socialists in answer to those who advocate Land Nationalization and regard Capital as something is, that if the Land, was nationalized and other capital allowed to remain private property it would merely result in a lowering of the money wages of the workers. The argument will work both ways. If it is sound in regard to Land it is equally so in regard to Capital; and if the miners seized upon their capital it would only be useful to them so far as there was a demand for their produce, and enabled them to receive what they desired in exchange; even if this seizure led to a general strike such as Anarchists advocate. The majority of the people are in the unfortunate position of being engaged in useless labor; occupations which it will be vain for them to ever hope to be engaged in again when once the capitalist system is destroyed. What use to tell lawyer's clerks and soap advertisers to seize upon their means and instruments of production? Of what use will they be themselves when useful workers have taken possession of theirs? twelve months ago I dreamt I should have taken a different view (not

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A JOURNAL OF

ANARCHIST COMMUNISM

WILLIAM REEVES, 185, FLEET STREET, E.C.

AND OF J. TOCHATTI, CARMAGNOLE HOUSE, 7, BEADON ROAD, HAMMERSMITH.

Clay

ment of rulership and power over the opportunities of others; but, any more, kept intact as an idea, we must; or else the drone and the dunce, our moral and intellectual weaklings and inferiors, will live upon us, and eat us clever and industrious ones out of house and home! How on earth am I to punish my inert or imbecile fellow creatures, if I let them have what I don't want for my own use, without fining them? Well, to begin with, I think ninety-nine per cent of the drones are only drones because we have poisoned the honey to such an extent that it has, for a large number, become not worth the trouble of gathering. I do not despair of the average drone, even when sure that he is a drone, by preference, and not merely a badly-circumstanced, ill-placed bee. And the dunce? Poor, stupid or semi-stupid blunderer and lumberer! Nature has fined the dunce already. Human law has often cancelled the fine. Look at Royal Families. But shall we withhold from the powerless dunce of the future his mere bread and cheese only because, for lack of wits or briskness, he cannot help us to produce them. I fear nothing from the inferior. When access is free, and powers all freely engaged in co-operative production or in healthy emulation, neither the dunce nor the drone will rule over us; as at present, take tribute of us as at present, or deprive our children of like opportunities with their own, as at present; and surely that is all that matters.

I hate almost murderously the parasitic drone and the dunce in office; but I declare that I could make them both most kindly and pitifully welcome to my superfluous food and clothing, (even though I personally had been the busy and clever part-producer of either form of wealth), so soon as it should become a clear fact to me that both drone and dunce were my powerless pensioners, and not my masters.

"Proudhon and Communism."

To the Editor of Liberty.

In the August issue of Liberty you print an extract from Proudhon's posthumous work "The Theory of Property," prefaced by a statement that "the so-called Proudhonians like to tell us that in preaching Individualism and private appropriation they follow his teachings. . . . To private property he personally preferred Slavonic or Communal possession of land." I do not see anything to warrant the charge of inconsistency on the part of the disciples of Proudhon. In the first place, they rigorously renounce Individualism, no less than Communism, considered exclusively. But they have always preached Communism in relation to land and natural products, for the reason that such are in nowise due to the efforts of individuals; on the other hand they have simply emphasized the right of personal appropriation of labor-products, for the reason that they are due to personal effort. Now, the denial of the right of personal appropriation of labor-products, varies with it the denial of Communism in this particular, for, if the man who conceives and carries out the production of a commodity has no right to consume or appropriate what he has produced, how can some other man (the community so-called) have a right to consume or appropriate it who have not produced it?—Yours truly, HENRY SWEET.

Are Liberty and Communism Antagonistic?

It is evidently very difficult for those who have pinned their faith to some one particular reform as the panacea for all ills to perceive the virtues of any other, still more to see how the two may harmonize. Thus both Democrats and Individualists think they have utterly demolished Anarchist-Communism by saying it is a contradiction in terms. No doubt liberty is incompatible with compulsory Communism as well with compulsory anything else. If, however, absolute individual freedom is but the means by which Anarchists hope to arrive, naturally and voluntarily, at their ideal Communism, which, probably, all will admit to be excellent, if practicable, then all such objections fall to the ground at once. Those critics evidently forget that we already have—and under the greatest possible measure of individual autonomy—must have, a large instalment of Communism. Air, sunshine, rain, the ocean, roads, bridges, scenery, the exterior of buildings, unique works of art, etc., are recognised as common to all; and the most rabid Individualist would hardly wish to subject them to private exploitation, even where that was possible. But the orthodox objections to Communism seem to argue a very low view of life in those who advance them. In their opinion, apparently, the only object for which human beings will put forth effort is to acquire material possessions for themselves. The careers of innumerable benefactors of mankind prove that such a theory is a libel on human nature; and when once, by the abolition of monopoly, the struggle for animal existence is ended, there is every reason to suppose that material wealth will be so superabundant as to be no more an incentive to, or object of, effort than are the common bounties of Nature now.

EVACUETA A. PIERSON.

A white loafer and a negro were idling on a wood pile at Nantucket. Says white loafer to negro: "Sam, go get a shovel and basket, go down to the shore and dig a bushel of slams and I'll give you half." And the negro did it. This seems funny—that anybody should be so foolish; but if you will stop and think you will see that the classes which live by usury, speculation, and their wits, giving no equivalent in production for what they enjoy, whether they actually say to the workers of the country, "Make your goods and bring them here and we'll give you half," or not, they so manipulate matters as to get their half all the same.

PEACE ON EARTH.

Peace on earth! Man reconciled
To law that bids him be;
O holy freedom! final faith!
O sacred certainty!
I sometimes think the road to it
Lies through Gethsemane.

And yet the young are with us too,
Bold from the very first;
Dear lads and maidens full of will,
The golden cage forbids;
Alert to note the living spirit
That slake the whole world's thirst.

The very goal we touch at last,
The heaven's of the free;
Ah, comrades! you who understand,
Sing in your heart with me—
"Thou Death, where now thy poisoned sting?
Where, Grave thy victory?"

L. S. BREVINOT.

HOW CASERIO DIED.

At a quarter to four o'clock the governor of the prison, accompanied by the Procureur of the Republic, the executioner and his assistants entered Caserio's cell. He was fast asleep. The governor shook him and said: "Courage, Caserio, your time has come."

Caserio, suddenly awakened, and sat up on his bed, his whole body agitated by a nervous trembling.

The governor asked him if he would like a cordial, he appeared not to understand, and as he did not reply the question was repeated, then he seemed to awake from a dream and answered, "I require nothing; I am ready." After this he regained his composure. His demeanour was calm, and his answers prompt; he endeavoured to overcome the convulsive trembling which had seized him, but without success. He was asked again if he would like some brandy, and scornfully declined it.

"Would you like us to call a priest?" the governor asked, "he will give you courage."

"I want no one—I am not lacking in courage."

"Have you anything to say to the Jugo d'Instruction?"

"Nothing."

"Would you like to see your enemies?"

"No! What would be the use? In any case—"

During this time the executioner's assistants finished dressing him, the governor asked him if he had anything to reveal.

Caserio replied: "No! no!" then pointing with his trembling finger to a letter lying open on the seat, in a low voice, "I've only to ask you to send this letter I have written to my mother."

"Very well; but have you really nothing else to say," asked the Procureur of the Republic.

Caserio shrugged his shoulders and replied in Italian, "I wish you wouldn't worry me!"

The governor then said "You don't consider the pain you have caused your poor mother."

The prisoner was deeply moved at the mention of his mother, great tears rolled down his cheeks as he replied with emotion, "I hope you will send her my letter."

As he said this he seemed almost choked with emotion, but only for a moment. He became comparatively calm and said, "Now I am ready." He was taken away in a wagon. When within four yards of the guillotine he alighted, raised his head resolutely, looked straight at the knife suspended above, and then turning towards the crowd said: "Courage, Comrades, Vive l'Anarchie!" He was then thrown under the knife, and as he cried, "Vive—" his head fell into the basket.—*Il Messaggero*, (Rome.)

During the rise in the Missouri river a man was standing watching the driftwood float past, when he called to several coloured brethren standing by, and said he would give them half of all they fished out. The proposition was too good to be rejected, and the sabbie spectators went to work with a will. They ransacked a lot of the driftwood and divided it, the result of their labour being a good thing for all concerned, particularly good for the man who made the generous offer. The occurrence will seem exceedingly funny to most people, but there is a great deal of work done on what is practically the same plan. The men who stand on the bank and make big-hearted propositions are the financiers.

RETRIBUTION.—St. Peter (to applicant): "You say you were an editorial writer on a daily newspaper?" "Yes, sir." "Step into the elevator, please." (Steps in.) "How soon does it go up?" "It doesn't go up, it goes down."

The following notice appeared in a shop window of a tailor in Hull: "Wanted, two apprentices, who will be treated as one of the family."

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In and Out of Church.

Dogma-dealer, talking treason,
Spurning truth, perverting reason
In and out of folly's season
Year by year—
Oh, a plague on all the twaddle
In your hum drum middle-noddle,
Mammon's law-paid molly-coddle
Limp with fear.
Is there "sin" in worldly leaven?
Yet there's not one day in seven
When you fail to sell your gammon
All for pelf;
"Heaven to let"—to paying lodger,
Ah, you canting devil-dodger,
Damn not us who spurn your Mammon,
Damn yourself!

If I've done some bad behaving,
And I don't deserve the saving,
Then 'tis honour bids the braving
Of my dues;
Pilot souls to your sky places
Who are full of Sunday grace,
And with sweat from poor men's faces
Pay for pews.
Call the purse-proud from their blisses,
Call the fashionable misses
From "advisers" holy kisses,
Call, and call;
Call the people's sly mind-shapers,
Call the kings of daily papers
Cutting "law and order" experts
One and all.

Here's my Lord Archbishop, mind you,
Paid to gorge himself, and blind you,
Till your very self can't find you
Anywhere;

Simple Jesus! See the old 'un!
Why, his dinner-plates are golden!
May the sight our hearts embolden
In our prayer.

Ah, dismiss them, with a "blessing!"
All intoning and confessing;
Never more our souls distressing
With their cant!

Help to silence priestly mumble,
Help the Mammon-temples tumble,
Freedom's banner o'er the jumble
Firm to plant.

Come, dear toilers, stained and weary,
Come and help the world grow cheery,
Come from out your prison dreary
Built by greed;

You who labour heavy-laden,
Slaving mother, trampled maiden,
Ever proached to, ever preyed on,
In your need;

Let your winters grow no colder,
Rise at last and dare be bolder,
Setting shoulder firm to shoulder
For a thrust!

Yokes be eased, and burdens lighter,
As the great Hope warms the fighter,
And the broad New Day grows brighter
And more just.

Anarchism is the Surest way.

"Freedom is the one purport wisely aimed at or unwisely, of all man's struggles toiling and sufferings in this earth."—*Carlyle*.

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LIBERTY



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Between Ourselves.
Correspondence.

Vol. III., No. 1. January, 1896

ONE PENNY.

LONDON



WISHES.

Oh, would it could be known to all
 What thought the scient thinks:
 How weal of one, by weal of all,
 To smallest import shrinks:
 For then some sad might learn to see
 Their sadness less distressfully.

I wish it could be felt of all,
 What glow the poet feels,
 And how his quivering life responds
 To life's minutest wheels:
 For then were all men just and kind,
 And mind no more should harass mind.

Oh, would it could be shared by all,
 That vision of the soul,
 Whose will, in tune with social due,
 Needs but its own control:
 For then a brave "new earth" would be
 Where all should love, and all there free.

L. S. BEVINGTON.

The foregoing was amongst the last of the contributions received from our late comrade, L. S. Bevington. For the portrait over the poem we are indebted to Comrade Wees, of the "Workers' Friend."

The International Workers' Congress.

To the Editor of LIBERTY.

When the invitation to the International Workers' Congress was read at a meeting of the Independent Tailors-Pressers and Machinists Union, some of us contended that it meant that all Trade Unions sending delegations were to believe that the solution of the labour question lies in parliamentarianism. But we are now living, I regret to say, in a world of politics, and our Union also contains politicians. These have decried us non-political Unionists to be liars and disturbers of the peace. The majority of the members have believed them, and decided to send a delegate. Accordingly I have sent a letter to the Secretary of the International Congress Committee (Will Thorne) asking him if a Trade Union not believing in Parliamentary action would be entitled to send a delegate. Here is the answer I have received:

"Comrade Baron,—Yours duly to hand, for which accept my

thanks. In reply I may say that all Trade Unions recognise the necessity of political action: that being so, the Zurich resolution covers them. But those people who are complaining about not being admitted to the next International Congress don't believe in the necessity of political action: that being so, the Zurich resolution will shut them out. Best wishes from, yours fraternally, W. THORNE"

There is no doubt that a handfull of politicians wish, by force, to make everybody believe that all Trade Unions are political, only instead of saying this openly they go a round-about way to do so. In any case let the Unions take good notice of this fact, and if they hold as real the true principles of workers unionism, if they value their motto "Union is strength" they ought to energetically protest against this invitation, and not allow themselves to be thus used for political purposes.

L. BARON,

Member Independent Tailors-Pressers and Machinists Union.

—From the "Workers' Friend," Dec. 27, '95.

ANARCHIST COMMITTEE.—The committee appointed by the conference of London Anarchists held on Boxing Day, 1895, met for the first time on the evening of Wednesday, the 1st January, 1896. It was agreed that James Tochatti should act as Secretary, W Wees as Treasurer, and T. Keece as Assistant Secretary. Correspondence relating to the status of Trade Unions and other working-class organisations not binding themselves unreservedly to political action, in the above Congress was read and discussed. The committee decided to open up communication with the provincial Anarchist groups and non-political working-class bodies for the purpose of securing concerted action against the unjust and despotic action of the Organising Committee of the Congress in shutting out the delegates of that section of the labour movement which does not believe in the efficacy of political action. The Secretary was accordingly instructed to endeavour to obtain some expression of opinion from these various bodies, and report at the next meeting. It was also resolved that a direct appeal to Trade Unions, on the lines of the one circulated prior to the Zurich Congress, should be issued, and as early in the month as possible. A fund to meet printing and incidental expenses was opened, to which contributions are earnestly solicited. All monies to be sent to W. Wees, 42, Cressy Houses, Cressy Street, Stepney, and all other communications to James Tochatti, Carriage House, Hammersmith, who will supply any information required. All contributions will be acknowledged in LIBERTY and FREEDOM, and a monthly balance sheet will be published.

The committee will meet weekly, and the cooperation and financial support of all comrades and lovers of fairplay and justice is invited.—T. KEECE, Asst. Sec.

Comrade J. Sketchley (27, Salthouse Lane, Hull) has just published a pamphlet entitled "Shall the People Govern themselves?" It is full of facts, figures, and statements in favour of an affirmative reply to the question—and its closing words are: "We demand the referendum to enable the people to govern themselves; to manage their own affairs, to determine their own destiny." Sketchley always puts his case clearly, and generally with considerable force: he has been very successful in this instance, and his pamphlet should have a wide circulation.

"The Popular Phrenologist," edited by "Cranion." No. 1. (46, Goswell Road, N.)—This endeavour to establish a penny monthly periodical, with a view to extending and popularising a knowledge of the science of phrenology, deserves to succeed. "Cranion" has started his work in admirable form. The periodical is readable from its first page to its last. A better medium for gaining the attention of those unacquainted with phrenology could scarcely have been devised. The contents are as varied as they are appropriate, and are made up of character sketches, biographies, lessons, anecdotes, health notes, stories, correspondence, reports, etc.

A DIALOGUE.

BY

L.S. BEVINGTON.

PRICE ONE PENNY.

CHIEFLY A DIALOGUE. Concerning Some Difficulties of a Dunce.

London.
"Freedom" Office,

7 Lamb's Conduit Street, W.C.
1895.

Dunce.- -

What is money?

The Other Fellow.- -

Something rare and useless which you are compelled to obtain before anyone will let you get at things that are needful, useful and plentiful.

Dunce.- -

Oh! Then, I suppose, if you have not got any money you had better leave off hoping for the plentiful things, and set to work to make what you want for yourself.

Other Fellow.- -

Why, old man, you can't!

Dunce.- -

How's that? I feel as if I could.

Other Fellow.- -

Not you. Money is there to stop you. It is a means used not only for making it difficult For for you to get at what is ready-made, but also for making it dangerous for you to start digging or planting, or making what you want for yourself.

Dunce.- -

Then what on earth is money good for?

Other Fellow.- -

Ah, that's where the joke comes in. Money is a device for enabling some people to get at whatever they want without paying for it.

Dunce.- -

What is paying?

Other Fellow.- -

Damaging yourself in some way; parting with what you are in need of; enduring Something something injurious; depriving yourself of health or strength or rest; spending more than your exertions can restore to you; impoverishing your life in some way. Money lets some people get all they want, and more too, by only damaging other people; so that they themselves are not required to pay at all.

Dunce.- -

Oh, but I shouldn't like to do that. Is there not enough of everything in this great big world for everyone to get at what they are in want of without damaging anyone?

Other Fellow.- -

Yes; and now-a-days it can all be got at too. But, then, there's not money enough to go round; and as I said before, you are bound to get money before you will be allowed to get at anything better, or even to make and use anything better, for yourself. And if no one gives you money which some one else has paid for, you will have to pay for some yourself. But whether you are one of the people who pay damage or no, when you have once got money enough away from other people, you can bribe anyone with it to let you have anything else you choose.

Dunce.- -

What people are they who don't pay?

Other Fellow.- -

Well, they have many names. They call themselves "noble" people, and "gentle" people; "upper" people, "higher" people, the "best" people, and so on. They speak of one another's "majesty," "highness," "grace," "holiness," and "eminence"; and are addressed as "honorable," "reverend," "learned," "worshipful"; and, in the absence of the other epithets, never miss getting themselves called "respectable."

Dunce.- -

What pretty names! Why do they call themselves all that?

Other Fellow.- -

Their god only knows. (There are three Ms and an N in their god's name. Aye! And he is in the know, too; and "has mercy on them, miserable sinners.") But they only call themselves by fancy names when money is not being inquired about. When it is, and especially when they are thinking about the man in the street, they call themselves Sovereigns, Legislators, Owners, Employers, Pastors, Masters and Benefactors. And the man in the street is mostly careful to get well out of the way of their carriages-and-pairs before he has the cheek to nickname them Bosses, Exploiters, Sweaters, Parasites, Loafers and Frauds. They are all men of means, that's why.

Dunce.- -

What is a man of means?

Other Fellow.- -

I told you before: men with money enough to procure necessaries, comforts, luxuries, leisure and pleasure without paying for them and entirely at other folk's expense; and then to force these folks to put up with them.

Dunce.- -

But don't people pay for what money they have?

Other Fellow.- -

Some do; some don't.

Dunce.- -

Who have the most money; the people who pay for it, or the people who don't?

Other Fellow.- -

The people who don't. They are called "rich" people, because they get more means than they can use up. They grow tall and live a long time, and are very much respected.

Dunce.- -

And what are the people called who pay for what money they have?

Other Fellow.- -

They are called "poor" people. They spend their time, strength and ability in making necessities, comforts and luxuries to give the rich people. They generally die early, and often miserably. They are not at all respected or envied.

Dunce.- -

Why do they spend themselves like that?

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Other Fellow.- -

To buy a little money with, from the rich people whom they make the presents to. You see, they cannot have any food or clothing for themselves till they have bought some money. And without any food or clothing they could not go on spending their time and strength again To-morrow to-morrow, and then the rich people would miss their luxuries.

Dunce.- -

But when they have bought enough money for their food and clothes, whom do they give it to? where do the food and clothes come from?

Other Fellow.- -

One question at a time, please. They don't give in the money where the food and clothes come from. They give the money to some people who have custody of the food and clothing, but who have not made it; and these people give a little of the money to the poor people who have made the food and clothes, keeping the rest for themselves. Sometimes the money is handed through several, and what passes on gets less and less, so that the men who buy the last shillings of it with the time and toil which they have spent away in providing the good are, you see, poor men also. This way of going on is called "business."

Dunce.- -

Stop! Let me understand. Then you mean to say that some rich folk, whom for clearness I'll call Strong, Sons & Co., get the full produce of the poor men's life-time and life-strength, and turn it into counters, and then hand back a very few of the counters so that the poor men may have them as tickets

for useful stuff for Strong & Co. to-morrow; and then do you tell me that another lot of rich people, whom we'll call Rong Brothers & Co., take the tickets as a bribe for the clothes and food, and keep back part of the counters from the other poor men who have made the clothes and food on like terms?

Other Fellow.- -

Yes, that's something like how it is. Only you've got to recollect that, with Strong, Sons & Co., over the way, insisting upon having everything they can think of for nothing, and forcing everybody to take their counters in exchange or go without, Messrs. Rong Brothers & Co. couldn't live at all (let alone live idly or "respectably") if they did not stop some of the goods from going straight where they are wanted, so as to be able to stop some of the counters coming from the other direction. They then let the goods pass on their way on condition of receiving more counters than they gave up in order to get the goods into their custody. What do you think of it all?

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Dunce.- -

Why, if you ask me plainly, I think the rich men are impudent rogues, and the poor men are damned fools. Which are you, sir, may I ask?

Other Fellow.- -

Oh, I'm one of the damned fools, or I certainly should not have answered your questions on the square. But, mark you, the impudence of the other gang is legal. There's a deal in that. And it takes a clever dunce like you to find out I am a fool. Most people think a man wise and prudent who puts up with what is legal. But you're right; I am a fool.

Dunce.- -

Legal! legal!--what's legal?

Other Fellow.- -

Oh, come now! Have I got to explain that too? Legal means according to Parliamentary law: the business way of managing to live by money, at the cost of other people's lives and liberties is according to law, whether fools call it impudence or not.

Dunce.- -

Isn't there any plainer word to tell me what Parliamentary law is; and why it makes people seem wise who put up with being impudently treated?

Other Fellow.- -

Why, Parliamentary law is whatever a few score of fellow have settled among themselves to make tens of millions of other people conform to; in fact, everybody is made to conform who has not extra money enough to make it worth the while of anyone in office to let him go his own way instead.

Dunce.- -

Oh! ah! But that isn't telling me what "law" is. What is it those fellows want you to conform to?

Other Fellow.- -

Well, you've got to conform to anything, no matter what, that more than half this little lot of fellows want to see other people do. Sometimes it's one thing; sometimes it's another; but it is always whatever this lot of fellows suppose will turn out best for business.

Dunce.- -

Then, it is only the wishes of the bigger number of this little lot that all other people are made to conform to? And the wishes of these law-fellows is whatever is good for business? And business is the plan of getting most money into the hands of people who pay least? And money is a means by which these people may make it difficult for the rest of us to get at what is necessary in order to make useful things with, and difficult to have the use of them when made? (Scratches his head.) And folks are "damned fools" who don't see the wisdom of putting up with it all.....Please, sir, what is this country called?--because it seems to me that everyone in it is off his chump.

Other Fellow.- -

You dunce! It is a glorious Empire! The land of the free!!

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Dunce.- -

Free what? Free business-law makers? or free rich law-breakers? or free swindlers and sweaters? or what?

Other Fellow.- -

Sh--! It isn't respectable to talk like that. Free citizens, of course! A free citizen is a law-abiding citizen. You are free just as far as you do what you are told.

Dunce.- -

I say, you're having a game with me! I'm not such a dunce that I don't know what "free" means. It doesn't mean abiding by what you are told, especially when you can't "abide" the chaps that tell you, nor yet their impudence. Free means exactly the opposite. It means living just how your own give-and-take commonsense makes you want to live. It means not being made to toil when you are in want of rest; and it means not being forced to be idle when you want to be at work.

Other Fellow.- -

Oh, that sort of freedom is only fit for angels and the other lower animals. It may suit beavers and birds and bees all right; but you and I are free citizens, you know, because we can take our chance of choosing whose wishes we will conform to. We can have a "Yes," or "No," to give to anyone who wants to be a law-maker; and if a certain number of others choose him too, then he can be one of those whose will will become our law and everyone else's, that is, of course, if he is one of those who, by counting heads, prevails over the others in Parliament. You must see how much freer that makes a citizen

than having only himself to consult! And a country may well be called free where nearly everyone can help choose his own law-master, some one whose head may chance to count up on the right side.

Dunce.- -

Nearly everyone? I suppose that means nine out of ten of us? Well, there's me and my wife at home, and my aged mother, and my daughter, aged 22; and two strong sons of 17 and 18. I suppose if nearly all of us can help choose whose wishes we'll conform to (so that business may go on) we all of us at home can have a choice; unless perhaps me, because everyone knows I'm a dunce. My mother and wife and daughter and sons are very sharp witted.

Other Fellow.- -

No: on the contrary, it's only you in all the family who may help choose someone to impose on the lot of you his way of keeping business what it is, and of keeping the rich people where they are,--that is, in position and in possession.

Dunce.- -

Lord! how queer! What knocks me is your saying we are all free citizens. If many households are constituted like mine, I should say it was only a small minority who may even choose,

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and it's a chance whose choice wins; and that believing in one master more than another has nothing to do with being free. But now, explain to me why anyone must choose any law-maker at all?

Other Fellow.- -

Must choose? Well, there's nothing to make you choose anyone if you don't want to. And there's no reason, if you come to that, why people who don't like to spend their lives inworking and suffering for the leisure and pleasure of those who take all their means from them, and run the laws to save themselves from being opposed,--no reason at all why they should choose anyone. But I suppose they do it because they good-naturedly believe the man they chooses cares more about them than himself; or because they believe it is good for somebody else even if it isn't very advantageous for themselves to have to conform to whomsoever wants to have his will made into law. And then, you see, if the poor don't help choose, they rightly suppose the rich will have all the choosing to themselves; and everything would be more business-like than ever. For, if you don't help choose, mark you, you have to conform to what others choose, all the same.

Dunce.- -

What a hell of a fix! But you keep saying "have to conform," and "make you conform," How's that? How can you be made to do anything in a land of free citizens?

Other Fellow.- -

What I mean by being made to conform is that if it is known that you don't want to conform you'll not get employed to help fatten any business man and his covey. And if he don't want you for his job you'll starve, just in proportion as you are free and law-abiding. That is your impersonal, non-aggressive legal punishment at his hands. And if you really set about going your own way as a man, wherever and

whenever you think the law is unfair, the you'll get a personal and direct punishment. Why, man alive! you've heard of "coppers" and police-courts, and soldiers and bullets and prisons and gallows, eh? You live in the enemy's country wherever you go.

Dunce.- -

Yes; but even now I can't imagine how it is possible to get the prisons built, or to find police and soldiers enough to do any particular harm with, if there are so few rich people in comparison with poor people. For, I suppose it is only rich people who care to build prisons or arsenals, or who will care to be coppers or soldiers or hangmen?

Other Fellow.- -

You Juggins! No. The rich people can't do all that! Why they want all their time for the Turf, and clubs, and big

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"receptions," and "little" dinners, etc., etc., etc. The prison-builders, and bullet and bomb makers, gallows-men, soldiers and bobbies are all poor devils like you and me! The rich folk carry out their law against the poor with the help of the poor. If our sort didn't do it for them, and bully our own sort in favour of the big bugs, then it wouldn't get done at all, because it couldn't.

Dunce.- -

Then being poor seems to make men do whatever rich folk want done; even if it is to injure themselves and to help kill one another.

Other Fellow.- -

Yes: being poor means being governed, body and soul. Being rich means governing.

Dunce.- -

Govern? that's another new word.

Other Fellow.- -

Same as law. That is to say, Government is a trick in two moves: First move, make your will "law"; second move, injure people who disobey your will, that is who "break" your law.

Dunce

(indignantly).- -

And, top of all this, you mean to tell me the people who are wise not to laugh at the officers, spoil the arsenals, make a bonfire of law-papers and title-deeds, and-

Other Fellow.- -

For Peace and Quiet's sake stop that nonsense. Why, it's tru-- it's Anar--, at any rate it's revo-- I mean it's downright unconstitutional to talk that way! It is quite constitutional to lock men up for less than that sometimes.

Dunce (after reflection).- -

Well, I've got an idea that can't be unconstitutional. Suppose all the poor people chose a little set of men like themselves to make the laws, how would the rich people get along then?

Other Fellow.- -

Come, dunce; you're getting quite a politician! And that's the very thing the rich folk more than anyone else would be glad to see you stop at, because your interests would have to lie their way then, and real change could be avoided.

Dunce.- -

How's that? Surely poor men's laws would be all fair and square; and there would be plenty of everything--bread, occupation, education, and liberty,--for everyone then, and no money to hitch the wheels with.

Other Fellow.- -

Poor men's laws! Ha! ha! Poor men don't need laws to make them able to dig and plant, or build machines and houses, or make roads, or steer ships, or take notice and learn things, and think. They can do all that as easily as bees can make a honeycomb and fill it, directly you sweep all the legal money-rubbish out of the way, and let them get at the land, and at the machinery they have already made. It is only par-

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asites that can't get hold of what they want any way except by turning the workers' honey into money, and then wiping it into their own pockets by the great law-trick.

Dunce.- -

Well, but poor men in the talking-shop might talk their wills into law, mightn't they? And make it illegal for anyone to live an other people's cost.

Other Fellow.- -

No: poor men are not patent men, warranted to keep square where it is cheaper to turn round. They are just like other men so far as that goes, and once inside the "gas-house" their first job is to stop there, and get themselves made into rich men if they can. Their "honorable" position makes them change their tastes to fit the present system and their memories get hazy about their mates in the street. And it soon dawns upon them that in order to run any laws at all with reference to a class that the laws don't suit, it is needful to do more than talk and report and tie knots in red tape. They must have the disposal of Tyranny's tricolor!

Dunce.- -

Eh? What's that?

Other Fellow.- -

Tyranny's three colors, I say, Red, Black, and Blue;--Soldiers, Priests and Policemen. If they have truncheons, cordite, and hell-fire to drive their laws home with, well and good. But law, without

these little aids, ends in gas, and looks silly. And these three implements cost money, don't you see? How are law-makers to expect to get the business folks' money to pay for brute force and clerical cunning, when it is to oppose business and riches by it?

Dunce.- -

Why, by taxes. I didn't know what law was till you told me, but the tax-collector told me the law could force me to pay my taxes, and had a right to the money to keep up the Royal Family, and the Army, and the Church, and God knows what. But if we had the government we could force the rich people to pay for things we care about, couldn't we?--Education, and Science, and Art, and beautiful smooth roads and railways, and electric locomotion, and miles of splendid gardens and free parks. Oh, my!

Other Fellow.- -

How you do gallop on. It is all wrong. Governments can only get money into their hands by taxing folks who have money. And more and more people would be short of money, to pay government or anyone else, if business got shaky or trade came to a standstill. And business and trade would get shaky directly people with a little money stopped a trick called "investing." And they would stop investing if Govern-

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ment couldn't be trusted to back up business for them, and to leave the control of the land and other capital just where it is. No, no, dunce. Even if it were any good to anyone to have this or that set or class of men forcing their notions on all the rest, there would still be no chance of getting government worked by our sort in our behalf. No need to waste time and energy that way. Everything that really wants doing by arrangements made directly among those able and willing to do it, without any formalities forced on them (with fines attached) by men at a distance not directly concerned in it. Red tape is expensive, mind you, besides tangling everybody's fingers.

Dunce.- -

Then what earthly reason have the people for not joining together and getting whatever there's enough material and machinery for, without bothering about the law? What is there to stop the poor policemen and soldiers from helping the people to employ themselves without orders from officers. What earthly reason- -

Other Fellow.- -

Look here! You forget the Church. There's no earthly reason, but there's an unearthly one. The priests and parsons who live at the people's cost, like the rest of the business world. They don't produce any wealth but they are allowed by the law to use up a good deal in exchange for the service they do the Royalties and Law-and-War-makers, Bankers and Stockbrokers, Pleasure-seekers and loafing Landgrabbers. Their job is to keep the people's minds dull and quiet, so that they should not make awkward inquiries, and find out how the whole swindle began and what it's kept going for. They chloroform the people's wits.

Dunce.- -

That's a bit! How can they chloroform anyone who doesn't choose?

Other Fellow.- -

Why, by telling them corrupting lies about wrongs and rights, and making out there's a dreadful curse on people who don't believe what parsons and priests say, and by keeping them so ignorant that they have no chance of discovering where the lies come in. These lovers of darkness have the decency to dress up in black; it is about the only honest thing they do. They cadge for money to run their music, illuminations, scents, millinery, and entertainments in church--bait for women and children' and, bock of it all, their job is to steal a march on straightforward progress,so as to keep the game as long as possible in the hands of those classes whose interests it is to run churches. They are after their own grub in the only way they

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know. It is a very respectable way of lying, cheating and tyrannising. In this free country these black ones are all the sons of gentiles and nobles and highly-respectable commercials.

Dunce.- -

Still I don't see how they can tie the hands of the people and prevent soldiers and police from joining them in trying for freedom.

Other Fellow.- -

Tie their hands? no. They know a trick worth two of that. They tie their consciences while they are young. They are funks about argument with men, but by flattering and baiting the women they get the children trusted to them in the schools of ignorance, because the little creatures are so defenceless against lies, that the best of them can be made to grow up with just that shaped conscience that it suits law and property for wage-slaves to have. When the people find out what the Church is after, then there's hope for the people. Not before.

Dunce.- -

Well, your information has made me feel sure of one thing. Law is only a fine word for coarse, cruel force wrapped up in fraud and cunning. And its only use is to keep up property and to keep rich people easy and unopposed. It is a big infernal swindle!

Other Fellow.- -

Agreed, old man. It is not Power but Freedom we want. You are a dunce, and I am a fool; but I think it would puzzle a philosopher to prove we were wrong.

PLAYED OUT.

Too long have been played
Moral tricks of mere trade,
They've brought us well-nigh to perdition;
For trade as a saviour
Of human behaviour
Is placed in a d-----d false position.

The base of sound moral
Leaves room for no quarrel,
But binds every life to its brothers;
While the meaning of trade
Is--"Sell! Sell!--till you're 'made.'
"Get power, Number One; hang the others!"

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HOW IT'S DONE.

"How shall I fill this church of mine
"On which my power depends?"--
"Say what old Mammon wants to hear,
"And he will help your ends."

"How shall I win an echoing name,
"As one too just to sin?"--
"Why, own a 'Daily,' sweat your staff,
"And puff yourself therein."

"But how to get the paper read?"--
The tradesman swift replies:
"Just advertise my shoddy, sir,
"And then I'll buy your lies."

"How shall I make my son a lord?"
Sighs yonder man of beer.
One who has done it tips the wink,
And whispers in his ear--

"Run your own venture on the cheap,
"And flatter those you sweat;
"Give moral reasons everywhere,
"And keep what of you get."

"How shall I get my weary wife
"An hour of needed rest?
"How shall I feed the little child
"That's starving at her breast?"

"Disguise your principles, my man,
"Accept a priest's advice,
"And sell your soul, to feed your child,
"At labour's lowest price."

"How shall I get our daughter wed?"
Cries Dives to his wife--
The answer was so infamous
I ran for my dear life.

Page 14

THE ANATHEMASIAN CREED.

Whosoever will be damned, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Capitalistic Faith.
Which Faith except everyone do keep whole and unqualified, without doubt he shall progress indefinitely.

And the Capitalistic Faith is this: that we worship one Mammon in Trinity and Trinity in Unity.

Neither confounding the monopolies nor dividing the substance (especially not dividing the substance).

For there is one monopoly of the Money-Bag, another of the Statute, and another of the Holy Church.

But the Mammon of the Money-Bag, of the Statute, and of the Holy Church is all one; the vainglory equal, the majesty co-infernal.

Such as the Money-Bag is, such is the Statute, and such is the Holy Church.

The Money-Bag indiscriminate, the Statute indiscriminate, and the Holy Church indiscriminate.

The Money-Bag indefensible, the Statute indefensible, and the Holy Church indefensible.

The Money-Bag infernal, the Statute infernal, and the Holy Church infernal.

And yet they are not three infernals but one infernal.

As also there are not three indefensibles, nor three undiscriminated, but one undiscriminated and one indefensible.

And yet there are not three Almighty's but one Almighty.

So is the Money-bag a god, the Statute a god, and the Holy Church a god.

And yet there are not three gods, but one god.

Likewise the Money-bag is Law, the Statute is Law, and the Holy Church is Law.

And yet not three Laws, but one Law.

For like as we are compelled by the Capitalistic Verity to acknowledge every privileged personage by himself to be God and Law.

So are we forbidden by the Capitalistic superstition to say there be three Gods, or three Laws.

The Money-Bag is made of none, neither needed nor earned.

The Statute is of the Money-Bag alone, not earned nor needed, but purchased.

The Holy Church is of the Money-Bag and the Statute, neither earned nor needed nor purchased, but resulting.

So there is one Mammon, not three Mammons; one Statute, not three Statutes; one Holy Church, not three Holy Churches.

And in this Trinity none is afore or after the other, none is greater or less than another.

But the whole three Jingoos are co-infernal together and co-equal.

So that in all things as is aforesaid the Unity in Trinity and the Trinity in Unity is to be worshipped.

This is the Capitalistic Faith, which except a man believe faithfully he may possibly be saved.

Glory be taken from the Money-Bag, and from the Statute, and from the Holy Church.

As it was in the beginning so it isn't now, nor ever will be again. Progress without end. Amen.

Page 15

WHO MADE THE CAKE?

"In the sweat of your brows," the rich man said, "ye who are useful shall eat your bread. In the sweat of your brows, too--don't mistake--we pastors and masters will live on cake." Year in, year out, the sweating was done; they toiled in the factory, toiled in the sun; for the master still left them a daily crust, and the pastor still preached that the text was just. Year in, year out, grew the pile of laws; this point grew weightier, clause by clause, "To him that holdeth shall more be given; from him that yieldeth take all but--heaven."

The Lord said, "Sweat of the brow brings bread." It was something shrewder the landlord said:--"Out of their sweat-won bread we'll draw cake for ourselves, and our rights by law." The parson in preaching quite left that out; the people were foolish and dull, no doubt; but landlords' hirelings have such an air when they mount in the pulpit or groan in prayer. They have lived on the fat of the land, you see, by letting the will of the landlord be, and by urging the winners of daily bread to bow to God's will in all they said.

Well, a new day dawned, and the people awoke, and found it was only old Mammon who spoke; they examined the swindle that held them fast, and got to the back of the trick at last. The sweat of the patient, toil-worn brow, buys more than the vouched-for bread by now. Surely, O world, there's a sad mistake, for where are the people who made the cake? How are they cared for, how are they fed? Care-worn and bound with their crust of bread; while the folk whom they feed make a law, you see, to keep themselves leisurely, merry, and free.

Men of the factory! men of the field! you who have won all this plentiful yield, cry to the world for your children's sake--

"Those who have made it shall taste of the cake!"

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